³1username³2LarrySanger³2name³2text_default³2version³21³2ts³2981080402³2ip³224.234.246.58³2data³2newauthor³31³3minor³30³3text³3Next we will examine the question: "Do we have any good reason to believe that God exists, or does not exist?"  I said before that answers to this question are in the affirmative or the negative, and are or should be supported by arguments, either with the conclusion that God <i>does</i> exist, or with the conclusion that God <i>does</i> <i>not</i> exist.  But there is a certain position on this question which does not involve arguments for or against the existence of God, and I want to talk a little bit about it.  I mean the view that one should simply have faith, or perhaps that faith is itself, somehow, good reason to believe in God.

The view that one should simply have faith that God exists is called <i>fideism</i>.  You may be surprised to hear that fideism is indeed studied by philosophers of religion.  But what is there to <i>study</i> about faith?  We just have it -- we have faith by the grace of God, as fideists would say -- or we don’t.  So what’s to study?  Well, two things.  First, what <i>is</i> faith?  And second, is faith <i>rational</i>?

Now a little about the first question, what is faith?  Some people are wont to say, "I take the existence of God on faith," or "Faith is my reason for believing."  I think these statements are, strictly speaking, incorrect.  Now let me explain they seem to imply that religious faith is something <i>different</i> from the belief that God exists.  But faith isn’t <i>different</i> from believing that God exists: it just <i>is</i> the belief that God exists.  Still, if I say I have <i>faith</i> that God exists, I am talking about a particular <i>kind</i> of belief in God, am I not?  It is, after all, possible to believe that God exists without having <i>faith</i> that God exists.  Right?  Suppose I say I have a battery of arguments that <i>prove</i> that God exists, and I support my belief rationally with those arguments; and I absolutely deny that I have <i>faith</i> that God exists.  I think that makes sense.  So what makes faith that God exists different from other kinds of belief that God exists?  What is faith really?

In order to answer that question I think there’s another interesting question to ask.  Is it something about the <i>belief</i> <i>itself</i> that makes faith different, or is it something about the <i>relation</i> of that belief to other things one believes?  Is it, for example, the <i>strength</i> of the belief in God that makes faith different, or is it how that belief is related to other things one believes, that makes the belief not just any belief, but <i>faith</i>?  If you think a little about it, I think you can see that it <i>isn’t</i> anything about the belief considered by itself that makes the belief faith.  It is, rather, the fact that the belief is accepted <i>without</i> <i>any</i> <i>reasons</i>.  In other words, what makes a kind of religious belief not just belief, but <i>faith</i>, is the fact that the belief is not supported by arguments, or reasons, or evidence.  Or most generally: there are no <i>other</i> beliefs that one has, which one thinks makes one’s belief that God exists <i>more</i> <i>probably</i> <i>true</i>.

So here then is the claim: If I have <i>faith</i> that God exists, then I believe that God exists, but I do not claim to have any other beliefs which make it more probably true that God exists.  Faith is belief without reasons.  Hence, fideism may be stated as the view that one ought to believe that God exists, but one should to base that belief on any other beliefs; one should, instead, accept it without any reasons at all.  At least <i>initially</i>.  There are some kinds of moderate fideism which say that one should have faith to begin with, and only then, when one’s faith is strong enough, go out in search of reasons to believe.

Now to the second question I wanted to ask about faith, namely, can faith be rational?  I think this depends on what you mean by the word "rational."  If, in order a belief to be rational, I <i>must</i> have reasons for the belief, then faith is, by definition, not rational.  And in that sense, fideism specifically recommends that one <i>not</i> be rational.  The question, then, is whether this is a very good notion about rationality.

Let me give you an example of a belief which is rational but for which you have no reasons.  Suppose you are suffering from an insistent and painful headache, and you tell me, "Geez I’ve got a splitting headache."  I say, "What are your reasons for believing that?"  You tell me, "Well, I just <i>feel</i> it."  So I demand to know what reasons you have for thinking that you feel the headache.  And so naturally you reply, "<i>Reasons</i> for thinking I <i>feel</i> the headache?  That’s ridiculous!  I have no reasons.  I just feel the pain!"  Then suppose I accuse you of being irrational.  I say, "You are believing something without reasons.  That’s irrational."  Do you think I would be correct?

Surely not.  Surely you can believe, without reasons, that you feel a headache, and be entirely rational in this belief.  In fact I would say you’d be nuts if you <i>didn’t</i> have the belief -- if, somehow, you felt a powerful headache and yet were somehow able to convince yourself that you weren’t feeling a headache.  That would, I think, be irrational.  So here’s my point: It is <i>possible</i>, in at least <i>some</i> cases (surely not in <i>all</i> cases), to be rational in a holding belief even though one has no reasons for the belief.  I think that <i>very</i> <i>many</i> beliefs require reasons in order to be rational.  But there are <i>some</i> beliefs which do <i>not</i> require reasons in order to be rational.

So is religious faith rational?  That depends on whether, indeed, reasons to believe in God <i>are</i> required for <i>that</i> belief to be rational.  Now, some recent philosophers, most prominently the American William Alston, have argued that belief in God <i>is</i> a "basic belief" -- in other words, faith can be rational even though it is not supported by reasons.  How can Alston say that?  Well, he says that some people have certain religious experiences, in which they can, as it were, perceive that God exists, or they can feel God’s presence.  And just like belief that you feel the pain, you don’t need reasons to believe that you are experiencing God’s existence when you feel his presence.  So Alston is, I think, fairly called a moderate mystic, in the sense I defined earlier.  Here’s the idea.  Suppose you think you can come into some sort of immediate contact with God -- you think you feel God’s presence.  Then the idea is that you don’t have to have <i>reasons</i> to believe that you feel God’s presence.  The belief, that you do indeed feel God’s presence, is nevertheless rational.  You have what might be called "rational faith."  That, at least roughly put, is Alston’s sort of view.

Now needless to say, if you don’t believe you have such experiences, or if you think that these experiences are just a kind of vivid imagination, then you won’t be at all impressed by Alston’s view.  And then you will maintain that, if belief in God is to be rational, it <i>must</i> be supported by reasons.  In other words, if you disagree with Alston, you will maintain that the belief in God is in that large class of beliefs which <i>do</i> require reasons in order to be rational.  That doesn’t mean that you will necessarily be an agnostic or an atheist.  You could still be a theist.  You’d simply maintain that you <i>do</i> have evidence supporting your theism, you <i>do</i> have reasons to believe that God exists.

So what if you think about all this long and hard, and you come to a conclusion.  You say to yourself, "Alston is wrong; we can’t <i>simply</i> say, without any reasons, we can feel the presence of God in nature and in our lives, and then expect to be <i>rational</i> in our belief in God.  Belief in God has to be backed up by arguments in order to be rational.  Faith, blind faith, is irrational; and so fideism recommends irrationality.  I’ll accept all that.  But see here, I don’t care about rationality.  Or rather, I want to be rational when it comes to my career, my family, and so forth; but when it comes to religious life, rationality is <i>not</i> <i>a</i> <i>virtue</i>.  So, even if faith is irrational, that doesn’t matter.  In fact, it might be a virtue to believe in God irrationally!  My very irrationality would show my devotion to God!"

There are people, including probably some people in this class, who think this way.  I won’t discuss this attitude, except to make one remark.  Namely, that it is not at all clear to me that it is possible to compartmentalize your life, so that you say that irrationality is all right in religious matters, but not in more ordinary matters.  I simply fear that if you permit yourself to be irrational in religious matters, you will also, under excitement or duress, permit yourself to be irrational in non-religious matters.

So suppose you then take an even <i>more</i> extreme view, and say, "Who cares?  I never thought rationality was important at all."  That is a view that I won’t dignify: I don’t think that <i>anyone</i> holds that view <i>really</i>.  <i>Everyone</i> cares about the rationality of <i>some</i> of their beliefs, I don’t care who you are or how strongly you deny it.  If you do deny it, I will tell you that you aren’t thinking hard enough about who you are and what your actual attitudes are, or how you live your everyday life.  So don’t go around saying that you don’t care about irrationality <i>at</i> <i>all</i>, because you most certainly do.  What I think <i>is</i> possible, though, as I said, is that you think that irrationality in <i>some</i> areas of your life, for example when it comes to religion and love and weekend activities, is OK.  And I am simply raising the question as to whether you will be able, <i>successfully</i>, to compartmentalize your attitudes this way.  Maybe you can.  Some people <i>seem</i> to be able to, anyway.

This is all just food for thought for you; as always you have the right to think whatever you like.  All right, that’s all I’m going to say about the rationality of faith.  Next what I am going to talk about are some positive reasons to believe that God exists -- in other words, <i>arguments</i> which have as their conclusion the claim, "God exists."
³3summary³3* Ch. 4, sect. 3³2tscreate³2981080402³2keepts³2981085669³2id³21001³2host³2dhcp058.246.lvcm.com³2revision³21³1username³2PhillipHankins³2name³2text_default³2version³21³2ts³2981085669³2ip³224.190.57.186³2data³2text³3<The following is a portion of LarrysText, wikification is invited> 

Next we will examine the question: "Do we have any good reason to believe that God exists, or does not exist?"  I said before that answers to this question are in the affirmative or the negative, and are or should be supported by arguments, either with the conclusion that God <i>does</i> exist, or with the conclusion that God <i>does</i> <i>not</i> exist.  But there is a certain position on this question which does not involve arguments for or against the existence of God, and I want to talk a little bit about it.  I mean the view that one should simply have faith, or perhaps that faith is itself, somehow, good reason to believe in God.

The view that one should simply have faith that God exists is called <i>fideism</i>.  You may be surprised to hear that fideism is indeed studied by philosophers of religion.  But what is there to <i>study</i> about faith?  We just have it -- we have faith by the grace of God, as fideists would say -- or we don’t.  So what’s to study?  Well, two things.  First, what <i>is</i> faith?  And second, is faith <i>rational</i>?

Now a little about the first question, what is faith?  Some people are wont to say, "I take the existence of God on faith," or "Faith is my reason for believing."  I think these statements are, strictly speaking, incorrect.  Now let me explain they seem to imply that religious faith is something <i>different</i> from the belief that God exists.  But faith isn’t <i>different</i> from believing that God exists: it just <i>is</i> the belief that God exists.  Still, if I say I have <i>faith</i> that God exists, I am talking about a particular <i>kind</i> of belief in God, am I not?  It is, after all, possible to believe that God exists without having <i>faith</i> that God exists.  Right?  Suppose I say I have a battery of arguments that <i>prove</i> that God exists, and I support my belief rationally with those arguments; and I absolutely deny that I have <i>faith</i> that God exists.  I think that makes sense.  So what makes faith that God exists different from other kinds of belief that God exists?  What is faith really?

In order to answer that question I think there’s another interesting question to ask.  Is it something about the <i>belief</i> <i>itself</i> that makes faith different, or is it something about the <i>relation</i> of that belief to other things one believes?  Is it, for example, the <i>strength</i> of the belief in God that makes faith different, or is it how that belief is related to other things one believes, that makes the belief not just any belief, but <i>faith</i>?  If you think a little about it, I think you can see that it <i>isn’t</i> anything about the belief considered by itself that makes the belief faith.  It is, rather, the fact that the belief is accepted <i>without</i> <i>any</i> <i>reasons</i>.  In other words, what makes a kind of religious belief not just belief, but <i>faith</i>, is the fact that the belief is not supported by arguments, or reasons, or evidence.  Or most generally: there are no <i>other</i> beliefs that one has, which one thinks makes one’s belief that God exists <i>more</i> <i>probably</i> <i>true</i>.

So here then is the claim: If I have <i>faith</i> that God exists, then I believe that God exists, but I do not claim to have any other beliefs which make it more probably true that God exists.  Faith is belief without reasons.  Hence, fideism may be stated as the view that one ought to believe that God exists, but one should to base that belief on any other beliefs; one should, instead, accept it without any reasons at all.  At least <i>initially</i>.  There are some kinds of moderate fideism which say that one should have faith to begin with, and only then, when one’s faith is strong enough, go out in search of reasons to believe.

Now to the second question I wanted to ask about faith, namely, can faith be rational?  I think this depends on what you mean by the word "rational."  If, in order a belief to be rational, I <i>must</i> have reasons for the belief, then faith is, by definition, not rational.  And in that sense, fideism specifically recommends that one <i>not</i> be rational.  The question, then, is whether this is a very good notion about rationality.

Let me give you an example of a belief which is rational but for which you have no reasons.  Suppose you are suffering from an insistent and painful headache, and you tell me, "Geez I’ve got a splitting headache."  I say, "What are your reasons for believing that?"  You tell me, "Well, I just <i>feel</i> it."  So I demand to know what reasons you have for thinking that you feel the headache.  And so naturally you reply, "<i>Reasons</i> for thinking I <i>feel</i> the headache?  That’s ridiculous!  I have no reasons.  I just feel the pain!"  Then suppose I accuse you of being irrational.  I say, "You are believing something without reasons.  That’s irrational."  Do you think I would be correct?

Surely not.  Surely you can believe, without reasons, that you feel a headache, and be entirely rational in this belief.  In fact I would say you’d be nuts if you <i>didn’t</i> have the belief -- if, somehow, you felt a powerful headache and yet were somehow able to convince yourself that you weren’t feeling a headache.  That would, I think, be irrational.  So here’s my point: It is <i>possible</i>, in at least <i>some</i> cases (surely not in <i>all</i> cases), to be rational in a holding belief even though one has no reasons for the belief.  I think that <i>very</i> <i>many</i> beliefs require reasons in order to be rational.  But there are <i>some</i> beliefs which do <i>not</i> require reasons in order to be rational.

So is religious faith rational?  That depends on whether, indeed, reasons to believe in God <i>are</i> required for <i>that</i> belief to be rational.  Now, some recent philosophers, most prominently the American William Alston, have argued that belief in God <i>is</i> a "basic belief" -- in other words, faith can be rational even though it is not supported by reasons.  How can Alston say that?  Well, he says that some people have certain religious experiences, in which they can, as it were, perceive that God exists, or they can feel God’s presence.  And just like belief that you feel the pain, you don’t need reasons to believe that you are experiencing God’s existence when you feel his presence.  So Alston is, I think, fairly called a moderate mystic, in the sense I defined earlier.  Here’s the idea.  Suppose you think you can come into some sort of immediate contact with God -- you think you feel God’s presence.  Then the idea is that you don’t have to have <i>reasons</i> to believe that you feel God’s presence.  The belief, that you do indeed feel God’s presence, is nevertheless rational.  You have what might be called "rational faith."  That, at least roughly put, is Alston’s sort of view.

Now needless to say, if you don’t believe you have such experiences, or if you think that these experiences are just a kind of vivid imagination, then you won’t be at all impressed by Alston’s view.  And then you will maintain that, if belief in God is to be rational, it <i>must</i> be supported by reasons.  In other words, if you disagree with Alston, you will maintain that the belief in God is in that large class of beliefs which <i>do</i> require reasons in order to be rational.  That doesn’t mean that you will necessarily be an agnostic or an atheist.  You could still be a theist.  You’d simply maintain that you <i>do</i> have evidence supporting your theism, you <i>do</i> have reasons to believe that God exists.

So what if you think about all this long and hard, and you come to a conclusion.  You say to yourself, "Alston is wrong; we can’t <i>simply</i> say, without any reasons, we can feel the presence of God in nature and in our lives, and then expect to be <i>rational</i> in our belief in God.  Belief in God has to be backed up by arguments in order to be rational.  Faith, blind faith, is irrational; and so fideism recommends irrationality.  I’ll accept all that.  But see here, I don’t care about rationality.  Or rather, I want to be rational when it comes to my career, my family, and so forth; but when it comes to religious life, rationality is <i>not</i> <i>a</i> <i>virtue</i>.  So, even if faith is irrational, that doesn’t matter.  In fact, it might be a virtue to believe in God irrationally!  My very irrationality would show my devotion to God!"

There are people, including probably some people in this class, who think this way.  I won’t discuss this attitude, except to make one remark.  Namely, that it is not at all clear to me that it is possible to compartmentalize your life, so that you say that irrationality is all right in religious matters, but not in more ordinary matters.  I simply fear that if you permit yourself to be irrational in religious matters, you will also, under excitement or duress, permit yourself to be irrational in non-religious matters.

So suppose you then take an even <i>more</i> extreme view, and say, "Who cares?  I never thought rationality was important at all."  That is a view that I won’t dignify: I don’t think that <i>anyone</i> holds that view <i>really</i>.  <i>Everyone</i> cares about the rationality of <i>some</i> of their beliefs, I don’t care who you are or how strongly you deny it.  If you do deny it, I will tell you that you aren’t thinking hard enough about who you are and what your actual attitudes are, or how you live your everyday life.  So don’t go around saying that you don’t care about irrationality <i>at</i> <i>all</i>, because you most certainly do.  What I think <i>is</i> possible, though, as I said, is that you think that irrationality in <i>some</i> areas of your life, for example when it comes to religion and love and weekend activities, is OK.  And I am simply raising the question as to whether you will be able, <i>successfully</i>, to compartmentalize your attitudes this way.  Maybe you can.  Some people <i>seem</i> to be able to, anyway.

This is all just food for thought for you; as always you have the right to think whatever you like.  All right, that’s all I’m going to say about the rationality of faith.  Next what I am going to talk about are some positive reasons to believe that God exists -- in other words, <i>arguments</i> which have as their conclusion the claim, "God exists."
³3minor³31³3newauthor³31³3summary³3*³2tscreate³2981080402³2keepts³2981421754³2id³21156³2host³2ool-18be39ba.dyn.optonline.net³2revision³22