³1username³2LarrySanger³2name³2text_default³2version³21³2ts³2981080632³2ip³224.234.246.58³2data³2newauthor³31³3minor³30³3text³3And so without further ado, let’s turn to the ontological argument.  By the time we finish talking about it, I think you’ll be able to see why it’s called "the ontological argument."  Obviously, the argument has something to do with ontology, with the study of existence.  Anyway, the following version of the argument is due to the Medieval philosopher, St. Anselm.  Here goes:

There are various kinds of so-called <i>perfections</i>.  Size, intelligence, beauty, power, benevolence, and so forth -- all these qualities we naturally regard as perfections.  And we all understand that there are various degrees of these perfections.  What is more intelligent is more perfect as regards intelligence; what is more beautiful is more perfect as regards beauty; and so forth.  Now, we have a concept of God, as that which has all perfections to the greatest degree conceivable.  Indeed, our notion of God is of something than which nothing greater, nothing more perfect, can be conceived.  If we ever conceive of some greater degree of perfection, than we previously conceived of, then we must regard God as having that greater degree.  So when we conceive of God, we conceive of something which is the greatest conceivable being.

But now just for the sake of argument, I want you to suppose two things.  Pay attention and keep these in mind.  The first supposition: we have a concept of the greatest conceivable being, God.  The second supposition: this concept of God exists <i>only</i> <i>in</i> <i>our</i> <i>minds</i>.  St. Anselm says that these two suppositions contradict each other.  How does he show that?  As follows.  Our supposition is that we have a notion of the greatest conceivable being, and that this most perfect conceivable being does not, in fact, exist in the world.  But in that case our concept of God is a concept of a being that is only imaginary; so it is not a concept of the greatest <i>conceivable</i> being -- why?  Because a being that <i>actually</i> <i>exists</i> is a greater being, more perfect, than a being that merely exists in our <i>minds</i>, of course.  Existence is a perfection, just like power, beauty, and so forth.  So if we conceive of the greatest conceivable being, we must conceive of a being <i>that</i> <i>exists</i>.  A being that didn’t exist wouldn’t be the <i>greatest</i> conceivable being.  So the second supposition, that the concept of God exists <i>only</i> <i>in</i> <i>our</i> <i>minds</i>, contradicts the first supposition, that we have a concept of God.  Hence, if we have a concept of God, then God necessarily exists.  And we do have a concept of God.  Therefore, God necessarily exists.

Now, there are a lot of things that we could be, and have been, said about this argument.  I’m just going to focus in on a few.  The basic trouble seems to be that we have, it appears, simply <i>conceived</i> <i>God</i> <i>into</i> <i>existence</i>.  Surely it’s very strange to think that all we have to do is to conceive of God as existing, and it follows from that alone that we have good reason to believe that God exists.  But let’s not jump the gun here; I’m going to present three traditional objections and then present another one of my own.

One traditional criticism of the argument is that existence is not a perfection, because existence is not a <i>property</i>.  If existence were a property of items, including God, then it might be a perfection.  But since it’s not a property, it cannot be a perfection; only properties of things can be perfections of things.  Now, we have previously encountered this notion, that existence is not a property, in our discussion of metaphysics.  I rather doubt that this view is correct.  There are better objections to be made, then, that do not depend on dubious presuppositions like this.

So a second traditional criticism is to say that, even if existence is a property, it is nonetheless <i>still</i> not a perfection.  Either something exists or it doesn’t; there aren’t any <i>degrees</i> of existence.  Something can’t be <i>more</i> <i>or</i> <i>less</i> existent.  So that’s a reason to think that existence isn’t a perfection.  But to this St. Anselm might reply that, even granted that there aren’t degrees of existence, surely existence <i>is</i> more perfect than nonexistence; and in any case, something that exists is <i>greater</i> than something that doesn’t.  That is certainly plausible.  So let us look for more objections.

So here’s a third, famous objection to the ontological argument, raised by Anselm’s contemporary, Gaunilo.  Gaunilo invited us to think of the greatest, or most perfect, conceivable island; I don’t know what would make the island perfect, but say it’s sunny, green, great beaches, skiing in the hills, who knows.  No such island exists, right?  But in that case we aren’t thinking of the <i>greatest</i> conceivable island, because the <i>greatest</i> conceivable island would <i>exist</i>, as well as having all those other desirable properties.  Since we can conceive of this greatest or most perfect conceivable island, then it must exist.

Of course, this is a silly argument.  But, Gaunilo says, this argument no worse than Anselm’s.  In the same way, you could, if you wanted to, "prove" the existence of the most perfect hamburger, the most perfect dumpster, or the most perfect toilet.  That’s absurd!  But Anselm’s argument isn’t any worse than these.  So Anselm’s argument isn’t any good either.

I’m going to offer a fourth objection, an objection of my own.  For the sake of simplicity, I’m going to restate the argument.  It would take me too long, and it would be too hard to follow, for me to explain <i>why</i> I think my restatement is equivalent to St. Anselm’s original argument.  So you’re just going to have to trust me that it is the same as Anselm’s original.  So here goes:



1. Suppose, just for the sake of argument, that the greatest conceivable being (call it B1) exists only in the mind.

2. But we can conceive of a being (call it B2) that is <i>greater</i> than any being that exists only in the mind.

3. So, we can conceive of a being (namely, B2) that is greater than B1 (since we are supposing that B1 exists only in the mind).

4. But then we can conceive of a being that is greater <i>than</i> <i>the</i> <i>greatest</i> <i>conceivable</i> <i>being</i> (B1) which is a contradiction.

5. Therefore, our supposition in (1) is wrong; the greatest conceivable being <i>really</i> exists, and not only in the mind.

That’s the argument.  Here’s my criticism: I think that (4) does not follow from (3).  I fully admit premise (3).  Yes, since we are supposing that B1 exists only in the mind, we can conceive of a being (namely, B2) that is greater than B1.  In other words, we can imagine that that being, God, which, as we suppose in premise (1), exists only in the mind, did not <i>only</i> exist in the mind, but also in reality.  Sure, we can imagine that.  But <i>that</i> <i>doesn’t</i> <i>mean</i> that we can conceive of a being that is greater than the greatest conceivable being!  Why would St. Anselm think that that follows?

Well, according to (3), we can conceive of a being that is greater than B1; and B1, remember, is <i>the</i> <i>greatest</i> <i>conceivable</i> <i>being</i>.  So naturally you’d think that (3) entails (4), that we can conceive of a being that is greater than <i>the</i> <i>greatest</i> <i>conceivable</i> <i>being</i>.  But B1 isn’t <i>the</i> <i>greatest</i> <i>conceivable</i> <i>being</i>, itself; B1 is a <i>concept</i> of the greatest conceivable being.  It’s an <i>idea</i> <i>we</i> <i>have</i> of the greatest conceivable being.

Why do I say that?  Look at premise (1) again.  It says: "Suppose, just for the sake of argument, that the greatest conceivable being (call it B1) exists only in the mind."  (Anselm’s phrase is: "Exists in the understanding alone.")  Now what is this thing, B1, which we say exists only in the mind?  <i>What</i> <i>is</i> it?  Is it <i>the</i> <i>greatest</i> <i>conceivable</i> <i>being</i>, itself, or is it, more <i>precisely</i> stated, <i>a</i> <i>concept</i> of the greatest conceivable being?  Clearly, it’s only the <i>concept</i> that can exist in the mind.  We would never admit that the greatest conceivable being <i>itself</i> might somehow exist only in our minds.  That wouldn’t make any sense!  In other words, when we say that the greatest conceivable being exists "in the mind," or "in the understanding alone," we just mean that we have a concept of the greatest conceivable being.  And then we use the words "greatest conceivable being" as short for "<i>concept</i> <i>of</i> the greatest conceivable being."  Make sense?

So here’s my criticism summed up.  St. Anselm’s argument, as I presented it, claims, in premise (3), that we can conceive of a being that is greater than B1.  But B1 is just a <i>concept</i>; even if it is the concept of the greatest conceivable being, it’s nonetheless still a concept.  And so of course we can conceive of lots of things greater than that <i>concept</i>.  But premise (4) doesn’t follow from <i>any</i> of the foregoing -- it just doesn’t follow that I can conceive of something greater than the greatest conceivable being.  All that follows is that I can conceive of something greater than <i>my</i> <i>concept</i> of the greatest conceivable being.  Which is no big surprise!

There are other versions of the ontological argument besides St. Anselm’s.  So maybe one of those other versions would do better.
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