³1username³2LarrySanger³2name³2text_default³2version³21³2ts³2981081868³2ip³224.234.246.58³2data³2newauthor³31³3minor³30³3text³3Last time we talked about various theories of truth.  You’ll remember that we started by rejecting the view that truth is just the same as belief.  It is bound to seem pretty obvious that <i>some</i> of the things that you believe are false, unless you remain an unreformed relativist, of a sort that <i>I</i> and <i>most</i> philosophers think is rather naïve.  Some of the things you now believe, and have believed, and will believe, are true, and some are false.  No one bats 1.000 when it comes to having the truth.

And there are some matters in life where it’s very difficult to know <i>whether</i> one’s belief <i>really</i> is true.  Philosophy is surely the best example.  You have, probably, lots of philosophical beliefs.  But if you’ve been paying attention at all so far, at the very least one thing has at some point struck you -- namely, that it’s very difficult indeed to <i>know</i>, without a doubt, that your philosophical beliefs are correct.  For any theory on any topic you might advance, you’ll be faced with a bunch of objections; and if you think you can reply to all the objections, you will be presupposing a lot of <i>other</i> philosophical views, each of which has some objections to <i>it</i>; and so on.

So you might very well wonder: <i>What</i> <i>do</i> <i>I</i> <i>have</i> <i>to</i> <i>do</i>, to be sure that I <i>do</i> have the truth?  <i>How</i> can I be sure that my beliefs are true?  Is there some sort of guarantee available to me -- some sort of criterion I might use, in order to decide, as rationally and as carefully as I possibly could, that indeed what I believe <i>is</i> true?

Suppose you thought your belief had been arrived at <i>rationally</i>.  You used logic, you based your belief on observation and experiment, you conscientiously answered objections, and so forth.  So you conclude that your belief is rational.  Well if so, then your belief has <i>at</i> <i>least</i> <i>some</i> claim to be true.  Rationality is a indicator of truth: if your belief is rational, then it is at least <i>probably</i> true.  At the very least, the rationality of a belief is <i>reason</i> <i>to</i> <i>think</i> <i>the</i> <i>belief</i> <i>is</i> <i>true</i>.

Now, there are a number of features of beliefs, such as rationality, justification, and probability, that are indicators of truth.  So let’s define a general term:

A feature of belief is an <i>epistemic</i> feature iff it is at least <i>some</i> indication that the belief is true.

Many of our beliefs do, I think, have lots of positive epistemic features; many of our beliefs are quite rational, quite justified, very probably true, highly warranted, and so on.  But most of us, I think, at least in some moments, don’t want to rest content with just being <i>rational</i>.  We don’t want to have a rational belief that is, unfortunately, false.  Because that’s possible, right?  I can be very conscious, careful, and logical in forming a belief, and so be rational in holding the belief; but it still might be false.  So rationality isn’t our ultimate ambition that we have for our beliefs.

Our ultimate ambition for our beliefs is <i>knowledge</i>.  Because if I <i>do</i> know something, then not only am I justified, or rational, in a belief; because I have <i>knowledge</i>, I have the truth.  So naturally, when we are thinking about the epistemic features of our beliefs, the big question is this: <i>When</i> do I have knowledge?  <i>When</i> can I say that I have it?  As I’m sure you are aware, there are some people who claim that we <i>can’t</i> have knowledge; such people are called <i>skeptics</i>.  More on that, of course, later.

Now I can describe to you the field of <i>epistemology</i>, which is also called the <i>theory</i> <i>of</i> <i>knowledge</i>. Here is a definition:

<i>Epistemology</i> includes the study of (1) what the epistemic features of belief, such as justification and rationality, each are (e.g., what justified belief is); (2) the origin or sources of such features (and thus the sources of knowledge); (3) what knowledge is, i.e., what epistemic features would make a true belief knowledge; (4) whether it is <i>possible</i> to have knowledge.

So, first, epistemologists spend a great deal of time concerning themselves with various epistemic features of belief, such as justification and rationality.  And they write long articles and books trying to say just when beliefs are justified, or rational.

A second, related concern is <i>where</i> such epistemic features ultimately come from.  If I say, for example, that my belief that Paris is the capital of France is justified, I can ask: Where did the justification for my belief come from?  Probably at some point some reliable source told me that Paris is the capital of France; and that was enough to make me <i>justified</i> in adopting the belief.  OK, then <i>one</i>, but <i>only</i> one, source of justification would be <i>testimony</i>, which is just a fancy word for what other people tell me.  Another source of justification would be sense-perception.  So epistemology asks: What are the ultimate sources of justification, rationality, or other epistemic features of belief?  And that allows to answer a further question: What are the ultimate sources of <i>knowledge</i>?

Which brings us to the third topic studied by epistemologists, namely, what knowledge is.  The question here isn’t what we <i>can</i> know, or even what we <i>do</i> know.  The question is: What would knowledge be, if we had it?  A belief has to pass some sort of muster if it’s to count as knowledge.  So what features would a belief have to have, in order to be an actual piece of knowledge -- not just something that pretends to be knowledge, but which is <i>actually</i> knowledge?

Then, fourth, there is one of the more difficult topics of philosophy -- trying to answer, or otherwise deal with, the challenge that we <i>cannot</i> have knowledge.  A number of philosophers -- not too many, but some -- have said that we cannot have knowledge.  A <i>lot</i> of philosophers have said that it’s very <i>difficult</i> to obtain knowledge; but they don’t deny that we have it, or that we <i>can</i> have it.  Not so many philosophers, however, have gone so far as to say that we have no knowledge at all, or (to say something even stronger) that it is <i>impossible</i> to have knowledge.
³3summary³3* Ch. 7, sect. 1³2tscreate³2981081868³2keepts³2981081924³2id³21001³2host³2dhcp058.246.lvcm.com³2revision³21³1username³2LarrySanger³2name³2text_default³2version³21³2ts³2981081924³2ip³224.234.246.58³2data³2text³3See also TheoryOfJustification; TheRegressArgumentInEpistemology; 

Last time we talked about various theories of truth.  You’ll remember that we started by rejecting the view that truth is just the same as belief.  It is bound to seem pretty obvious that <i>some</i> of the things that you believe are false, unless you remain an unreformed relativist, of a sort that <i>I</i> and <i>most</i> philosophers think is rather naïve.  Some of the things you now believe, and have believed, and will believe, are true, and some are false.  No one bats 1.000 when it comes to having the truth.

And there are some matters in life where it’s very difficult to know <i>whether</i> one’s belief <i>really</i> is true.  Philosophy is surely the best example.  You have, probably, lots of philosophical beliefs.  But if you’ve been paying attention at all so far, at the very least one thing has at some point struck you -- namely, that it’s very difficult indeed to <i>know</i>, without a doubt, that your philosophical beliefs are correct.  For any theory on any topic you might advance, you’ll be faced with a bunch of objections; and if you think you can reply to all the objections, you will be presupposing a lot of <i>other</i> philosophical views, each of which has some objections to <i>it</i>; and so on.

So you might very well wonder: <i>What</i> <i>do</i> <i>I</i> <i>have</i> <i>to</i> <i>do</i>, to be sure that I <i>do</i> have the truth?  <i>How</i> can I be sure that my beliefs are true?  Is there some sort of guarantee available to me -- some sort of criterion I might use, in order to decide, as rationally and as carefully as I possibly could, that indeed what I believe <i>is</i> true?

Suppose you thought your belief had been arrived at <i>rationally</i>.  You used logic, you based your belief on observation and experiment, you conscientiously answered objections, and so forth.  So you conclude that your belief is rational.  Well if so, then your belief has <i>at</i> <i>least</i> <i>some</i> claim to be true.  Rationality is a indicator of truth: if your belief is rational, then it is at least <i>probably</i> true.  At the very least, the rationality of a belief is <i>reason</i> <i>to</i> <i>think</i> <i>the</i> <i>belief</i> <i>is</i> <i>true</i>.

Now, there are a number of features of beliefs, such as rationality, justification, and probability, that are indicators of truth.  So let’s define a general term:

A feature of belief is an <i>epistemic</i> feature iff it is at least <i>some</i> indication that the belief is true.

Many of our beliefs do, I think, have lots of positive epistemic features; many of our beliefs are quite rational, quite justified, very probably true, highly warranted, and so on.  But most of us, I think, at least in some moments, don’t want to rest content with just being <i>rational</i>.  We don’t want to have a rational belief that is, unfortunately, false.  Because that’s possible, right?  I can be very conscious, careful, and logical in forming a belief, and so be rational in holding the belief; but it still might be false.  So rationality isn’t our ultimate ambition that we have for our beliefs.

Our ultimate ambition for our beliefs is <i>knowledge</i>.  Because if I <i>do</i> know something, then not only am I justified, or rational, in a belief; because I have <i>knowledge</i>, I have the truth.  So naturally, when we are thinking about the epistemic features of our beliefs, the big question is this: <i>When</i> do I have knowledge?  <i>When</i> can I say that I have it?  As I’m sure you are aware, there are some people who claim that we <i>can’t</i> have knowledge; such people are called <i>skeptics</i>.  More on that, of course, later.

Now I can describe to you the field of <i>epistemology</i>, which is also called the <i>theory</i> <i>of</i> <i>knowledge</i>. Here is a definition:

<i>Epistemology</i> includes the study of (1) what the epistemic features of belief, such as justification and rationality, each are (e.g., what justified belief is); (2) the origin or sources of such features (and thus the sources of knowledge); (3) what knowledge is, i.e., what epistemic features would make a true belief knowledge; (4) whether it is <i>possible</i> to have knowledge.

So, first, epistemologists spend a great deal of time concerning themselves with various epistemic features of belief, such as justification and rationality.  And they write long articles and books trying to say just when beliefs are justified, or rational.

A second, related concern is <i>where</i> such epistemic features ultimately come from.  If I say, for example, that my belief that Paris is the capital of France is justified, I can ask: Where did the justification for my belief come from?  Probably at some point some reliable source told me that Paris is the capital of France; and that was enough to make me <i>justified</i> in adopting the belief.  OK, then <i>one</i>, but <i>only</i> one, source of justification would be <i>testimony</i>, which is just a fancy word for what other people tell me.  Another source of justification would be sense-perception.  So epistemology asks: What are the ultimate sources of justification, rationality, or other epistemic features of belief?  And that allows to answer a further question: What are the ultimate sources of <i>knowledge</i>?

Which brings us to the third topic studied by epistemologists, namely, what knowledge is.  The question here isn’t what we <i>can</i> know, or even what we <i>do</i> know.  The question is: What would knowledge be, if we had it?  A belief has to pass some sort of muster if it’s to count as knowledge.  So what features would a belief have to have, in order to be an actual piece of knowledge -- not just something that pretends to be knowledge, but which is <i>actually</i> knowledge?

Then, fourth, there is one of the more difficult topics of philosophy -- trying to answer, or otherwise deal with, the challenge that we <i>cannot</i> have knowledge.  A number of philosophers -- not too many, but some -- have said that we cannot have knowledge.  A <i>lot</i> of philosophers have said that it’s very <i>difficult</i> to obtain knowledge; but they don’t deny that we have it, or that we <i>can</i> have it.  Not so many philosophers, however, have gone so far as to say that we have no knowledge at all, or (to say something even stronger) that it is <i>impossible</i> to have knowledge.
³3minor³30³3newauthor³30³3summary³3* Ch. 7, sect. 1³2tscreate³2981081868³2keepts³2981082029³2id³21001³2host³2dhcp058.246.lvcm.com³2revision³22³1username³2LarrySanger³2name³2text_default³2version³21³2ts³2981082029³2ip³224.234.246.58³2data³2newauthor³30³3minor³30³3text³3See also TheoryOfJustification; TheRegressArgumentInEpistemology; APrioriAndAPosteriorKnowledge

Last time we talked about various theories of truth.  You’ll remember that we started by rejecting the view that truth is just the same as belief.  It is bound to seem pretty obvious that <i>some</i> of the things that you believe are false, unless you remain an unreformed relativist, of a sort that <i>I</i> and <i>most</i> philosophers think is rather naïve.  Some of the things you now believe, and have believed, and will believe, are true, and some are false.  No one bats 1.000 when it comes to having the truth.

And there are some matters in life where it’s very difficult to know <i>whether</i> one’s belief <i>really</i> is true.  Philosophy is surely the best example.  You have, probably, lots of philosophical beliefs.  But if you’ve been paying attention at all so far, at the very least one thing has at some point struck you -- namely, that it’s very difficult indeed to <i>know</i>, without a doubt, that your philosophical beliefs are correct.  For any theory on any topic you might advance, you’ll be faced with a bunch of objections; and if you think you can reply to all the objections, you will be presupposing a lot of <i>other</i> philosophical views, each of which has some objections to <i>it</i>; and so on.

So you might very well wonder: <i>What</i> <i>do</i> <i>I</i> <i>have</i> <i>to</i> <i>do</i>, to be sure that I <i>do</i> have the truth?  <i>How</i> can I be sure that my beliefs are true?  Is there some sort of guarantee available to me -- some sort of criterion I might use, in order to decide, as rationally and as carefully as I possibly could, that indeed what I believe <i>is</i> true?

Suppose you thought your belief had been arrived at <i>rationally</i>.  You used logic, you based your belief on observation and experiment, you conscientiously answered objections, and so forth.  So you conclude that your belief is rational.  Well if so, then your belief has <i>at</i> <i>least</i> <i>some</i> claim to be true.  Rationality is a indicator of truth: if your belief is rational, then it is at least <i>probably</i> true.  At the very least, the rationality of a belief is <i>reason</i> <i>to</i> <i>think</i> <i>the</i> <i>belief</i> <i>is</i> <i>true</i>.

Now, there are a number of features of beliefs, such as rationality, justification, and probability, that are indicators of truth.  So let’s define a general term:

A feature of belief is an <i>epistemic</i> feature iff it is at least <i>some</i> indication that the belief is true.

Many of our beliefs do, I think, have lots of positive epistemic features; many of our beliefs are quite rational, quite justified, very probably true, highly warranted, and so on.  But most of us, I think, at least in some moments, don’t want to rest content with just being <i>rational</i>.  We don’t want to have a rational belief that is, unfortunately, false.  Because that’s possible, right?  I can be very conscious, careful, and logical in forming a belief, and so be rational in holding the belief; but it still might be false.  So rationality isn’t our ultimate ambition that we have for our beliefs.

Our ultimate ambition for our beliefs is <i>knowledge</i>.  Because if I <i>do</i> know something, then not only am I justified, or rational, in a belief; because I have <i>knowledge</i>, I have the truth.  So naturally, when we are thinking about the epistemic features of our beliefs, the big question is this: <i>When</i> do I have knowledge?  <i>When</i> can I say that I have it?  As I’m sure you are aware, there are some people who claim that we <i>can’t</i> have knowledge; such people are called <i>skeptics</i>.  More on that, of course, later.

Now I can describe to you the field of <i>epistemology</i>, which is also called the <i>theory</i> <i>of</i> <i>knowledge</i>. Here is a definition:

<i>Epistemology</i> includes the study of (1) what the epistemic features of belief, such as justification and rationality, each are (e.g., what justified belief is); (2) the origin or sources of such features (and thus the sources of knowledge); (3) what knowledge is, i.e., what epistemic features would make a true belief knowledge; (4) whether it is <i>possible</i> to have knowledge.

So, first, epistemologists spend a great deal of time concerning themselves with various epistemic features of belief, such as justification and rationality.  And they write long articles and books trying to say just when beliefs are justified, or rational.

A second, related concern is <i>where</i> such epistemic features ultimately come from.  If I say, for example, that my belief that Paris is the capital of France is justified, I can ask: Where did the justification for my belief come from?  Probably at some point some reliable source told me that Paris is the capital of France; and that was enough to make me <i>justified</i> in adopting the belief.  OK, then <i>one</i>, but <i>only</i> one, source of justification would be <i>testimony</i>, which is just a fancy word for what other people tell me.  Another source of justification would be sense-perception.  So epistemology asks: What are the ultimate sources of justification, rationality, or other epistemic features of belief?  And that allows to answer a further question: What are the ultimate sources of <i>knowledge</i>?

Which brings us to the third topic studied by epistemologists, namely, what knowledge is.  The question here isn’t what we <i>can</i> know, or even what we <i>do</i> know.  The question is: What would knowledge be, if we had it?  A belief has to pass some sort of muster if it’s to count as knowledge.  So what features would a belief have to have, in order to be an actual piece of knowledge -- not just something that pretends to be knowledge, but which is <i>actually</i> knowledge?

Then, fourth, there is one of the more difficult topics of philosophy -- trying to answer, or otherwise deal with, the challenge that we <i>cannot</i> have knowledge.  A number of philosophers -- not too many, but some -- have said that we cannot have knowledge.  A <i>lot</i> of philosophers have said that it’s very <i>difficult</i> to obtain knowledge; but they don’t deny that we have it, or that we <i>can</i> have it.  Not so many philosophers, however, have gone so far as to say that we have no knowledge at all, or (to say something even stronger) that it is <i>impossible</i> to have knowledge.
³3summary³3* Ch. 7, sect. 1³2tscreate³2981081868³2keepts³2981082088³2id³21001³2host³2dhcp058.246.lvcm.com³2revision³23³1username³2LarrySanger³2name³2text_default³2version³21³2ts³2981082088³2ip³224.234.246.58³2data³2text³3See also TheoryOfJustification; TheRegressArgumentInEpistemology; APrioriAndAPosteriorKnowledge; KnowLedge

Last time we talked about various theories of truth.  You’ll remember that we started by rejecting the view that truth is just the same as belief.  It is bound to seem pretty obvious that <i>some</i> of the things that you believe are false, unless you remain an unreformed relativist, of a sort that <i>I</i> and <i>most</i> philosophers think is rather naïve.  Some of the things you now believe, and have believed, and will believe, are true, and some are false.  No one bats 1.000 when it comes to having the truth.

And there are some matters in life where it’s very difficult to know <i>whether</i> one’s belief <i>really</i> is true.  Philosophy is surely the best example.  You have, probably, lots of philosophical beliefs.  But if you’ve been paying attention at all so far, at the very least one thing has at some point struck you -- namely, that it’s very difficult indeed to <i>know</i>, without a doubt, that your philosophical beliefs are correct.  For any theory on any topic you might advance, you’ll be faced with a bunch of objections; and if you think you can reply to all the objections, you will be presupposing a lot of <i>other</i> philosophical views, each of which has some objections to <i>it</i>; and so on.

So you might very well wonder: <i>What</i> <i>do</i> <i>I</i> <i>have</i> <i>to</i> <i>do</i>, to be sure that I <i>do</i> have the truth?  <i>How</i> can I be sure that my beliefs are true?  Is there some sort of guarantee available to me -- some sort of criterion I might use, in order to decide, as rationally and as carefully as I possibly could, that indeed what I believe <i>is</i> true?

Suppose you thought your belief had been arrived at <i>rationally</i>.  You used logic, you based your belief on observation and experiment, you conscientiously answered objections, and so forth.  So you conclude that your belief is rational.  Well if so, then your belief has <i>at</i> <i>least</i> <i>some</i> claim to be true.  Rationality is a indicator of truth: if your belief is rational, then it is at least <i>probably</i> true.  At the very least, the rationality of a belief is <i>reason</i> <i>to</i> <i>think</i> <i>the</i> <i>belief</i> <i>is</i> <i>true</i>.

Now, there are a number of features of beliefs, such as rationality, justification, and probability, that are indicators of truth.  So let’s define a general term:

A feature of belief is an <i>epistemic</i> feature iff it is at least <i>some</i> indication that the belief is true.

Many of our beliefs do, I think, have lots of positive epistemic features; many of our beliefs are quite rational, quite justified, very probably true, highly warranted, and so on.  But most of us, I think, at least in some moments, don’t want to rest content with just being <i>rational</i>.  We don’t want to have a rational belief that is, unfortunately, false.  Because that’s possible, right?  I can be very conscious, careful, and logical in forming a belief, and so be rational in holding the belief; but it still might be false.  So rationality isn’t our ultimate ambition that we have for our beliefs.

Our ultimate ambition for our beliefs is <i>knowledge</i>.  Because if I <i>do</i> know something, then not only am I justified, or rational, in a belief; because I have <i>knowledge</i>, I have the truth.  So naturally, when we are thinking about the epistemic features of our beliefs, the big question is this: <i>When</i> do I have knowledge?  <i>When</i> can I say that I have it?  As I’m sure you are aware, there are some people who claim that we <i>can’t</i> have knowledge; such people are called <i>skeptics</i>.  More on that, of course, later.

Now I can describe to you the field of <i>epistemology</i>, which is also called the <i>theory</i> <i>of</i> <i>knowledge</i>. Here is a definition:

<i>Epistemology</i> includes the study of (1) what the epistemic features of belief, such as justification and rationality, each are (e.g., what justified belief is); (2) the origin or sources of such features (and thus the sources of knowledge); (3) what knowledge is, i.e., what epistemic features would make a true belief knowledge; (4) whether it is <i>possible</i> to have knowledge.

So, first, epistemologists spend a great deal of time concerning themselves with various epistemic features of belief, such as justification and rationality.  And they write long articles and books trying to say just when beliefs are justified, or rational.

A second, related concern is <i>where</i> such epistemic features ultimately come from.  If I say, for example, that my belief that Paris is the capital of France is justified, I can ask: Where did the justification for my belief come from?  Probably at some point some reliable source told me that Paris is the capital of France; and that was enough to make me <i>justified</i> in adopting the belief.  OK, then <i>one</i>, but <i>only</i> one, source of justification would be <i>testimony</i>, which is just a fancy word for what other people tell me.  Another source of justification would be sense-perception.  So epistemology asks: What are the ultimate sources of justification, rationality, or other epistemic features of belief?  And that allows to answer a further question: What are the ultimate sources of <i>knowledge</i>?

Which brings us to the third topic studied by epistemologists, namely, what knowledge is.  The question here isn’t what we <i>can</i> know, or even what we <i>do</i> know.  The question is: What would knowledge be, if we had it?  A belief has to pass some sort of muster if it’s to count as knowledge.  So what features would a belief have to have, in order to be an actual piece of knowledge -- not just something that pretends to be knowledge, but which is <i>actually</i> knowledge?

Then, fourth, there is one of the more difficult topics of philosophy -- trying to answer, or otherwise deal with, the challenge that we <i>cannot</i> have knowledge.  A number of philosophers -- not too many, but some -- have said that we cannot have knowledge.  A <i>lot</i> of philosophers have said that it’s very <i>difficult</i> to obtain knowledge; but they don’t deny that we have it, or that we <i>can</i> have it.  Not so many philosophers, however, have gone so far as to say that we have no knowledge at all, or (to say something even stronger) that it is <i>impossible</i> to have knowledge.
³3minor³31³3newauthor³30³3summary³3* Ch. 7, sect. 1³2tscreate³2981081868³2keepts³2981082193³2id³21001³2host³2dhcp058.246.lvcm.com³2revision³24³1username³2LarrySanger³2name³2text_default³2version³21³2ts³2981082193³2ip³224.234.246.58³2data³2newauthor³30³3minor³31³3text³3See also TheoryOfJustification; TheRegressArgumentInEpistemology; APrioriAndAPosteriorKnowledge; KnowLedge; ScepticIsm; CommonSenseAndTheDiallelus

Last time we talked about various theories of truth.  You’ll remember that we started by rejecting the view that truth is just the same as belief.  It is bound to seem pretty obvious that <i>some</i> of the things that you believe are false, unless you remain an unreformed relativist, of a sort that <i>I</i> and <i>most</i> philosophers think is rather naïve.  Some of the things you now believe, and have believed, and will believe, are true, and some are false.  No one bats 1.000 when it comes to having the truth.

And there are some matters in life where it’s very difficult to know <i>whether</i> one’s belief <i>really</i> is true.  Philosophy is surely the best example.  You have, probably, lots of philosophical beliefs.  But if you’ve been paying attention at all so far, at the very least one thing has at some point struck you -- namely, that it’s very difficult indeed to <i>know</i>, without a doubt, that your philosophical beliefs are correct.  For any theory on any topic you might advance, you’ll be faced with a bunch of objections; and if you think you can reply to all the objections, you will be presupposing a lot of <i>other</i> philosophical views, each of which has some objections to <i>it</i>; and so on.

So you might very well wonder: <i>What</i> <i>do</i> <i>I</i> <i>have</i> <i>to</i> <i>do</i>, to be sure that I <i>do</i> have the truth?  <i>How</i> can I be sure that my beliefs are true?  Is there some sort of guarantee available to me -- some sort of criterion I might use, in order to decide, as rationally and as carefully as I possibly could, that indeed what I believe <i>is</i> true?

Suppose you thought your belief had been arrived at <i>rationally</i>.  You used logic, you based your belief on observation and experiment, you conscientiously answered objections, and so forth.  So you conclude that your belief is rational.  Well if so, then your belief has <i>at</i> <i>least</i> <i>some</i> claim to be true.  Rationality is a indicator of truth: if your belief is rational, then it is at least <i>probably</i> true.  At the very least, the rationality of a belief is <i>reason</i> <i>to</i> <i>think</i> <i>the</i> <i>belief</i> <i>is</i> <i>true</i>.

Now, there are a number of features of beliefs, such as rationality, justification, and probability, that are indicators of truth.  So let’s define a general term:

A feature of belief is an <i>epistemic</i> feature iff it is at least <i>some</i> indication that the belief is true.

Many of our beliefs do, I think, have lots of positive epistemic features; many of our beliefs are quite rational, quite justified, very probably true, highly warranted, and so on.  But most of us, I think, at least in some moments, don’t want to rest content with just being <i>rational</i>.  We don’t want to have a rational belief that is, unfortunately, false.  Because that’s possible, right?  I can be very conscious, careful, and logical in forming a belief, and so be rational in holding the belief; but it still might be false.  So rationality isn’t our ultimate ambition that we have for our beliefs.

Our ultimate ambition for our beliefs is <i>knowledge</i>.  Because if I <i>do</i> know something, then not only am I justified, or rational, in a belief; because I have <i>knowledge</i>, I have the truth.  So naturally, when we are thinking about the epistemic features of our beliefs, the big question is this: <i>When</i> do I have knowledge?  <i>When</i> can I say that I have it?  As I’m sure you are aware, there are some people who claim that we <i>can’t</i> have knowledge; such people are called <i>skeptics</i>.  More on that, of course, later.

Now I can describe to you the field of <i>epistemology</i>, which is also called the <i>theory</i> <i>of</i> <i>knowledge</i>. Here is a definition:

<i>Epistemology</i> includes the study of (1) what the epistemic features of belief, such as justification and rationality, each are (e.g., what justified belief is); (2) the origin or sources of such features (and thus the sources of knowledge); (3) what knowledge is, i.e., what epistemic features would make a true belief knowledge; (4) whether it is <i>possible</i> to have knowledge.

So, first, epistemologists spend a great deal of time concerning themselves with various epistemic features of belief, such as justification and rationality.  And they write long articles and books trying to say just when beliefs are justified, or rational.

A second, related concern is <i>where</i> such epistemic features ultimately come from.  If I say, for example, that my belief that Paris is the capital of France is justified, I can ask: Where did the justification for my belief come from?  Probably at some point some reliable source told me that Paris is the capital of France; and that was enough to make me <i>justified</i> in adopting the belief.  OK, then <i>one</i>, but <i>only</i> one, source of justification would be <i>testimony</i>, which is just a fancy word for what other people tell me.  Another source of justification would be sense-perception.  So epistemology asks: What are the ultimate sources of justification, rationality, or other epistemic features of belief?  And that allows to answer a further question: What are the ultimate sources of <i>knowledge</i>?

Which brings us to the third topic studied by epistemologists, namely, what knowledge is.  The question here isn’t what we <i>can</i> know, or even what we <i>do</i> know.  The question is: What would knowledge be, if we had it?  A belief has to pass some sort of muster if it’s to count as knowledge.  So what features would a belief have to have, in order to be an actual piece of knowledge -- not just something that pretends to be knowledge, but which is <i>actually</i> knowledge?

Then, fourth, there is one of the more difficult topics of philosophy -- trying to answer, or otherwise deal with, the challenge that we <i>cannot</i> have knowledge.  A number of philosophers -- not too many, but some -- have said that we cannot have knowledge.  A <i>lot</i> of philosophers have said that it’s very <i>difficult</i> to obtain knowledge; but they don’t deny that we have it, or that we <i>can</i> have it.  Not so many philosophers, however, have gone so far as to say that we have no knowledge at all, or (to say something even stronger) that it is <i>impossible</i> to have knowledge.
³3summary³3* Ch. 7, sect. 1³2tscreate³2981081868³2keepts³2981086071³2id³21001³2host³2dhcp058.246.lvcm.com³2revision³25