Vicipedia lfnwiki https://lfn.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paje_xef MediaWiki 1.46.0-wmf.22 first-letter Media Spesial Discute Usor Usor Discute Vicipedia Vicipedia Discute Fix Fix Discute MediaWiki MediaWiki talk Model Model Discute Aida Aida Discute Categoria Categoria Discute TimedText TimedText talk Modulo Modulo Discute Event Event talk 0 3519 42612 42596 2026-04-07T16:41:25Z Penarc 4148 42612 wikitext text/x-wiki {{Site | nom = Астана | bandera = New flag of Astana.svg | scermo = Emblem of Nur-Sultan.svg | imaje = [[File:Astana_districts_coloured_2023.png|thumb|La Parlamento de Cazacstan en Astana]] | pais = [[Cazacstan]] | rejion = | latitude = 51°11′00″N | lonjitude = 71°24′00″E | altia = 347 | area = 710,2 | popla = 1.350.228 | anio = 2022 | densia = 958 | interede = | mapa = Astana in Kazakhstan.svg }} '''Astana''' (asta 2022 conoseda como Nur-Sultan) es la capital de [[Cazacstan]]. Nomes istorial de la site: * 1830-1961: Acmolinsk * 1961-1992: Tselinograd * 1992-1998: Acmola * 1998-2019: Astana * 2019-2022: Nur-Sultan * Pos 2022: Astana {{Sites capital de Asia}} [[Categoria:Sites]] [[Category:Capitales]] [[Category:Cazacstan]] 0rsbeyo0py3cn2p0avlehfm2m3y1pzd 0 3801 42621 41351 2026-04-07T21:06:29Z CommonsDelinker 47 Removing [[:c:File:Elizabeth_Anderson,_philosopher_(cropped).jpg|Elizabeth_Anderson,_philosopher_(cropped).jpg]], it has been deleted from Commons by [[:c:User:Jameslwoodward|Jameslwoodward]] because: per [[:c:Commons:Deletion requests/Files from macfound 42621 wikitext text/x-wiki {{Articles bon}} '''Epistemolojia''' es la ramo de [[filosofia]] cual esamina la natur, orijina e limitas de [[sabe]]. Lo esplora tipos diferente de sabe, como [[sabe proposal]] sur fatos, [[sabe pratical]] en la forma de capasias, e [[sabe par conose]] como un conose par esperia. Epistemolojistes studia la consetas de [[crede]], [[veria]] e [[justi]] per comprende la natur de sabe. Per descovre como sabe emerji, los investiga fontes de justi, como [[persepi]], [[introspeta]], [[memoria]], [[razona]] e [[atesta]]. La scola de [[seticisme]] pone en duta la capasia umana per ateni sabe e [[falibilisme]] dise ce sabe es nunca serta. [[empiricalisme|Empiricaliste]]s afirma ce tota sabe veni de esperia sensal, ma [[razonalisme|razonaliste]]s afirma ce alga sabe no depende de lo. [[coerentisme|Coerentiste]]s argumenta ce un crede es justida si lo coere con otra credes. [[fundalisme|Fundaliste]]s, en contrasta, manteni ce la justi de credes fundal no depende de otra credes. [[Internisme e esternisme]] no acorda esce justi es determinada sola par [[state mental|states mental]] o ance par situas esterna. Ramos separada de epistemolojia es dedicada a sabe trovada en campos spesifada, como sabe siensal, matematical, moral e relijiosa. [[Epistemolojia naturalida]] depende de metodos e descovres empirical, ma [[epistemolojia formal]] usa utiles formal de [[lojica]]. [[Epistemolojia sosial]] investiga la aspeta comunial de sabe e [[epistemolojia istorial]] esamina sua situa istorial. Epistemolojia es prosima relatada a [[psicolojia]], cual descrive la credes cual persones teni, ma epistemolojia studia la normas cual governa la evalua de credes. Lo crusa ance con campos como la [[teoria de deside]], [[educa]] e [[antropolojia]]. Refletas temprana sur la natur, fontes e estende de sabe es trovada en [[filosofia elinica antica|filosofia elinica]], [[filosofia barati antica|barati]] e [[filosofia xines antica|xines antica]]. La relata entre razona e crede relijiosa ia es un tema sentral en la [[eda medieval|periodo medieval]]. La [[eda moderna]] ia es marcada par la perspetivas contrastante de empiricalisme e razonalisme. Epistemolojistes en la sentenio 20 ia esamina la composantes, strutur e valua de sabe e integra intuis de la [[siensa natural|siensas natural]] e [[linguistica]]. == Definis == Epistemolojia es la studia filosofial de [[sabe]]. Ance nomida la teoria de sabe, lo esamina cual sabe es e cual tipos de sabe esiste. Lo investiga ance la fontes de sabe, como [[persepi]], [[dedui]] e [[atesta]] per determina como sabe es creada. Un otra tema es la estende e limitas de sabe, frontinte demandas sur cual persones pote e no pote sabe.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Truncellito|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Blaauw|Pritchard|2005|pp=49–50}} | {{harvnb|Crumley II|2009|p=16}} | {{harvnb|Carter|Littlejohn|2021|loc=Introduction: 1. What Is Epistemology?}} | {{harvnb|Moser|2005|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=5NJjAwAAQBAJ 3]}} }}</ref> Otra consetas sentral inclui [[crede]], [[veria]], [[justi]], [[demostra]] e [[razona]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Fumerton|2006|pp=1–2}} | {{harvnb|Moser|2005|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=5NJjAwAAQBAJ 4]}} }}</ref> Epistemolojia es un de la ramos xef de filosofia estra campos como [[etica]], [[lojica]] e [[metafisica]].<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Brenner|1993|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=DFoFDgAAQBAJ&pg=PT16 16]}} |2={{harvnb|Palmquist|2010|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=NOKjGp7NHtUC&pg=PA800 800]}} |3={{harvnb|Jenicek|2018|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=kWC1DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA31 31]}} }}</ref> La terma es ance usada con un sinifia pico diferente per refere no a la ramo de filosofia ma a un loca spesifada en acel ramo, como en la epistemolojia de [[Platon]] e la epistemolojia de [[Immanuel Kant]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Steup|Neta|2024|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Moss|2021|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=Dq8SEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 1–2]}} }}</ref> Como un campo normida de investiga, epistemolojia esplora como persones debe oteni credes. En esta modo, lo determina cual credes sasia la normas o goles epistemolojial de sabe e cual fali, tal furninte un evalua de credes. Campos descrivente de investiga, como [[psicolojia]] e [[sosiolojia cognisial]], es ance interesada en credes e prosedes cognisial relatada. No como epistemolojia, los studia la credes cual persones ave e como persones oteni los en loca de esamina la normas evaluante de esta prosedes.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crumley II|2009|p=16}} | {{harvnb|Carter|Littlejohn|2021|loc=Introduction: 1. What Is Epistemology?}} }}</ref>{{efn|An con esta contrasta, epistemolojistes pote depende de trovadas de la siensas empiricaliste per formula sua teorias norminte.<ref>{{harvnb|O′Donohue|Kitchener|1996|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=T7uYSFSxxVkC&pg=PA2 2]}}</ref> Seguente un interprete, la gol de epistemolojia naturalida es responde demandas descrivente, ma esta interprete es disputada.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crumley II|2009|p=192}} | {{harvnb|Mi|2007|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=wDx1SG8tS5oC&pg=PA113 113, 115]}} }}</ref>}} Epistemolojia es pertinente a multe campos descrivente e normida, como la otra ramos de filosofia e la siensas, par esplora la prinsipes de como los pote ariva a sabe.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Audi|2003|pp=258–259}} | {{harvnb|Wolenski|2004|pp=3–4}} | {{harvnb|Campbell|2024|loc=Lead section}} }}</ref> La parola ''epistemolojia'' veni de la termas elinica antica ἐπιστήμη (episteme, sinifiante ''sabe'' o ''comprende'') e λόγος (logos, sinifiante ''studia de'' o ''razona''), leteral, la studia de sabe. Ma, an si filosofistes elinica antica ia pratica cual es oji considerada como epistemolojia, los no ia comprende sua investigas en esta termas. La parola ia es sola creada en la sentenio 19 per eticeta esta campo e conseta lo como un ramo diferente de filosofia.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Steup|Neta|2024|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Scott|2002|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=G8aOAwAAQBAJ&pg=PT30 30]}} | {{harvnb|Wolenski|2004|p=3}} }}</ref>{{efn|Como un nom per un ramo de filosofia, la terma "epistemolojia" ia es prima usada en engles en 1854 par James E. Ferrier.<ref>{{harvnb|Wolenski|2004|p=3}}</ref> En un contesto diferente, la parola ia es usada tan temprana como 1847 en ''Eclectic Magazine'' de New York per tradui ''Wissenschaftlehre'' (siensa de sabe) de filosofiste [[Johann Gottlieb Fichte]].<ref>{{multiref|{{harvnb|Oxford University Press|2024}}|{{harvnb|Vető|1993|p=48}}}}</ref> Car la terma no esiste ante la sentenio 19, filosofistes temprana no ia usa lo per descrive sua teorias e ia esplora lo frecuente en combina con [[psicolojia]].<ref>{{harvnb|Alston|2006|pp=1–2}}</ref> Longo la filosofiste Thomas Sturm, cuanto pertinente problemes tratada par filosofistes pasada es a la filosofia contempora es un demanda abrida.<ref>{{harvnb|Sturm|2011|pp=308–309}}</ref>}} == Consetas sentral == === Sabe === {{AX|Sabe}} Sabe es un consensia, conose, comprende, o capasia. Sua formas variosa inclui tota un susede cognisial tra cual un person fa contata epistemolojial con realia.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Zagzebski|1999|p=109}} | {{harvnb|Steup|Neta|2020|loc=Lead section, § 1. The Varieties of Cognitive Success}} | {{harvnb|HarperCollins|2022a}}}}</ref> Sabe es tipal comprendeda como un aspeta de individuas, jeneral como un [[state mental]] cognisial cual aida los comprende, interprete, e interata con la mundo. An si esta sensa nucleal es de interesa spesial a epistemolojistes, la terma ance ave otra sinifias. Comprendeda a un nivel sosial, sabe es un cualia de un grupo de persones ci comparti ideas, comprende, o [[cultur]] en jeneral.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Klausen|2015|pp=[https://portal.findresearcher.sdu.dk/da/publications/bbee5873-28f2-46d5-94b6-49ef5b18a38b 813–818]}} | {{harvnb|Lackey|2021|pp=111–112}} }}</ref> La terma pote ance refere a [[informa]] retenida en documentos, como "sabe retenida en la biblioteca"<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|HarperCollins|2022a}} | {{harvnb|Magee|Popper|1971|pp=[https://archive.org/details/modernbritishphi0000mage/page/74 74–75]}} }}</ref> o sabe retenida en computadores en la forma de la [[banco de sabe]] de un [[sistem esperta]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|HarperCollins|2022b}} | {{harvnb|Walton|2005|pp=59, 64}} }}</ref> Sabe contrasta con [[nonsabe]], cual es frecuente simple definida como la asentia de sabe. Sabe es usual acompaniada par nonsabe car persones rara ave sabe completa de un campo, cual forsa los a depende de informa noncompleta o nonserta cuando los fa desides.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gross|McGoey|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=D75hCQAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 1–4]}} | {{harvnb|Haas|Vogt|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=D75hCQAAQBAJ&pg=PA17 17–18]}} | {{harvnb|Blaauw|Pritchard|2005|p=79}} }}</ref> An si multe formas de nonsabe pote es diminuida par educa e rexerca, on ave alga limitas a la comprende umana cual causa nonsabe nonevitable.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Markie|Folescu|2023|loc=§ 1. Introduction}} | {{harvnb|Rescher|2009|pp=2, 6}} | {{harvnb|Stoltz|2021|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=pTkqEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA120 120]}} }}</ref> Alga limitas es inerente en la [[cognisio|capasias cognisial]] umana mesma, como la noncapasia de sabe fatos tro complicada per la [[mente|mente umana]] a conseta.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Rescher|2009|pp=10, 93}} | {{harvnb|Rescher|2009a|pp=x–xi, 57–58}} | {{harvnb|Dika|2023|p=163}} }}</ref> Otras depende de situas esterna cuando no asede a la informa pertinente esiste.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Rescher|2009|pp=2, 6}} | {{harvnb|Rescher|2009a|pp=140–141}} }}</ref> Epistemolojistes no acorda sur cuanto persones sabe, per esemplo, esce credes falable sur cosas dial pote deveni sabe o esce sertia asoluta es nesesada. La vista la plu sever es afirmada par [[seticisme filosofial|seticas radical]], ci argumenta ce on ave tota no sabe.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Wilson|2008|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=b8n609PDSrsC&pg=PA314 314]}} | {{harvnb|Pritchard|2005|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=DGVcCIDbUQ8C&pg=PA18 18]}} | {{harvnb|Hetherington, "''Fallibilism''"|ref=Hetherington, "''Fallibilism''"|loc=Lead section, § 8. Implications of Fallibilism: No Knowledge?}} }}</ref> ====Tipos==== Epistemolojistes distingui entre tipos diferente de sabe.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hetherington, "''Knowledge''"|ref=Hetherington, "''Knowledge''"|loc=§ 1. Kinds of Knowledge}} | {{harvnb|Barnett|1990|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=eTjlAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA40 40]}} | {{harvnb|Lilley|Lightfoot|Amaral|2004|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=HT8VDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA162 162–163]}} }}</ref> Sua interesa prima es en sabe de fatos, nomida sabe proposal.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Klein|1998|loc=§ 1. The Varieties of Knowledge}} | {{harvnb|Hetherington, "''Knowledge''"|ref=Hetherington, "''Knowledge''"|loc=§ 1b. Knowledge-That}} | {{harvnb|Stroll|2023|loc=§ The Nature of Knowledge}} }}</ref>{{efn|Alga sinonimes inclui ''sabe declarante'' e ''sabe descrivente''.<ref name="auto">{{harvnb|Hetherington, "''Knowledge''"|ref=Hetherington, "''Knowledge''"|loc=§ 1b. Knowledge-That}}</ref>}} Lo es un sabe teorial cual on pote espresa en frases declarante usante un proposa con "ce", como "Ravi sabe ce cangarus salta".<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hetherington, "''Knowledge''"|ref=Hetherington, "''Knowledge''"|loc=§ 1b. Knowledge-That}} | {{harvnb|Stroll|2023|loc=§ The Nature of Knowledge}} | {{harvnb|Zagzebski|1999|p=92}} }}</ref> Epistemolojistes frecuente comprende lo como un relata entre el ci sabe e un proposa sabeda, en la caso a supra entre la person Ravi e la proposa "cangarus salta".<ref name="auto"/> Lo es nondependente de usa car lo no es liada a un intende spesifada. Lo es un representa mental cual depende de consetas e ideas per depinta realia.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Morrison|2005|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=znbkHaC8QeMC&pg=PA371 371]}} | {{harvnb|Reif|2008|p=33}} | {{harvnb|Zagzebski|1999|p=93}} }}</ref> Par causa de sua natur teorial, on frecuente crede ce sola viventes relativa sofisticada, como umanas, posese sabe proposal.<ref>{{harvnb|Pritchard|2013|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=sfUhAQAAQBAJ&pg=PA4 4]}}</ref> Sabe proposal contrasta con sabe nonproposal en la forma de [[sabe prosedal]] e [[conose]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hetherington, "''Knowledge''"|ref=Hetherington, "''Knowledge''"|loc=§ 1. Kinds of Knowledge}} | {{harvnb|Stroll|2023|loc=§ The Nature of Knowledge}} | {{harvnb|Stanley|Willlamson|2001|pp=[https://philpapers.org/rec/WILKHV 411–412]}} }}</ref> Sabe prosedal es un capasia pratical, como sabe leje o prepara [[lasanie]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hetherington, "''Knowledge''"|ref=Hetherington, "''Knowledge''"|loc=§ 1d. Knowing-How}} | {{harvnb|Pritchard|2013|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=sfUhAQAAQBAJ&pg=PA3 3]}} }}</ref> Lo es usual liada a un gol spesifada e no mestrida en la astrata sin pratica concreta.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Merriënboer|1997|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=o0I3IXLfXuAC&pg=PA32 32]}} | {{harvnb|Klauer|Manstetten|Petersen|Schiller|2016|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=YjglDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA105 105–6]}} | {{harvnb|Pavese|2022|loc=[https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-how/ Lead section]}} }}</ref> Conose alga cosa sinifia es familiarida con lo par causa de contata esperial. Esemplos es conose la site [[Perth]], conose la sabor de [[tsampa]], e conose [[Marta Vieira da Silva]] personal.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hetherington, "''Knowledge''"|ref=Hetherington, "''Knowledge''"|loc=§ 1a. Knowing by Acquaintance}} | {{harvnb|Stroll|2023|loc=§ St. Anselm of Canterbury}} | {{harvnb|Zagzebski|1999|p=92}} | {{harvnb|Benton|2024|p=4}} }}</ref> Un otra distingui influente es entre sabe ''a posteriori'' e ''a priori''.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Stroll|2023|loc=§ A Priori and a Posteriori Knowledge}} | {{harvnb|Baehr, "''A Priori and A Posteriori''"|ref=Baehr, "''A Priori and A Posteriori''"|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Russell|2020|loc=Lead section}} }}</ref> Sabe ''a posteriori'' es sabe de fatos empirical fundida sur esperia sensal, como vide ce la sol brilia e ole ce un peso de carne es putrida.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Baehr, "''A Priori and A Posteriori''"|ref=Baehr, "''A Priori and A Posteriori''"|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Moser|2016|loc=Lead section}} }}</ref> Sabe cual parteni a la siensas empirical e sabe de cosas dial parteni a sabe ''a posteriori''. Sabe ''a priori'' es sabe de fatos nonempirical e no depende de demostra de esperia sensal. Lo parteni a campos como [[matematica]] e [[lojica]], como sabe ce <math>2 + 2=4</math>.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Russell|2020|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Baehr, "''A Priori and A Posteriori''"|ref=Baehr, "''A Priori and A Posteriori''"|loc=Lead section, § 1. An Initial Characterization}} | {{harvnb|Moser|2016|loc=Lead section}}}}</ref> La contrasta entre sabe ''a posteriori'' e ''a priori'' jua un rol sentral en la debate entre [[empiricalisme|empiricaliste]]s e [[razonalisme|razonaliste]]s sur esce tota sabe depende de esperia sensal.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Carter|Littlejohn|2021|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=w98mEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA79 § 3. The Apriori]}} | {{harvnb|Popper|2014|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=pXd9AwAAQBAJ&pg=PA31 2. Deductivism and Inductivism]}} }}</ref> [[File:Immanuel Kant portrait c1790.jpg|upright=0.8|alt=Depinta de Immanuel Kant|thumb|La distingui analisal-sintesal ave sua orijina en la filosofia de [[Immanuel Kant]].<ref>{{harvnb|Juhl|Loomis|2009|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=8kiPAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA4 4]}}</ref>]] Un contrasta prosima relatada es entre verias analisal e sintesal. Un frase es analisal vera si sua veria depende sola de la sinifia de la parolas cual lo usa. Per esemplo, la frase "tota orfanes ave jenitores mor" es analisal vera car la parola "orfan" inclui ja la sinifia "ave jenitores mor". Un frase es sintesal vera si sua veria depende de fatos ajuntada. Per esemplo, la frase "neva es blanca" es sintesal vera car sua veria depende de la color de neva en ajunta a la sinifias de la parolas ''neva'' e ''blanca''. Sabe ''a priori'' es prima asosiada con frases analisal ma sabe ''a posteriori'' es prima asosiada con frases sintesal. Ma, lo es controversa esce esta es vera per tota casos. Alga filosofistes, como [[Willard Van Orman Quine]], rejeta la distingui, disente ce on ave no verias analisal.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Juhl|Loomis|2009|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=8kiPAgAAQBAJ&pg=PR9 ix–x, 1–2]}} | {{harvnb|Russell|2023}} }}</ref> ====Analise==== {{AX|Definis de sabe}} La analise de sabe es la atenta identifia la composantes esensal o nesesadas de tota e sola states de sabe proposal. Seguente la analise tradisional,{{efn|La nom ''analise tradisional'' es disputada car lo sujeta aseta vasta en la istoria de filosofia, un idea no compartida par tota espertas.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crumley II|2009|pp=54–55}} | {{harvnb|Ayers|2019|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=Qt-RDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA4 4]}} }}</ref>}} sabe ave tre composantes: lo es un crede cual es justida e vera.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Ichikawa|Steup|2018|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Crumley II|2009|pp=53–54}} }}</ref> En la dui du de la sentenio 20, esta vista ia es poneda en duta par un serie de esperimentas de pensa cual ia atenta mostra ce alga credes justida e vera no es sabe.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crumley II|2009|pp=61–62}} | {{harvnb|Ichikawa|Steup|2018|loc=§ 3. The Gettier Problem}} }}</ref> En un de los, un person no conose tota la granerias falsa en sua area. Par coaveni, el para ante la sola graneria vera e formi un crede justida e vera ce lo es un graneria vera.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Rodríguez|2018|pp=29–32}} | {{harvnb|Goldman|1976|pp=771–773}} | {{harvnb|Sudduth|loc=§ 2b. Defeasibility Analyses and Propositional Defeaters}} | {{harvnb|Ichikawa|Steup|2018|loc=§ 10.2 Fake Barn Cases}} }}</ref> Multe epistemolojistes acorda ce esta no es sabe car la justi no es direta pertinente a la veria.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crumley II|2009|pp=61–62}} | {{harvnb|Ichikawa|Steup|2018|loc=§ 8. Epistemic Luck}} }}</ref> Plu spesifada, esta e contraesemplos simil envolve alga forma de fortuna epistemolojial, pd un susede cognisial cual resulta de situas fortunosa en loca de capasia.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Pritchard|2005|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=DGVcCIDbUQ8C&pg=PA1 1–4]}} | {{harvnb|Broncano-Berrocal|Carter|2017|loc=Lead section}} }}</ref> [[File:Justified_True_Belief_model_of_knowledge.svg|thumb|alt=Scema de composantes de sabe|La ''analise tradisional'' dise ce sabe es crede justida e vera. [[Edmund Gettier]] ia atenta mostra ce alga credes justida e vera no es sabe.]] Seguente esta [[esperimenta de pensa|esperimentas de pensa]], filosofistes ia proposa definis variosa e alternativa de sabe par cambia o estende la analise tradisional.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crumley II|2009|p=65}} | {{harvnb|Ichikawa|Steup|2018|loc=Lead section, § 3. The Gettier Problem}} }}</ref> Seguente un vista, la fato conoseda debe causa la crede en la modo coreta.<ref>{{harvnb|Crumley II|2009|pp=67–68}}</ref> Un otra teoria afirma ce la crede es la produida de un prosede fidable de formi credes.<ref>{{harvnb|Ichikawa|Steup|2018|loc=§ 6.1 Reliabilist Theories of Knowledge}}</ref> Otra prosimis nesesa ce la person no ta ave la crede si lo ta es falsa,<ref>{{harvnb|Ichikawa|Steup|2018|loc=§ 5.1 Sensitivity}}</ref> ce la crede no es deduida de un falsia,<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crumley II|2009|p=75}} | {{harvnb|Ichikawa|Steup|2018|loc=§ 4. No False Lemmas}} }}</ref> ce la justi no pote es suminida,<ref>{{harvnb|Crumley II|2009|p=69}}</ref> o ce la crede es nonfalable.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hetherington, "''Knowledge''"|ref=Hetherington, "''Knowledge''"|loc=§ 5c. Questioning the Gettier Problem, § 6. Standards for Knowing}} | {{harvnb|Kraft|2012|pp=49–50}} }}</ref> On ave no consensa sur cual de la cambias e reconsetas proposada es coreta.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Ichikawa|Steup|2018|loc=§ 3. The Gettier Problem, § 7. Is Knowledge Analyzable?}} | {{harvnb|Zagzebski|1999|pp=93–94, 104–105}} | {{harvnb|Steup|Neta|2020|loc=§ 2.3 Knowing Facts}} }}</ref> Alga filosofistes, como [[Timothy Williamson]], rejeta la suposa fundal cual suporta la analise de sabe par argumenta ce sabe proposal es un state unica cual no pote es divideda en composantes plu simple.<ref>{{harvnb|Ichikawa|Steup|2018|loc=§ 7. Is Knowledge Analyzable?}}</ref> ====Valua==== La valua de sabe es la merita cual lo teni par estende comprende e gida ata. Sabe pote ave [[valua strumental]] par aida un person ateni sua goles.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Degenhardt|2019|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=FuCsDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 1–6]}} | {{harvnb|Pritchard|2013|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=sfUhAQAAQBAJ&pg=PA10 10–11]}} | {{harvnb|Olsson|2011|pp=874–875}} }}</ref> Per esemplo, sabe de un maladia aida un dotor a cura sua pasiente, e sabe de cuando un intervisa de emplea comensa aida un aspiror a ariva a tempo.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Pritchard|2013|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=sfUhAQAAQBAJ&pg=PA11 11]}} | {{harvnb|McCormick|2014|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=3BAhBQAAQBAJ&pg=PA42 42]}} }}</ref> La usosia de un fato conoseda depende de la situa. Sabe de alga fatos pote ave poca o no usas, como memori numeros de telefon acaso de un libro de telefon desvalidida.<ref>{{harvnb|Pritchard|2013|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=sfUhAQAAQBAJ&pg=PA11 11–12]}}</ref> Es capas de evalua la valua de sabe importa en eleje cual informa on debe oteni e transmete a otras. Lo afeta desides como cual temas on debe ensenia a scola e como asinia mone a projetas de rexerca.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Stehr|Adolf|2016|pp=483–485}} | {{harvnb|Powell|2020|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=GYdnEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA132 132–133]}} | {{harvnb|Meirmans|Butlin|Charmantier|Engelstädter|2019|pp=754–756}} | {{harvnb|Degenhardt|2019|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=FuCsDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 1–6]}} }}</ref> De interesa spesial a epistemolojistes es la demanda de esce sabe es plu valuada ca un mera opina cual es vera.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Pritchard|Turri|Carter|2022|loc=§ 1. Value Problems}} | {{harvnb|Olsson|2011|pp=874–875}} | {{harvnb|Greco|2021|loc=§ The Value of Knowledge}} }}</ref> Sabe e opina vera ave frecuente un usosia simil car ambos es representas esata de realia. Per esemplo, si un person vole vade a [[Larissa]], un opina vera sur como ariva ala pote aida el en la mesma modo como sabe.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Olsson|2011|pp=874–875}} | {{harvnb|Pritchard|Turri|Carter|2022|loc=§ 1. Value Problems}} | {{harvnb|Plato|2002|pp=[https://archive.org/details/fivedialogueseut00plat/page/89 89–90, 97b–98a]}} }}</ref> Platon ia considera ja esta problem e ia sujesta ce sabe es plu bon car lo es plu stable.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Olsson|2011|p=875}} | {{harvnb|Greco|2021|loc=§ The Value of Knowledge}} }}</ref> Un otra sujesta foca a [[razona pratical]]. Lo proposa ce persones pone plu fida en sabe ca en mera credes vera cuando los fa concluis e deside cual los debe fa.<ref>{{harvnb|Pritchard|Turri|Carter|2022|loc=§ 6. Other Accounts of the Value of Knowledge}}</ref> Un responde diferente dise ce sabe ave valua inerente, sinifiante ce lo es bon en se mesma nondependente de sua usosia.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Pritchard|2013|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=sfUhAQAAQBAJ&pg=PA15 15–16]}} | {{harvnb|Greco|2021|loc=§ The Value of Knowledge}} }}</ref> ===Crede e veria=== {{AX|Crede|Veria}} Credes es states mental sur cual es la caso, como crede ce neva es blanca o ce [[esiste de Dio|Dio esiste]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Braddon-Mitchell|Jackson|2011|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Bunnin|Yu|2008|pp=80–81}} | {{harvnb|Dretske|2005|p=85}} | {{harvnb|Crumley II|2009|p=18}} }}</ref> En epistemolojia, los es frecuente comprendeda como [[disposa proposal|disposas sujetal cual afirma o nega un proposa]], cual pote es espresada en un frase declarante. Per esemplo, crede ce neva es blanca es afirma la proposa "neva es blanca". Seguente esta vista, credes es representas de como la mundo es. Los es retenida en memoria e pote es reprendeda cuando on pensa ativa sur realia o cuando on deside como ata.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Braddon-Mitchell|Jackson|2011|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Schwitzgebel|2024|loc=Lead section, § 1.1 Representationalism}} | {{harvnb|Schwitzgebel|2011|pp=14–15}} }}</ref> Un vista diferente comprende credes como modeles condual o disposas per ata en loca de como cosas represental retenida en la mente. Esta vista dise ce crede ce on ave acua mineral en la friador es no plu ca un grupo de disposas condual relatada a acua mineral e la friador. Esemplos es la disposas per responde a demandas sur la presentia de acua mineral afirmante e vade a la friador cuando on sidi.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Schwitzgebel|2024|loc=§ 1.2 Dispositionalism}} | {{harvnb|Schwitzgebel|2011|pp=17–18}} }}</ref> Alga teoristes nega la esiste de credes, disente ce esta conseta emprestada de [[psicolojia popular]] es un suprasimpli de prosedes psicolojial multe plu complicada.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Schwitzgebel|2024|loc=§ 1.5 Eliminativism, Instrumentalism, and Fictionalism}} | {{harvnb|Schwitzgebel|2011|p=20}} }}</ref> Credes jua un rol sentral en debates epistemolojial variosa, cual covre sua state como un composante de sabe proposal, la demanda de esce persones ave controla sur e es respondosa per sua credes, e la tema de esce on ave grados de crede.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Blaauw|Pritchard|2005|pp=14–15}} | {{harvnb|Schwitzgebel|2024|loc=§ 2.3 Degree of Belief, § 2.5 Belief and Knowledge}} }}</ref> Como disposas proposal, credes es vera o falsa dependente de esce los afirma un proposa vera o falsa.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Dretske|2005|p=85}} | {{harvnb|Lowe|2005|p=926}} | {{harvnb|Crumley II|2009|p=18}} }}</ref> Seguente la [[teoria de veria como coresponde]], es vera sinifia sta en la relata coreta a la mundo par descrive esata como lo es. Esta sinifia ce veria es ojetal: un crede es vera si lo coresponde a un [[fato]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Lowe|2005|p=926}} | {{harvnb|Dowden|Swartz|loc=§ 3. Correspondence Theory}} | {{harvnb|Lynch|2011|pp=3–5}} | {{harvnb|Crumley II|2009|p=58}} }}</ref> La [[teoria de veria como coere]] dise ce un crede es vera si lo parteni a un sistem coerente de credes. Un resulta de esta vista es ce veria es relativa car lo depende de otra credes.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Glanzberg|2023|loc=§ 1.2 The Coherence Theory}} | {{harvnb|Lowe|2005|pp=926–927}} | {{harvnb|Lynch|2011|p=3}} | {{harvnb|Crumley II|2009|p=58}} }}</ref> Otra teorias de veria inclui teorias pratical, semantical, pluraliste, e deflaiste.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Lynch|2011|pp=5–7, 10}} | {{harvnb|Glanzberg|2023|loc=§ 1. The Neo-classical Theories of Truth, § 2. Tarski’s Theory of Truth, § 4.4 Truth Pluralism, § 5. Deflationism}} | {{harvnb|Blaauw|Pritchard|2005|pp=148–149}} }}</ref> Veria jua un rol sentral en epistemolojia como un gol de prosedes cognisial e un composante de sabe proposal.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Lynch|2011|p=5}} | {{harvnb|Blaauw|Pritchard|2005|p=148}} }}</ref> ===Justi=== {{AX|Justi (epistemolojia)}} En epistemolojia, justi es un cualia de credes cual sasia alga normas sur lo cual un person debe crede.<ref name="auto6">{{multiref | {{harvnb|Goldman|Bender|2005|p=465}} | {{harvnb|Kvanvig|2011|pp=25–26}} }}</ref> Seguente un vista comun, esta sinifia ce la person ave razonas sufisinte per ave esta crede car los ave informa cual suporta lo.<ref name="auto6"/> Un otra vista afirma ce un crede es justida si lo es formida par un prosede fidable de formi credes, como persepi.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crumley II|2009|pp=83–84}} | {{harvnb|Olsson|2016}} }}</ref> La termas ''razonal'', ''meritante'' e ''suportada'' es prosima relatada a la idea de justi e es a veses usada como sinonimes.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Kvanvig|2011|p=25}} | {{harvnb|Foley|1998|loc=Lead section}} }}</ref> Justi es lo cual distingui credes justida de [[superstisio]] e divina fortunosa.<ref>{{harvnb|Ichikawa|Steup|2018|loc=§ 1.3 The Justification Condition}}</ref> Ma, justi no garantia veria. Per esemplo, si un person ave demostra forte ma malgidante, los pote formi un crede justida cual es falsa.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crumley II|2009|p=149}} | {{harvnb|Comesaña|Comesaña|2022|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=LaFhEAAAQBAJ&pg=PT44 44]}} }}</ref> Epistemolojistes identifia frecuente justi como un composante de sabe.<ref>{{harvnb|Blaauw|Pritchard|2005|pp=92–93}}</ref> Usual, los no es sola interesada en esce un person ave un razona sufisinte per ave un crede, conoseda como ''justi proposal'', ma ance en esce la person ave la crede car o fundida sur{{efn|La relata entre un crede e la razona cual suporta lo es nomida un ''relata fundinte.''<ref>{{harvnb|Silva|Oliveira|2022|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=99FkEAAAQBAJ&pg=PT10 1–4]}}</ref>}} esta razona, conoseda como ''justi doxastica''. Per esemplo, si un person ave un razona sufisinte per crede ce un visineria es perilosa ma formi esta crede fundida sur superstisio alora los ave justi proposal ma manca de justi doxastica.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Ichikawa|Steup|2018|loc=§ 1.3.2 Kinds of Justification}} | {{harvnb|Silva|Oliveira|2022|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=99FkEAAAQBAJ&pg=PT10 1–4]}} }}</ref> ====Fontes==== Fontes de justi es modos o capasias cognisial tra cual persones oteni justi. Fontes frecuente discuteda inclui [[persepi]], [[introspeta]], [[memoria]], [[razona]] e [[atesta]], ma on ave no acorda universal a cual grado tota los furni justi valida.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Kern|2017|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=eyh5DQAAQBAJ&pg=PA8 8–10, 133]}} | {{harvnb|Smith|2023|p=3}} | {{harvnb|Steup|Neta|2024|loc=§ 5. Sources of Knowledge and Justification}} | {{harvnb|Hetherington, "''Knowledge''"|ref=Hetherington, "''Knowledge''"|loc=§ 3. Ways of Knowing}}}}</ref> Persepi depende de [[sensa|organos sensal]] per oteni informa empirical. On ave formas variosa de persepi corespondente a stimulas fisical diferente, como [[vide|persepi vidal]], [[oia|oreal]], [[palpa|palpal]], [[ole|olal]], e [[proba (sensa)|probal]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Steup|Neta|2024|loc=§ 5.1 Perception}} | {{harvnb|Hetherington, "''Knowledge''"|ref=Hetherington, "''Knowledge''"|loc=§ 3. Ways of Knowing}} }}</ref> Persepi no es mera la reseta de impresas sensal ma un prosede ativa cual eleje, organiza e interprete siniales sensal.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Khatoon|2012|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=Ha1KBZm9CXQC&pg=PA104 104]}} | {{harvnb|Martin|1998|loc=Lead section}} }}</ref> Introspeta es un prosede prosima relatada focada no a ojetos fisical esterna ma a states mental interna. Per esemplo, vide un bus a un stasion de bus parteni a persepi ma senti fatiga parteni a introspeta.<ref>{{harvnb|Steup|Neta|2024|loc=§ 5.2 Introspection}}</ref> Razonalistes comprende razona como un fonte de justi per fatos nonempirical. Lo es frecuente usada per esplica como persones pote sabe verias matematical, lojical e consetal. Razona es la fonte de sabe deduinte, en cual un o alga credes es usada como premisas per suporta un otra crede.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hetherington, "''Knowledge''"|ref=Hetherington, "''Knowledge''"|loc=§ 3d. Knowing by Thinking-Plus-Observing}} | {{harvnb|Steup|Neta|2024|loc=§ 5.4 Reason}} | {{harvnb|Audi|2002|pp=85, 90–91}} | {{harvnb|Audi|2006|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=-YPTEeIhOXYC&pg=PA38 38]}} }}</ref> Memoria depende de informa furnida par otra fontes, cual lo reteni e recorda, como recorda un numero de telefon persepida plu temprana.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Steup|Neta|2024|loc=§ 5.3 Memory}} | {{harvnb|Audi|2002|pp=72–75}} | {{harvnb|Gardiner|2001|pp=1351–1352}} | {{harvnb|Michaelian|Sutton|2017}} }}</ref> Justi par atesta depende de informa cual un person comunica a un otra person. Esta pote aveni par parla a lunlotra ma pote ance aveni en otra formas, como un letera, un jornal e un blog.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Steup|Neta|2024|loc=§ 5.5 Testimony}} | {{harvnb|Leonard|2021|loc=Lead section, § 1. Reductionism and Non-Reductionism}} | {{harvnb|Green|2022|loc=Lead section}} }}</ref> === Otra consetas === [[Razonalia]] es prosima relatada a justi e la termas ''crede razonal'' e ''crede justida'' es a veses usada como sinonimes. Ma, razonalia ave un estende plu larga cual enclui ambos un lado teorial, covrente credes, e un lado pratical, covrente [[teoria de desides|desides]], [[intende]]s e atas.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Blaauw|Pritchard|2005|pp=123–124}} | {{harvnb|Foley|2011|pp=37, 39–40}} | {{harvnb|Harman|2013|loc=§ Theoretical and Practical Rationality}} | {{harvnb|Mele|Rawling|2004|pp=3–4}} }}</ref> On ave consetas diferente sur cual lo sinifia ce alga cosa es razonal. Seguente un vista, un state mental es razonal si lo es fundida sur o responde a razonas bon. Un otra vista asentua la rol de coere, afirmante ce razonalia nesesa ce la states mental diferente de un person es coerente e suporta lunlotra.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Heinzelmann|2023|pp=312–314}} | {{harvnb|Kiesewetter|2020|pp=332–334}} }}</ref> Un prosimi pico diferente afirma ce razonalia es sur la ateni de alga goles. Du goles de razonalia teorial es esatia e completia, sinifiante ce un person ave tan poca credes falsa e tan multe credes vera como posible.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Foley|2011|pp=39–40}} | {{harvnb|Blaauw|Pritchard|2005|pp=123–124}} }}</ref> Normas epistemolojial es criterios per evalua la cualia cognisial de credes, como sua justi e razonalia. Epistemolojistes distingui entre normas deontica, cual es prescrives sur lo cual persones debe crede o lo cual credes es coreta, e normas axiolojial, cual identifia la goles e valuas de credes.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Blaauw|Pritchard|2005|p=109}} | {{harvnb|Engel|2011|p=47}} }}</ref> Normas epistemolojial es prosima relatada a [[virtua epistemolojial|virtuas epistemolojial]] o inteletal, cual es cualias de carater como [[abridia de mente]] e [[consiensosia]]. Virtuas epistemolojial aida individuas a formi credes vera e oteni sabe. Los contrasta con mal abituas epistemolojial e ata como consetas fundal de la [[epistemolojia de virtua]]. [[Demostra]] cual suporta un crede es informa cual suporta lo. Epistemolojistes comprende demostra prima en termas de states mental, per esemplo, como impresas sensal o como otra proposas cual un person sabe. Ma en un sensa plu larga, lo pote ance inclui ojetos fisical, como manxas de sangue esaminada par analisores forense o rejistras finansial studiada par jornalistes investigosa.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Blaauw|Pritchard|2005|pp=50–51}} | {{harvnb|DiFate|loc=Lead section, § 1. The Nature of Evidence: What Is It and What Does It Do?}} | {{harvnb|Kelly|2016|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|McGrew|2011|pp=58–59}} }}</ref> Demostra es frecuente comprendeda en termas de [[probablia]]: demostra suportante un crede fa ce lo es plu probable ce la crede es vera.<ref>{{harvnb|McGrew|2011|p=59}}</ref> Un vinsor es demostra cual refuta un crede o demostra cual sumina otra demostra suportante. Per esemplo, [[atesta]] cual lia un suspetada a un crimin es demostra suportante sua culpablia ma un [[alibi]] es un vinsor.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Sudduth|loc=Lead section, § 2c. Constraints on Propositional Defeaters}} | {{harvnb|McPherson|2020|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=6I7fDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA10 10]}} }}</ref> Evidentialistes analise justi en termas de demostra par dise ce per es justida, un crede nesesa la suporta de demostra sufisinte.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Blaauw|Pritchard|2005|p=51}} | {{harvnb|Kelly|2016|loc=§ 1. Evidence as That Which Justifies Belief}} }}</ref> La presentia de demostra afeta tipal [[duta]] e [[sertia]], cual es disposas sujetal a proposas cual difere en relata a sua nivel de fida. Duta envolve nonconvinsedia sur la validia o veria de un proposa. Sertia, en contrasta, es un disposa afirmante forte, sinifiante ce la person no duta la veria de la proposa. En epistemolojia, duta e sertia jua roles sentral en atentas per trova un funda secur de tota sabe e en projetas setica cual atenta demostra ce no crede es imune a duta.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Blaauw|Pritchard|2005|pp=18–19, 44}} | {{harvnb|Hookway|2005a|p=134}} | {{harvnb|Hookway|2005b|p=220}} }}</ref> An si sabe proposal es la tema xef en epistemolojia, alga teoristes foca a [[comprende]] en loca de sabe. Comprende es un idea plu oliste cual envolve un teni mental plu larga de un sujeto. Per comprende alga cosa, un person nesesa consensia de como cosas diferente es liada e perce los es como los es. Per esemplo, sabe de fatos isolida memorida de un libro de testo no es comprende. Seguente un vista, comprende es un bonia epistemolojial spesial cual, no como sabe, es sempre inerente valuada.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Blaauw|Pritchard|2005|p=150}} | {{harvnb|Grimm|2011|pp=84, 88}} | {{harvnb|Gordon|loc=Lead section}} }}</ref> [[Sajia]] es simil en esta modo e es a veses considerada la bonia epistemolojial la plu alta. Lo inclui un comprende refletante con aplicas pratical. Lo aida persones teni mental e evalua situas complicada e vive un bon vive.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Kekes|2005|p=959}} | {{harvnb|Blaauw|Pritchard|2005|p=157}} | {{harvnb|Whitcomb|2011|p=95}} }}</ref> == Scolas de pensa == === Seticisme, falablisme e relativisme === {{AX|Seticisme|Falablisme|Relativisme epistemolojial}} [[Seticisme filosofial]] pone en duta la capasia umana per ariva a sabe. Alga seticas limita sua critica a alga campos de sabe. Per esemplo, [[seticisme relijiosa|seticas relijiosa]] dise ce lo es nonposible per ave sabe serta sur la esiste de divines o otra dotrinas relijiosa. Simil, seticas moral pone en duta la esiste de sabe moral e seticas metafisical dise ce umanas no pote sabe realia ultima.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Cohen|1998|loc=§ Article Summary}} | {{harvnb|Hookway|2005|p=838}} | {{harvnb|Moser|2011|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=1ETRCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA200 200]}} }}</ref> Seticisme global es la forma la plu larga de seticisme, afirmante ce on ave no sabe en cualce campo.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hookway|2005|p=838}} | {{harvnb|Bergmann|2021|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=T7EzEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA57 57]}} }}</ref> En [[filosofia antica]], esta vista ia es asetada par [[Seticisme academial|seticas academial]] ma [[Seticisme pironian|seticas pironian]] ia recomenda la suspende de crede per ateni un state de calmia.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hazlett|2014|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=4INnAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA18 18]}} | {{harvnb|Levine|1999|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=umYHtjvOhwIC&pg=PA11 11]}} }}</ref> En tota, no multe epistemolojistes defende direta seticisme global. La influe de esta vista deriva xef de atentas par otra filosofistes per mostra ce sua teoria vinse la difisilia de seticisme. Per esemplo, [[René Descartes]] ia usa [[Duta cartesian|duta metodolojial]] per trova fatos cual no pote es dutada.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hookway|2005|p=838}} | {{harvnb|Comesaña|Klein|2024|loc=Lead section}} }}</ref> Un considera cual suporta seticisme global es la [[argumenta de sonia]]. Lo comensa de la oserva ce, cuando persones sonia, los es usual nonsabente de esta. Esta noncapasia de distingui entre sonia e esperia normal es usada per argumenta ce on ave no sabe serta car un person es nunca serta ce el no es soniante.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Windt|2021|loc=§ 1.1 Cartesian Dream Skepticism}} | {{harvnb|Klein|1998|loc=§ 8. The Epistemic Principles and Scepticism}} | {{harvnb|Hetherington, "''Knowledge''"|ref=Hetherington, "''Knowledge''"|loc=§ 4. Sceptical Doubts About Knowing}} }}</ref>{{efn|La [[serebro en un tance]] es un [[esperimenta de pensa]] similar cual suposa ce un person no ave un corpo ma es sola un serebro cual reseta stimulas eletrical nondistinguable de la stimulas cual un serebro en un corpo ta reseta. Esta argumenta gida ance a la conclui de seticisme global fundida sur la afirma ce lo no es posible per distingui stimulas cual representa la mundo vera de stimulas simulada.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hookway|2005|p=838}} | {{harvnb|Steup|Neta|2024|loc=§ 6.1 General Skepticism and Selective Skepticism}} }}</ref>}} Alga criticas afirma ce seticisme global es un idea cual refuta se mesma car nega la esiste de sabe es un afirma sur sabe. Un otra refuta dise ce la razona astrata cual gida a seticisme no es sufisinte convinsente per nega sensa comun.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Steup|Neta|2024|loc=§ 6.2 Responses to the Closure Argument}} | {{harvnb|Reed|2015|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=geSrCQAAQBAJ&pg=PA75 75]}} }}</ref> Falablisme es un otra responde a seticisme.<ref>{{harvnb|Cohen|1998|loc=§ 1. The Philosophical Problem of Scepticism, § 2. Responses to Scepticism}}</ref> Falablistes acorda con seticas ce sertia asoluta es nonposible. La plu de falablistes no acorda con seticas sur la esiste de sabe, disente ce on ave sabe car lo no nesesa sertia asoluta.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hetherington, "''Fallibilism''"|ref=Hetherington, "''Fallibilism''"|loc=Lead section, § 9. Implications of Fallibilism: Knowing Fallibly?}} | {{harvnb|Rescher|1998|loc=§ Article Summary}} }}</ref> Los asentua la nesesa de manteni un mente abrida e demandante car duta no pote nunca es intera escluida, an per alegas de sabe bon instituida como teorias siensal bon probada.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Rescher|1998|loc=§ Article Summary}} | {{harvnb|Hetherington, "''Fallibilism''"|ref=Hetherington, "''Fallibilism''"|loc=§ 9. Implications of Fallibilism: Knowing Fallibly?}} }}</ref> Relativisme epistemolojial es un vista relatada. Lo no nega la esiste de sabe en jeneral ma rejeta la idea ce on ave normas epistemolojial universal o prinsipes asoluta cual aplica egal a tota persones. Esta sinifia ce lo cual un person sabe depende de la criterios sujetal o convenis sosial usada per evalua la state epistemolojial.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Carter|2017|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=RzslDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA292 292]}} | {{harvnb|Luper|2004|pp=271–272}} }}</ref> === Empiricalisme e razonalisme === {{AX|Empiricalisme|Razonalisme}} {{multiple image |perrow=2 |total_width=350 |image1=John Locke.jpg |alt1=Depinta de John Locke |image2=David_Hume_2.jpg |alt2=Depinta de David Hume |footer=[[John Locke]] e [[David Hume]] ia formi la filosofia de empiricalisme. }} La debate entre empiricalisme e razonalisme es consentrada sur la orijinas de sabe umana. Empiricalisme asentua ce [[demostra empirical|esperia sensal]] es la fonte prima de tota sabe. Alga empiricalistes espresa esta vista par afirma ce la mente es un [[tabula rasa|tableta vacua]] cual developa sola ideas sur la mundo esterna de la datos sensal cual lo reseta de la organos sensal. Seguente los, la mente pote ariva a alga intuis ajuntada par compara impresas, combina los, jenerali per ariva a ideas plu astrata, e dedui concluis nova de los. Empiricalistes dise ce tota esta operas mental depende de materia de la sensas e no funsiona nondependente.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Lacey|2005|p=242}} | {{harvnb|Markie|Folescu|2023|loc=Lead section, § 1.2 Empiricism}} }}</ref> An si razonalistes aseta tipal esperia sensal como un fonte de sabe,{{efn|Alga formas de razonalisme estrema, trovada en [[filosofia elinica antica]], comprende razona como la sola fonte de sabe.<ref>{{harvnb|Lacey|2005a|p=783}}</ref>}} los dise ce formas importante de sabe veni ance direta de [[razona]] sin esperia sensal,<ref name="auto2">{{multiref | {{harvnb|Lacey|2005a|p=783}} | {{harvnb|Markie|Folescu|2023|loc=Lead section, § 1. Introduction}} }}</ref> como sabe de verias matematical e lojical.<ref>{{harvnb|Tieszen|2005|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=2fgQ_fuCcKAC&pg=PA175 175]}}</ref> Seguente alga razonalistes, la mente posese [[inatisme|ideas inata]] cual lo pote asede sin la aida de la sensas. Otras afrima ce on ave un capasia cognisial ajuntada, a veses nomida [[intui lojical|intui razonal]], par cual persones oteni sabe nonempirical.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Lacey|2005a|p=783}} | {{harvnb|Markie|Folescu|2023|loc=Lead section, § 1. Introduction}} | {{harvnb|Hales|2009|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=sINRmT4rZ5wC&pg=PA29 29]}} }}</ref> Alga razonalistes limita sua discute a la orijina de consetas, disente ce la mente depende de [[teoria de categorias|categorias]] inata per comprende la mundo e organiza esperia.<ref name="auto2"/> === Fundalisme e coerentisme === {{AX|Fundalisme epistemolojial|Coerentisme}} Fundalistes e coerentistes no acorda sur la strutur de sabe.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Audi|1988|pp=407–408}} | {{harvnb|Stairs|2017|pp=155–156}} | {{harvnb|Margolis|2007|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=BeyuCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA214 214]}} }}</ref>{{efn|On pote comprende ambos como respondes a la [[regresa infinita|problem de regresa]].<ref>{{harvnb|Bradley|2015|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=qKXDCQAAQBAJ&pg=PA170 170]}}</ref>}} Fundalisme distingui entre credes fundal e nonfundal. Un crede es fundal si lo es direta justida, sinifiante ce sua validia no depende de la suporta de otra credes.{{efn|La teoria de fundalisme clasical ave un nesesada plu forte cual dise ce credes fundal es [[autoevidente]] o nondutable.<ref>{{harvnb|Blaauw|Pritchard|2005|p=64}}</ref>}} Un crede es nonfundal si lo es justida par un otra crede.<ref name="auto7">{{multiref | {{harvnb|Stairs|2017|pp=155–156}} | {{harvnb|Margolis|2007|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=BeyuCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA214 214]}} }}</ref> Per esemplo, la crede ce lo ia pluve a la note pasada es un crede nonfundal si lo es deduida de la oserva ce la strada es moiada.<ref>{{harvnb|Stairs|2017|p=155}}</ref> Seguente fundalisme, credes fundal es la funda sur cual tota otra sabe es construida ma credes nonfundal constitui la suprastrutur cual reposa sur esta funda.<ref name="auto7"/> Coerentistes rejeta la distingui entre credes fundal e nonfundal, disente ce la justi de cualce crede depende de otra credes. Los afirma ce un crede debe es en acorda con otra credes per deveni sabe. Esta es la caso si la credes es coerente e suporta lunlotra. Seguente coerentisme, justi es un aspeta [[Olisme|oliste]] determinada par la sistem intera de credes, cual sembla un rede interliada.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Stairs|2017|pp=156–157}} | {{harvnb|O'Brien|2006|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=TOQcebWMstwC&pg=PA77 77]}} }}</ref> La vista de [[fundcoerentisme]] es un loca media cual combina elementos de ambos fundalisme e coerentisme. Lo aseta la distingui entre credes fundal e nonfundal ma afirma ce la justi de credes nonfundal depende de coere con otra credes.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Ruppert|Schlüter|Seide|2016|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=nF2mCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA59 59]}} | {{harvnb|Tramel|2008|pp=215–216}} }}</ref> [[Infinitisme]] presenta un otra prosimi a la strutur de sabe. Lo acorda con coerentisme ce on ave no credes fundal ma rejeta la vista ce credes pote suporta lunlotra en un [[razona circulo|modo sirculo]]. En loca, lo argumenta ce credes formi cadenas infinita de justi, en cual cada lia de la cadena suporta la crede seguente lo e es suportada par la crede presedente lo.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Bradley|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=qKXDCQAAQBAJ&pg=PA170 170–171]}} | {{harvnb|Stairs|2017|pp=155–156}} }}</ref> === Internisme e esternisme === [[File:Alvin Goldman 1966.jpg|thumb|alt=Foto de Alvin Goldman|[[Alvin Goldman]] ia es un defendor influente de esternisme.{{efn|BonJour|2016}}]] La desacorda entre internisme e esternisme es sur la fontes de justi.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Pappas|2023|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Crumley II|2009|pp=159–160}} | {{harvnb|Fumerton|2011|loc=Lead section}} }}</ref>{{efn|La debate interniste-esterniste es diferente de la debate sur internisme-esternisme de [[filosofia de mente]], cual demanda esce states mental depende sola de la individua o ance de sua ambiente.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Bernecker|2013|loc=Note 1}} | {{harvnb|Wilson|2023}} }}</ref>}} Internistes dise ce justi depende sola de fatores en la individua. Esemplos de tal fatores inclui esperia persepal, memorias, e la posese de otra credes. Esta vista asentua la importa de la perspetiva cognisial de la individua en la forma de sua states mental. Lo es comun asosiada con la idea ce la fatores pertinente es asededa, sinifiante ce la individua pote deveni consensa de sua razonas per teni un crede justida con introspeta e refleta.<ref name="auto4">{{multiref | {{harvnb|Pappas|2023|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Poston|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Crumley II|2009|pp=159–160}} }}</ref> Esternisme rejeta esta vista, disente ce a la min alga fatores pertinente es esterna a la individua. Esta sinifia ce la perspetiva cognisial de la individua es min sentral en cuando otra fatores, spesial la relata a veria, deveni plu importante.<ref name="auto4"/> Per esemplo, cuando on considera la crede ce un tas de cafe es sur la table, esternistes no es sola interesada en la esperia persepal cual ia gida a esta crede ma considera ance la cualia de la vide de la person, sua capasia de distingui cafe de otra bevidas, e la situas su cual el ia oserva la tas.<ref>{{harvnb|Crumley II|2009|p=160}}</ref> [[Demostralisme]] es un vista interniste influente. Lo dise ce justi depende de la posese de [[demostra]]. En esta contesto, demostra suportante un crede es cualce informa en la mente de la individua cual suporta la crede.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crumley II|2009|pp=99, 298}} | {{harvnb|Carter|Littlejohn|2021|loc=§ 9.3.3 An Evidentialist Argument}} | {{harvnb|Mittag|loc=Lead section}} }}</ref> Per esemplo, la esperia persepal de pluve es demostra suportante la crede ce lo pluve. Demostralistes ia sujesta otra formas variosa de demostra, incluinte memorias, intuis, e otra credes.<ref>{{harvnb|Mittag|loc=§ 2b. Evidence}}</ref> Seguente demostralisme, un crede es justida si la demostra de la individua suporta la crede e los manteni la crede par causa de esta demostra.<ref>{{harvnb|Crumley II|2009|pp=99, 298}}</ref> [[Fidablisme]] es un teoria esterniste cual afirma ce un lia fidable entre crede e veria es nesesada per justi.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crumley II|2009|pp=83, 301}} | {{harvnb|Olsson|2016}} }}</ref> Alga fidablistes esplica esta en termas de prosedes fidable. Seguente esta vista, un crede es justida si lo es produida par un prosede fidable de formi credes, como persepi. Un prosede de formi credes es fidable si la plu de la credes cual lo causa es vera. Un vista pico diferente foca a credes en loca de prosedes de formi credes, disente ce un crede es justida si lo es un indicador fidable de la fato cual lo presenta. Esta sinifia ce la crede segue la fato: la person crede lo car lo es un fato ma no ta crede lo en otra modo.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crumley II|2009|p=84}} | {{harvnb|Lyons|2016|pp=160–162}} | {{harvnb|Olsson|2016}} }}</ref> [[Epistemolojia de virtua]] es un otra tipo de esternisme e es a veses comprendeda como un forma de fidablisme. Lo dise ce un crede es justida si lo mostra virtuas inteletal. Virtuas inteletal es capasias o cualias cual fa funsionas cognisial e aida persones formi credes vera. Esemplos sujestada inclui capasias como vide, memoria, e introspeta.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crumley II|2009|pp=175–176}} | {{harvnb|Baehr, "''Virtue Epistemology''"|ref=Baehr, "''Virtue Epistemology''"|loc=Lead section, § 1. Introduction to Virtue Epistemology}} }}</ref> === Otras === En la epistemolojia de persepi, [[realisme direta e nondireta|realistes direta e nondireta]] no acorda sur la lia entre la persepor e la ojeto persepida. Realistes direta dise ce esta lia es direta, sinifiante ce on ave no difere entre la ojeto presente en la esperia persepal e la ojeto fisical cual causa esta esperia. Seguente realisme nondireta, la lia es nondireta car on ave cosas mental, como ideas o datos sensal, cual media entre la persepor e la mundo esterna. La contrasta entre realisme direta e nondireta es importante per esplica la natur de iludes.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Brown|1992|p=341}} | {{harvnb|Crumley II|2009|pp=268–269, 277–278, 300–301}} }}</ref> [[Construintisme (filosofia de siensa)|Construintisme]] en epistemolojia es la teoria ce como persones vide la mundo no es un refleta simple de realia esterna ma un inventa o un construi sosial. Esta vista asentua la rol creosa de interprete ma sumina ojetalia car construis sosial pote difere de sosia a sosia.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Chiari|Nuzzo|2009|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=CrqNAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA21 21]}} | {{harvnb|Crumley II|2009|pp=215–216, 301}} }}</ref> Seguente [[contrastisme]], sabe es un terma comparativa, sinifiante ce sabe alga cosa envolve distingui lo de alternativas pertinente. Per esemplo, si un person vide un avia en la jardin, el pote sabe ce lo es un pasaro en loca de un agila ma el pote no sabe ce lo es un pasaro en loca de un ologram nondistinguable de un pasaro.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Cockram|Morton|2017}} | {{harvnb|Baumann|2016|pp=59–60}} }}</ref> [[Conservalisme epistemolojial]] es un vista sur la [[revisa de credes]]. Lo dona prefere a la credes cual un person ave ja, afirmante ce un person debe sola cambia sua credes si el ave un razona bon per fa lo. Un motiva per adota conservalisme epistemolojial es ce la recursos cognisial de umanas es limitada, sinifiante ce lo no es posible reesamina constante cada crede.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Foley|1983|p=165}} | {{harvnb|Vahid|loc=Lead section, § 1. Doxastic Conservatism: The Debate}} }}</ref> Epistemolojia [[practicalisme|praticaliste]] es un forma de falablisme cual asentua la relata prosima entre sabe e ata. Lo vide la persegue de sabe como un prosede continuante gidada par sensa comun e esperia ma sempre abrida a revisa.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Legg|Hookway|2021|loc=Lead section, § 4. Pragmatist Epistemology}} | {{harvnb|Kelly|Cordeiro|2020|p=1}} }}</ref> [[Epistemolojia bayesian]] es un prosimi formal fundida sur la idea ce persones ave grados de crede cual representa cuanto serta los es. Lo usa la teoria de probablia per defini normas de razonalia cual governa cuanto serta persones debe es sur sua credes.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Titelbaum|2022|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=AiFnEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA3 3, 31–32]}} | {{harvnb|Cozic|2018|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=RCxhDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA68 Confirmation and Induction]}} }}</ref> Epistemolojia [[fenomenolojia|fenomenolojial]] asentua la importa de esperia de person prima. Lo distingui entre la disposas natural e fenomenolojial. La disposa natural foca a ojetos cual parteni a sensa comun e siensa natural. La disposa fenomenolojial foca a la esperia de ojetos e atenta furni un descrive sin presuposa de como ojetos apare a la oservor.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Pietersma|2000|pp=3–4}} | {{harvnb|Howarth|1998|loc=§ Article Summary}} }}</ref> Spesifadisme e jeneralisme no acorda sur la [[metodolojia filosofial|metodo coreta de condui rexerca epistemolojial]]. Spesifadistes comensa sua investiga par regarda casos spesifada. Per esemplo, per trova un defini de sabe, los depende de sua intuis sur casos concreta de sabe e esperimentas de pensa spesial. Los usa esta oservas como constrinjes metodolojial cual cualce teoria de prinsipes plu jeneral nesesa segue. Jeneralistes prosede en la dirije oposante. Los dona prefere a prinsipes epistemolojial jeneral, disente ce lo no es posible esata identifia e descrive casos spesifada sin un comprende de esta prinsipes.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Greco|2021|loc=§ 1. Methodology in Epistemology: Particularism and Generalism}} | {{harvnb|Lemos|2005|pp=488–489}} | {{harvnb|Dancy|2010|pp=532–533}} }}</ref> Otra metodos en epistemolojia contempora atenta estrae [[filosofia de lingua comun|intuis filosofial de lingua comun]] o regarda la rol de sabe en fa afirmas e gida atas.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Greco|2021|loc=§ 2. Methodology in Epistemology: Beyond Particularism}} | {{harvnb|Gardiner|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=xn2ECgAAQBAJ&pg=PA31 31, 33–35]}} }}</ref> Epistemolojia [[posmodernisme|posmoderna]] critica la situas de sabe en sosias avansada. Esta conserna spesial la [[metanara]] de un progresa constante de sabe siensal cual gida a un comprende universal e fundal de realia.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Sharpe|2018|pp=318–319}} | {{harvnb|Best|Kellner|1991|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=vZBKEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA165 165]}} }}</ref> Epistemolojia [[femisme|femiste]] critica la efeto de [[jenero]] sur sabe. Entre otra temas, lo esplora como preconsetas sur jenero influe ci ave asede a sabe, como sabe es produida, e cual tipos de sabe es valuada en sosia.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Anderson|1995|p=50}} | {{harvnb|Anderson|2024|loc=Lead section}} }}</ref> Eruditia descoloninte critica la influe global de sistemes de sabe ueste, frecuente con la gol de [[descoloni de sabe|descoloni sabe]] per suverti la ejemonia ueste.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Lee|2017|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=ZtArDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT67 67]}} | {{harvnb|Dreyer|2017|pp=1–7}} }}</ref> Scolas variosa de epistemolojia es trovada en [[Āstika e nāstika|filosofia barati tradisional]]. Multe de los foca a la fontes diferente de sabe, nomida pramāṇa. [[Pratyaksha|Persepi]], dedui e [[Shabda|atesta]] es fontes discuteda par la plu de scolas. Otra fontes considerada sola par alga scolas es [[Anupalabdhi|nonpersepi]], cual gida a sabe de asentias, e suposa.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Phillips|1998|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Phillips|Vaidya|2024|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Bhatt|Mehrotra|2017|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=D4kwEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA12 12–13]}} }}</ref> Epistemolojia [[budisme|budiste]] tende foca a esperia direta, comprendeda como la presenta de spesifadas unica sin la envolve de prosedes cognisial du, como pensa e desira.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Phillips|1998|loc=§ 1. Buddhist Pragmatism and Coherentism}} | {{harvnb|Siderits|2021|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=YzhCEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA332 332]}} }}</ref> La epistemolojia de [[Nyāya]] discute la relata causal entre la sabente e la ojeto de sabe, cual aveni par prosedes fidable de formi sabe. Lo vide persepi como la fonte prima de sabe, identifiante un lia prosima entre lo e ata susedosa.<ref>{{harvnb|Phillips|1998|loc=§ 2. Nyāya Reliabilism}}</ref> La epistemolojia de [[Mīmāṃsā]] comprende la scrivedas santa conoseda como la [[Vedas]] como un fonte clavin de sabe e discute la problem de sua interprete coreta.<ref>{{harvnb|Phillips|1998|loc=§ 2. Mīmāṃsā Self-certificationalism}}</ref> [[Epistemolojia jain]] afirma ce realia es [[Anekantavada|multifasal]], sinifiante ce no vista singular pote catura la intera de veria.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Webb|loc=§ 2. Epistemology and Logic}} | {{harvnb|Sethia|2004|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=QYdlKv8wBiYC&pg=PA93 93]}} }}</ref> == Ramos == Alga ramos de epistemolojia foca a la problemes de sabe en disiplinas academial spesifada. La [[filosofia de siensa|epistemolojia de siensa]] esamina como sabe siensal es jenerada e cual problemes emerji en la prosede de valida, justi, e interprete alegas siensal. Un tema clavin conserna la problem de como [[problem de indui|oservas individua pote suporta leges siensal universal]]. Otra temas inclui la natur de demostra siensal e la goles de siensa.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|McCain|Kampourakis|2019|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=wlAPEAAAQBAJ&pg=PR13 xiii–xiv]}} | {{harvnb|Bird|2010|p=[https://www.jstor.org/stable/40801354 5]}} | {{harvnb|Merritt|2020|pp=[https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/philosophical-approach-to-mond/epistemology-of-science/065BF49E6DE64BA37364BA90542815D0 1–2]}} }}</ref> La epistemolojia de matematica studia la orijina de sabe matematical. En esplora como teorias matematical es justida, lo investiga la rol de demostras e esce on ave fontes empirical de sabe matematical.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Murawski|2004|pp=571–572}} | {{harvnb|Sierpinska|Lerman|1996|pp=[https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-009-1465-0_23 827–828]}} }}</ref> Problemes epistemolojial es trovada en la plu de areas de filosofia. La [[lojica|epistemolojia de lojica]] esamina como persones sabe ce un [[argumenta]] es [[Validia (lojica)|valida]]. Per esemplo, lo esplora como lojicistes justi ce [[modus ponens]] es un regula de dedui coreta o ce tota [[contradise]]s es falsa.<ref>{{harvnb|Warren|2020|loc=§ 6. The Epistemology of Logic}}</ref> [[metafisica|Epistemolojistes de metafisica]] investiga esce sabe de realia ultima es posible e cual fontes esta sabe ta ave.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|McDaniel|2020|loc=§ 7.2 The Epistemology of Metaphysics}} | {{harvnb|Van Inwagen|Sullivan|Bernstein|2023|loc=§ 5. Is Metaphysics Possible?}} }}</ref> Sabe de afirmas moral, como la afirma ce menti es mal, parteni a la [[etica|epistemolojia de etica]]. Lo studia la rol de [[intuisme etical|intuis etical]], [[coerentisme|coere]] entre credes moral, e la problem de desacorda moral.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|DeLapp|loc=Lead section, § 6. Epistemological Issues in Metaethics}} | {{harvnb|Sayre-McCord|2023|loc=§ 5. Moral Epistemology}} }}</ref> La [[etica de crede]] es un campo prosima relatada cual trata la interelata entre epistemolojia e [[etica]]. Lo esamina la normas cual governa la formi de credes e demanda esce viole los es moral mal.<ref>{{harvnb|Chignell|2018|loc=Lead section}}</ref> [[Epistemolojia relijial]] studia la rol de sabe e justi per dotrinas e praticas relijiosa. Lo evalua la pesa e fidablia de demostra de [[esperia relijial]] e [[testo relijial|scrivedas santa]] ma demanda ance esce la normas de razona debe es aplicada a [[fida]] relijial.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|McNabb|2019|pp=1–3, 22–23}} | {{harvnb|Howard-Snyder|McKaughan|2023|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=M5LTEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA96 96–97]}} }}</ref> [[Epistemolojia sosial]] foca a la dimension sosial de sabe. An si epistemolojia tradisional es xef interesada en sabe poseseda par individuas, epistemolojia sosial trata la oteni, transmete e evalua de sabe en grupos, con asentua spesial a como persones depende de lunlotra cuando los xerca sabe.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Tanesini|2017|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|O’Connor|Goldberg|Goldman|2024|loc=Lead section, § 1. What Is Social Epistemology?}} }}</ref> [[Epistemolojia istorial]] esamina como la comprende de sabe e consetas relatada ia cambia tra tempo. Lo demanda esce la temas xef en epistemolojia es perene e a cual grado teorias epistemolojial pasada es pertinente a debates contempora. Lo es spesial consernada con sabe siensal e praticas asosiada con lo.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Ávila|Almeida|2023|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=sFTaEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA235 235]}} | {{harvnb|Vermeir|2013|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=hKqCD5U_ba8C&pg=PA65 65–66]}} | {{harvnb|Sturm|2011|pp=303–304, 306, 308}} }}</ref> Lo contrasta con la istoria de epistemolojia, cual presenta, reconstrui e evalua teorias epistemolojial de filosofistes en la pasada.<ref>{{harvnb|Sturm|2011|pp=303–304, 08–309}}</ref>{{efn|La natur esata de la contrasta es disputada.<ref>{{harvnb|Sturm|2011|p=304}}</ref>}} [[Epistemolojia naturalida]] es prosima asosiada con la [[siensas natural]], dependente de sua metodos e teorias per esamina sabe. Epistemolojistes naturaliste foca a oserva empirical per formula sua teorias e critica frecuente prosimis epistemolojial cual prosede par razona ''a priori''.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crumley II|2009|pp=183–184, 188–189, 300}} | {{harvnb|Wrenn|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Rysiew|2021|loc=§ 2. 'Epistemology Naturalized'}} }}</ref> [[Epistemolojia evolual]] es un prosimi naturaliste cual comprende cognisio como un produida de [[evolui]], esaminante sabe e la capasias cognisial cual capasi lo de la perspetiva de [[eleje natural]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Bradie|Harms|2023|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Gontier|loc=Lead section}} }}</ref> Epistemolojistes de lingua esplora la natur de sabe lingual. Un de sua temas es la rol de sabe induinte, per esemplo, cuando parlores nativa mestre la regulas de [[gramatica]] ma no es capas de espresa clar acel regulas..<ref>{{harvnb|Barber|2003|pp=1–3, 10–11, 15}}</ref> Epistemolojistes de modalia esamina sabe sur lo cual es posible e nesesada.<ref>{{harvnb|Vaidya|Wallner|2021|pp=1909–1910}}</ref> Problemes epistemolojial cual emerji cuando du persones ave opinas diverjente sur un tema es tratada par la epistemolojia de desacorda.<ref>{{harvnb|Croce|2023|loc=Lead section}}</ref> Epistemolojistes de nonsabe es interesada en falias e bucos epistemolojial en sabe.<ref>{{harvnb|Maguire|2015|pp=[https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-017-9309-4_4 33–34]}}</ref> On ave areas distinguida de epistemolojia dedicada a fontes spesifada de sabe. Esemplos es la epistemolojia de persepi, la epistemolojia de memoria e la [[filosofia de atesta|epistemolojia de atesta]]. Alga ramos de epistemolojia es marcada par sua metodo de rexerca. [[Epistemolojia formal]] emplea utiles formal trovada en lojica e matematica per investiga la natur de sabe.<ref>{{harvnb|Douven|Schupbach|2014|loc=Lead section}}</ref>{{efn|Lo es prosima relatada a [[epistemolojia computal]], cual esamina la interelata entre sabe e prosedes computal.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Segura|2009|pp=557–558}} | {{harvnb|Hendricks|2006|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=Bjnje5u2q9cC&pg=PA115 115]}} }}</ref>}} [[Filosofia esperimental|Epistemolojistes esperimental]] depende en sua rexerca de demostra empirical sur praticas comun de sabe.<ref>{{harvnb|Beebe|2017|loc=Lead section}}</ref> [[Epistemolojia aplicada]] foca a la aplica pratical de prinsipes epistemolojial a problemes diversa de la mundo real, como la fidablia de afirmas de sabe en la interede, como evalua alegas de [[ataca sesal]], e como [[razisme]] pote gida a [[nonjustia epistemolojial]].<ref>{{harvnb|Lackey|2021|pp=3, 8–9, 13}}</ref>{{efn|Nonjustia epistemolojial aveni cuando afirmas valida de sabe es rejetada o malrepresentada.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Fricker|2007|pp=1–2}} | {{harvnb|Crichton|Carel|Kidd|2017|pp=65–66}} }}</ref>}} [[metaepistemolojia|Metaepistemolojistes]] esamina la natur, goles e metodos de rexerca de epistemolojia. Como un [[metateoria]], lo no defende direta un vista sur cual teorias epistemolojial es coreta ma esamina sua consetas fundal e suposas fondal.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gerken|2018|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Mchugh|Way|Whiting|2019|pp=1–2}} }}</ref>{{efn|An tal, intuis metaespistemolojial pote ave efetos nondireta variosa sur disputas en epistemolojia.<ref>{{harvnb|Gerken|2018|loc=Lead section}}</ref>}} == Campos relatada == Epistemolojia e [[psicolojia]] no ia es definida como campos diferente asta la sentenio 19; investigas plu temprana sur sabe frecuente no conveni esata a la categorias academial de oji.<ref>{{harvnb|Alston|2006|p=2}}</ref> Ambos campos contempora studia credes e la prosedes mental cual formi e cambia los. Un contrasta importante es ce psicolojia descrive cual credes persones ave e como los oteni los, e en esta modo, lo esplica perce algun ave un crede spesifada.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Kitchener|1992|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=q_MxOPSqRjYC&pg=PA119 119]}} | {{harvnb|Crumley II|2009|p=16}} | {{harvnb|Schmitt|2004|pp=841–842}} }}</ref> La foca de epistemolojia es a la evalua de credes, gidante a un judi sur esce un crede es justida e razonal en un caso spesifada. Epistemolojia ave un lia simil intima a [[siensa cognisial]], cual comprende avenis mental como prosedes cual transformi [[informa]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Schmitt|2004|pp=841–842}} | {{harvnb|Friedenberg|Silverman|Spivey|2022|pp=2–3}} }}</ref> [[Inteleto artifis]] depende de la intuis de epistemolojia e siensa cognisial per reali solves concreta a problemes asosiada con la [[representa de sabe]] e [[razona automata]].<ref>{{harvnb|Wheeler|Pereira|2004|pp=469–470, 472, 491}}</ref> [[Lojica]] es la studia de razona coreta. Per epistemolojia, lo es pertinente a sabe deduinte, cual emerji cuando un person razona de un fato conoseda a un otra.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Rosenberg|2002|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=8UgVDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA184 184]}} | {{harvnb|Steup|Neta|2024|loc=§ 4.1 Foundationalism}} | {{harvnb|Audi|2002|p=90}} }}</ref> Esta es la caso, per esemplo, si un person no sabe direta ce <math>572+382=954</math> ma dedui lo car el sabe ce <math>2+2=4</math>, <math>8+7=15</math> e <math>5+3=8</math>.<ref>{{harvnb|Clark|2009|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=i1tNI9646Q4C&pg=PA516 516]}}</ref> Esce un crede deduinte deveni sabe depende de la forma de [[razona lojical|razona]] usada, spesial, esce la prosede no viole la leges de lojica.<ref>{{harvnb|Stairs|2017|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=Km1QDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA156 156]}}</ref> Un otra tema compartida par la du campos es trovada en la prosimi epistemolojial a la teoria de [[falasia]]s.<ref name="auto3">{{harvnb|Hansen|2023|loc=§ 3.5 The Epistemic Approach to Fallacies}}</ref> Falasias es argumentas defetosa fundida sur razona noncoreta.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hansen|2023|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Chatfield|2017|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=6Xg4DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA194 194]}} }}</ref> La prosimi epistemolojial a falasias esplica perce los es defetosa, afirmante ce argumentas atenta estende sabe. Seguente esta vista, un argumenta es un falasia si lo fali fa tal. Un otra crusa es trovada en lojica epistemolojial, cual usa aparatos lojical formal per studia consetas epistemolojial como ''sabe'' e ''crede''.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Rescher|2005|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=o7m3amAbDEsC&pg=PA1 1]}} | {{harvnb|Rendsvig|Symons|Wang|2024|loc=Lead section}} }}</ref> Ambos [[teoria de deside]] e epistemolojia es interesada en la fundas de pensa razonal e la rol de credes. No como multe prosimis en epistemolojia, la foca xef de teoria de deside es min en la lado teorial e plu en la lado pratical, esplorante como credes es traduida a ata.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Kaplan|2005|pp=434, 443–444}} | {{harvnb|Steele|Stefánsson|2020|loc=Lead section, § 7. Concluding Remarks}} | {{harvnb|Hooker|Leach|McClennen|2012|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=7fntCAAAQBAJ&pg=PR13 xiii–xiv]}} }}</ref> Teoristes de deside esamina la razona envolveda en fa desides e la normas de desides bon.<ref>{{harvnb|Steele|Stefánsson|2020|loc=Lead section}}</ref> Los identifia credes como un aspeta sentral de fa desides. Un de sua inovas es distingui entre credes plu debil e plu forte. Esta aida los a atende la efeto de nonsertias sur desides.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Kaplan|2005|pp=434, 443–444}} | {{harvnb|Steele|Stefánsson|2020|loc=§ 7. Concluding Remarks}} }}</ref> Epistemolojia e [[educa]] ave un interesa compartida en sabe, con un difere esente ce educa foca a la transmete de sabe, esplorante la roles de ambos la aprendor e la ensenior.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Chazan|2022|p=15}} | {{harvnb|Leong|2007|loc=[https://www.encyclopedia.com/education/applied-and-social-sciences-magazines/epistemology-and-education § Abstract, § Some Implications for Educators]}} }}</ref> [[Teoria de aprende]] esamina como persones oteni sabe.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Kelly|2004|pp=183–184}} | {{harvnb|Harasim|2017|p=4}} }}</ref> Teorias de aprende [[conduisme|condual]] esplica la prosede en termas de cambias de condui, per esemplo, par [[condisiona clasical|asosia un responde spesifada con un stimula spesial]].<ref>{{harvnb|Harasim|2017|p=11}}</ref> Teorias de aprende [[cognisialisme|cognisial]] studia como la prosedes cognisial cual afeta la oteni de sabe transformi informa.<ref>{{harvnb|Harasim|2017|pp=11–12}}</ref> [[Pedagojia]] regarda la transmete de sabe de la lado de la ensenior, esplorante la [[metodo de ensenia|metodos de ensenia]] cual los pote usa.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Watkins|Mortimore|1999|pp=1–3}} | {{harvnb|Payne|2003|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=abocsyBzTMMC&pg=PA264 264]}} | {{harvnb|Gabriel|2022|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=PreYEAAAQBAJ&pg=PT16 16]}} | {{harvnb|Turuthi|Njagi|Chemwei|2017|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=5JE3DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA365 365]}} }}</ref> En metodos consentrada a la ensenior, la ensenior jua la rol de la autoria xef cual furni sabe e gida la prosede de aprende. En [[aprende consentrada a la studiante|metodos consentrada a la studiante]], la ensenior xef suporta e fasili la prosede de aprende en cuando la studiantes jua un rol plu ativa.<ref>{{harvnb|Emaliana|2017|pp=59–61}}</ref> La credes cual studiantes ave sur sabe, nomida epistemolojia personal, afeta sua developa inteletal e susede de aprende.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hofer|2008|pp=[https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-4020-6596-5_1 3–4]}} | {{harvnb|Hofer|2001|pp=353–354, 369–370}} }}</ref> La [[antropolojia]] de sabe esamina como sabe es otenida, retenida, reprendeda, e comunicada. Lo studia la situas sosial e cultural cual afeta como sabe es reproduida e cambia, tratante la rol de instituidas como departes de universia e jornales siensal e ance discutes con fas a fas e comunicas enlinia. Lo comprende sabe con un sinifia larga cual inclui formas variosa de comprende e cultur, como capasias pratical. No como epistemolojia, lo no es interesada en esce un crede es vera o justida ma en como comprende es reproduida en sosia.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Allwood|2013|pp=[https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/9781118339893.wbeccp025 69–72]}} | {{harvnb|Barth|2002|pp=1–2}} }}</ref> La [[sosiolojia de sabe]] es un campo prosima relatada con un conseta simil de sabe. Lo esplora como fatores fisical, demografial, economial e sosiocultural afeta sabe. Lo esamina en cual contestos sosioistorial sabe emerji e la efetos cual lo ave a persones, per esemplo, como situas sosioeconomial es relatada a la [[ideolojia dominante]] en un sosia.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Coser|2009|loc=[https://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences-and-law/sociology-and-social-reform/sociology-general-terms-and-concepts/sociology-knowledge Knowledge, Sociology of]}} | {{harvnb|Tufari|2003|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=4C0KAQAAMAAJ Knowledge, Sociology of]}} | {{harvnb|Scheler|Stikkers|2012|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=pFqrO7Lxiw4C&pg=PA23 23]}} }}</ref> == Istoria == Refletas temprana sur la natur e fontes de sabe es trovada en istoria antica. En [[filosofia elinica antica]], [[Platon]] (427–347 aec) ia studia [[episteme|lo cual sabe es]], esaminante como lo difere de [[doxa|opina]] vera par es fundida sur razonas bon.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hamlyn|2005|p=260}} | {{harvnb|Pappas|1998|loc=§ Ancient Philosophy}} }}</ref> Seguente el, la prosede de aprende alga cosa es [[Anamnese|un forma de recorda]] en cual la spirito recorda lo cual lo ia sabe ja a ante.<ref name="auto5">{{harvnb|Pappas|1998|loc=§ Ancient Philosophy}}</ref>{{efn|Per argumenta per esta punto, Platon ia usa la esemplo de un xico slavida, ci susede responde a un serie de demandas sur jeometria an con ce el no ia studia jeometria a ante.<ref name="auto5"/>}} Aristotele (384–322 aec) ia es spesial interesada en sabe siensal, esplorante la rol de esperia sensal e como fa deduis de prinsipes jeneral.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Pappas|1998|loc=§ Ancient Philosophy}} | {{harvnb|Hamlyn|2005|p=260}} | {{harvnb|Wolenski|2004|p=7}} }}</ref> La [[filosofia eliniste|scolas eliniste]] ia comensa emerji en la sentenio 4 aec. La [[epicurisme|epicuristes]] ia ave un perspetiva [[empiricalisme|empiricaliste]], afirmante ce sensas es sempre esata e servi como la norma suprema de judis.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hamlyn|2006|pp=287–288}} | {{harvnb|Wolenski|2004|p=8}} }}</ref> La [[stoicisme|stoicas]] ia defende un vista simil ma ia limita se a sensas clar e spesifada, cual los ia regarda como vera.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hamlyn|2006|p=288}} | {{harvnb|Vogt|2011|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=4s-X8wfhemsC&pg=PA44 44]}} }}</ref> La seticas ia ave duta sur esce sabe es posible, recomendante en loca la suspende de judi per ariva a un state de calmia.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Wolenski|2004|p=8}} | {{harvnb|Pappas|1998|loc=§ Ancient Philosophy}} }}</ref> [[File:Tibet, c. 15th-16th century - Portrait of Dharmakirti - 2010.474 - Cleveland Museum of Art.tif|thumb|alt=Statua de Dharmakirti|La filosofiste budiste [[Dharmakirti]] ia developa un teoria causal de sabe.<ref name="auto1">{{harvnb|Dunne|2006|p=753}}</ref>]] La [[Upanixades]], scrivedas filosofial composada en [[Barat antica]] entre 700 e 300 aec, ia esamina como persones oteni sabe, incluinte la rol de introspeta, compara e dedui.<ref>{{harvnb|Black|loc=Lead section}}</ref> En la sentenio 6 aec, la scola de [[Ajñana]] ia developa un seticisme radical cual pone en duta la posiblia e usosia de sabe.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Fountoulakis|2021|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=xGtREAAAQBAJ&pg=PA23 23]}} | {{harvnb|Warder|1998|pp=43–44}} | {{harvnb|Fletcher|Romero|Talbot|Warburton|2020|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=drX4DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA46 46]}} }}</ref> La scola de [[Nyāya]] ia emerji en la sentenio 2 aec e ia furni un trata sistemosa de como persones oteni sabe, distinguinte entre fontes valida e nonvalida.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Prasad|1987|p=48}} | {{harvnb|Dasti|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Bhatt|1989|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=upIQgJhpmsIC&pg=PA72 72]}} }}</ref> Cuando [[filosofia budiste|filosofistes budiste]] ia deveni plu tarda interesada en epistemolojia, los ia depende de consetas developada en Nyāya e otra tradisiones.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Prasad|1987|p=6}} | {{harvnb|Dunne|2006|p=753}} }}</ref> La filosofiste budiste [[Dharmakirti]] (sentenio 6 o 7 ec)<ref>{{harvnb|Bonevac|2023|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=neDwEAAAQBAJ&pg=PR18 xviii]}}</ref> ia analise la prosede de sabe como un serie de avenis causal relatada.<ref name="auto1"/> [[Filosofia xines|Filosofistes xines]] antica ia comprende sabe como un fenomeno interliada fundal liada a condui etical e envolve sosial. Multe ia vide sajia como la gol de ateni sabe.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Rošker|2021|loc=Lead section, § 2.1 Relational Epistemology}} | {{harvnb|Shen|2006|pp=215–216, 219}} }}</ref> [[Mozi]] (470–391 aec) ia proposa un prosimi praticaliste a sabe usante rejistras istorial, demostra sensal, e resultas pratical per validi credes.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Littlejohn|loc=§ 2a. The Mozi, Later Mohists and Debaters (bianshi)}} | {{harvnb|Shen|2006|p=216}} }}</ref> [[Mencius]] (sirca 372–289 aec) ia esplora razona analoja como un otra fonte de sabe.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Littlejohn|loc=§ 2c. Mencius (Mengzi, c. 372-289 B.C.E.) and Analogical Reasoning}} | {{harvnb|Shen|2006|p=216}} }}</ref> [[Xunzi (filofiste)|Xunzi]] (sirca 310-220 aec) ia atenta combina oserva empirical e investiga razonal. El ia asentua la importa de claria e normas de razona sin esclui la rol de senti e emosia.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Littlejohn|loc=§ 2d. Xunzi (310-220 B.C.E.): Dispelling Obsessions}} | {{harvnb|Shen|2006|p=216}} }}</ref> La relata entre [[razona]] e [[fida]] ia es un tema sentral en la [[filosofia medieval|periodo medieval]]. En [[filosofia muslim|filosofia arabi-persian]], [[al-Farabi]] (sirca 870–950) e [[Averroes]] (1126–1198) ia discute como filosofia e [[teolojia]] interata e cual es la veculo plu bon a veria. [[Al-Ghazali]] (sirca 1056–1111) ia critica multe de la ensenias xef de filosofistes muslim presedente, disente ce los depende de suposas nonprobada cual no deveni sabe.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Griffel|2020|loc=Lead section, § 3. Al-Ghazâlî's 'Refutations' of Falsafa and Ismâ'îlism}} | {{harvnb|Vassilopoulou|Clark|2009|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=bI59DAAAQBAJ&pg=PA303 303]}} }}</ref> En filosofia ueste, Anselmo de Canterbury (1033–1109) ia proposa ce ensenia teolojial e demanda filosofial es en armonia e completi lunlotra.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Wolenski|2004|p=11}} | {{harvnb|Holopainen|2010|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=x5FiMR3kd_8C&pg=PA75 75]}} }}</ref> [[Peter Abelard]] (1079–1142) ia argumenta contra autorias teolojial nondemandada e ia dise ce tota cosas es abrida a duta razonal.<ref>{{harvnb|Wolenski|2004|p=11}}</ref> Influeda par [[Aristotele]], [[Thomas Aquinas]] (1225–1274) ia developa un teoria empiricaliste, afirmante ce "no cosa es en la inteleto estra si lo ia prima apare en la sensas".<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Wolenski|2004|p=11}} | {{harvnb|Hamlyn|2006|pp=289–290}} }}</ref> Seguente un forma temprana de realisme direta proposada par William de Ockham (sirca 1285–1349), persepi de ojetos nondependente de la mente aveni direta sin medias.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Kaye|loc=Lead section, § 4a. Direct Realist Empiricism}} | {{harvnb|Antognazza|2024|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=MzATEQAAQBAJ&pg=PA86 86]}} }}</ref> Entretempo, en la sentenio 14 en Barat, [[Gaṅgeśa]] ia developa un teoria fidabliste de sabe e ia considera la problemes de atesta e falasias.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Phillips|2024|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Prasad|1987|pp=2, 8, 200–202}} }}</ref> En Xina, [[Wang Yangming]] (1472–1529) ia esplora la unia de sabe e ata, credente ce sabe moral es inata e pote es atenida par vinse interesa personal.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Littlejohn|loc=§ 2g. Wang Yangming on liangzhi: Direct, Clear, Universal Knowledge, § 3h. Wang Yangming: Moral Willing as Knowing}} | {{harvnb|Shen|2006|pp=219–222}} }}</ref> [[File:Frans Hals - Portret van René Descartes.jpg|thumb|alt=Depinta de René Descartes|[[René Descartes]] ia usa [[duta cartesian|duta metodolojial]] per xerca fundas serta per filosofia.]] La curso de [[filosofia moderna]] ia es formida par [[René Descartes]] (1596–1650), ci ia afirma ce filosofia debe comensa de un loca de sabe nondutable de prinsipes prima. Inspirada par seticisme, el ia atenta trova sabe asoluta serta par identifia verias cual no pote es dutada. El ia pensa ce esta es la caso per la afirma "[[me pensa, donce me es]]", de cual el ia construi la resta de sua sistem filosofial.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Wolenski|2004|pp=14–15}} | {{harvnb|Hamlyn|2006|p=291}} }}</ref> Descartes, con [[Baruch Spinoza]] (1632–1677) e [[Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz]] (1646–1716), ia parteni a la scola de [[razonalisme]], cual afirma ce la mente posese [[inatisme|ideas inata]] nondependente de esperia.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hamlyn|2005|p=261}} | {{harvnb|Evans|2018|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=Oo9xDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA298 298]}} }}</ref> [[John Locke]] (1632–1704) ia rejeta esta vista en favore de un empiricalisme cual afirma ce la mente es un [[tableta vacua]]. Esta sinifia ce tota ideas depende de esperia sensal, o como "ideas de sensa", cual es direta presentada par la sensas, o como "ideas de refleta", cual la mente crea par refleta sur ideas de sensa.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Wolenski|2004|pp=17–18}} | {{harvnb|Hamlyn|2006|pp=298–299}} | {{harvnb|Hamlyn|2005|p=261}} }}</ref> [[David Hume]] (1711–1776) ia usa esta idea per esplora la limitas de lo cual persones pote sabe. El ia dise ce sabe de fatos es nunca serta, ajuntante ce sabe de relatas entre ideas, como verias matematical, ta pote es serta ma conteni no informa sur la mundo.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Coventry|Merrill|2018|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=X950DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA161 161]}} | {{harvnb|Pappas|1998|loc=§ Modern Philosophy: From Hume to Peirce}} | {{harvnb|Wolenski|2004|pp=22–23}} }}</ref> [[Immanuel Kant]] (1724–1804) ia atenta trova un vista media entre razonalisme e empiricalisme par identifia un tipo de sabe cual ia manca de Hume. Per Kant, esta es sabe sur prinsipes cual suporta tota esperia e struturi lo, como relatas spasial e tempal e categorias fundal de comprende.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Wolenski|2004|pp=27–30}} | {{harvnb|Pappas|1998|loc=§ Modern Philosophy: From Hume to Peirce}} }}</ref> En la sentenio 19, [[Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel]] (1770–1831) ia argumenta contra empiricalisme, disente ce impresas sensal solitar no pote deveni sabe car tota sabe es ativa struturida par la sujeto sabente.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Pappas|1998|loc=§ Modern Philosophy: From Hume to Peirce}} | {{harvnb|Hamlyn|2005|p=262}} }}</ref> [[John Stuart Mill]] (1806–1873) ia defende un forma vasta de empiricalisme e ia esplica sabe de verias jeneral con [[razona induinte]]. [[Charles Peirce]] (1839–1914) ia pensa ce tota sabe es [[falable]], asentuante ce xercores de sabe debe sempre es preparada per revisa sua credes si [[demostra]] nova es encontrada. El ia usa esta idea per argumenta contra fundalisme cartesian cual xerca verias asoluta serta.<ref>{{harvnb|Pappas|1998|loc=§ Modern Philosophy: From Hume to Peirce}}</ref> En la sentenio 20, falablisme ia es plu esplorada par [[J. L. Austin]] (1911–1960) e [[Karl Popper]] (1902–1994).<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Pappas|1998|loc=§ Twentieth Century}} | {{harvnb|Kvasz|Zeleňák|2009|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=R3aywtFIKKsC&pg=PA71 71]}} }}</ref> En [[filosofia continental]], [[Edmund Husserl]] (1859–1938) ia aplica la idea setica de suspende judi a la [[fenomenolojia (filosofia)|studia de esperia]]. Par no judi esce un esperia es esata o no, el ia atenta descrive la strutur interna de esperia en loca.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Rockmore|2011|pp=131–132}} | {{harvnb|Wolenski|2004|p=44}} | {{harvnb|Hamlyn|2006|p=312}} }}</ref> [[positivisme lojical|Positivistes lojical]], como [[A. J. Ayer]] (1910–1989), ia dise ce tota sabe es o empirical o analisal.<ref>{{harvnb|Hamlyn|2005|p=262}}</ref> [[Bertrand Russell]] (1872–1970) ia developa un teoria empiricaliste de datos sensal, distinguinte entre sabe direta par conose de datos sensal e sabe nondireta par descrive, cual es deduida de sabe par conose.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Pappas|1998|loc=§ Twentieth Century}} | {{harvnb|Hamlyn|2006|p=315}} | {{harvnb|Wolenski|2004|pp=48–49}} }}</ref> [[Sensa comun]] ia ave un loca sentral en la epistemolojia de [[G. E. Moore]] (1873–1958). El ia usa oservas trivial, como la fato ce el ave du manos, per argumenta contra teorias filosofial astrata cual devia de sensa comun.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Baldwin|2010|loc=§ 6. Common Sense and Certainty}} | {{harvnb|Wolenski|2004|p=49}} }}</ref> [[Filosofia de lingua comun]], como praticada par [[Ludwig Wittgenstein]] (1889–1951), es un prosimi simil cual atenta estrae intuis epistemolojial de como lingua comun es usada.<ref>{{harvnb|Hamlyn|2006|pp=317–318}}</ref> [[Edmund Gettier]] (1927–2021) ia conseta contraesemplos contra la idea ce sabe es la mesma como crede justida e vera. Esta contraesemplos ia stimula multe filosofistes a sujesta [[definis de sabe|definis alternativa de sabe]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hamlyn|2005|p=262}} | {{harvnb|Beilby|2017|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=omdQDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA74 74]}} | {{harvnb|Pappas|1998|loc=§ Twentieth Century}} }}</ref> Un de la alternativas considerada ia es [[fidablisme]], cual dise ce sabe nesesa fontes fidable, movente la foca a via de justi.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Goldman|Beddor|2021|loc=Lead section, § 1. A Paradigm Shift in Analytic Epistemology}} | {{harvnb|Pappas|1998|loc=§ Twentieth Century, § Recent Issues}} }}</ref> [[Epistemolojia de virtua]], un responde prosima relatada, analise la formi de credes en termas de la virtuas inteletal o capasias cognisial envolveda en la prosede.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Goldman|Beddor|2021|loc=§ 4.1 Virtue Reliabilism}} | {{harvnb|Crumley II|2009|p=175}} }}</ref> [[Epistemolojia naturalida]], como consetada par [[Willard Van Orman Quine]] (1908–2000), usa consetas e ideas de la siensas natural per formula sua teorias.<ref>{{harvnb|Crumley II|2009|pp=183–184, 188–189}}</ref> Otra developas en la tarda de la sentenio 20 en epistemolojia ia es la emerji de [[epistemolojia sosial]], [[epistemolojia femiste|femiste]] e [[epistemolojia itorial|istorial]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Pappas|1998|loc=§ Recent Issues}} | {{harvnb|Vagelli|2019|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=hT33DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA96 96]}} }}</ref> == Vide ance == * [[Teorias de Epistemolojia]] == Referes == ===Notas=== {{Notelist}} ===Sitas=== {{reflist}} ===Fontes=== <div style="height: 200px; overflow:auto; border: 1px solid gray; padding-right: 12px; background-color: var(--background-color-neutral, #eaecf0); color: inherit"> <small> {{Refbegin}} * {{cite book |last1=Allwood |first1=Carl Martin |title=The Encyclopedia of Cross-Cultural Psychology |date=2013 |publisher=John Wiley & Sons, Inc. |isbn=978-1-118-33989-3 |pages=69–72 |url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/9781118339893.wbeccp025 |language=en |chapter=Anthropology of Knowledge |doi=10.1002/9781118339893.wbeccp025 |access-date=26 September 2022 |archive-date=26 September 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220926085332/https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/9781118339893.wbeccp025 |url-status=live }} * {{cite book |last1=Alston |first1=William Payne |title=Beyond Justification: Dimensions of Epistemic Evaluation |publisher=Cornell University Press |isbn=978-0-8014-4291-9 |date=2006 }} * {{cite journal |last1=Anderson |first1=Elizabeth |title=Feminist Epistemology: An Interpretation and a Defense |journal=Hypatia |volume=10 |issue=3 |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/3810237 |issn=0887-5367 |date=1995 |pages=50–84 |doi=10.1111/j.1527-2001.1995.tb00737.x |jstor=3810237 |access-date=3 August 2024 |archive-date=2 August 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240802113229/https://www.jstor.org/stable/3810237 |url-status=live }} * {{cite web |last1=Anderson |first1=Elizabeth |title=Feminist Epistemology and Philosophy of Science |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminism-epistemology/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=2 August 2024 |date=2024 |archive-date=14 October 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191014000453/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminism-epistemology/ |url-status=live }} * {{cite book |last1=Antognazza |first1=Maria Rosa |editor1-last=Logins |editor1-first=Arturs |editor2-last=Vollet |editor2-first=Jacques-Henri |title=Putting Knowledge to Work |publisher=Oxford University PRess |isbn=978-0-19-288237-0 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=MzATEQAAQBAJ&pg=PA86 |chapter=Knowledge as Presence and Presentation: Highlights from the History of Knowledge-First Epistemology |date=2024 |access-date=19 July 2024 |archive-date=18 July 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240718160022/https://books.google.com/books?id=MzATEQAAQBAJ&pg=PA86 |url-status=live }} * {{cite journal |last1=Audi |first1=Robert |title=Foundationalism, Coherentism, and Epistemological Dogmatism |journal=Philosophical Perspectives |volume=2 |doi=10.2307/2214083 |date=1988 |pages=407–442 |jstor=2214083 }} * {{cite book |last1=Audi |first1=Robert |title=The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology |publisher=Oxford University Press |pages=71–94 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/AUDTSO-3 |chapter=The Sources of Knowledge |year=2002 |access-date=12 June 2022 |archive-date=12 June 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220612112116/https://philpapers.org/rec/AUDTSO-3 |url-status=live |isbn=978-0-19-513005-8 }} * {{cite book |last1=Audi |first1=Robert |title=Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-0-415-28108-9 |edition=2 |date=2003 }} * {{cite book |last1=Audi |first1=Robert |editor1-last=Lackey |editor1-first=Jennifer |editor2-last=Sosa |editor2-first=Ernest |title=The Epistemology of Testimony |publisher=Clarendon Press |isbn=978-0-19-153473-7 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=-YPTEeIhOXYC&pg=PA38 |language=en |chapter=Testimony, Credulity, and Veracity |date=2006 |access-date=15 August 2024 |archive-date=22 August 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240822122207/https://books.google.com/books?id=-YPTEeIhOXYC&pg=PA38#v=onepage&q&f=false |url-status=live }} * {{cite book |last1=Ávila |first1=Gabriel da Costa |last2=Almeida |first2=Tiago Santos |editor1-last=Condé |editor1-first=Mauro L. |editor2-last=Salomon |editor2-first=Marlon |title=Handbook for the Historiography of Science |publisher=Springer Nature |isbn=978-3-031-27510-4 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=sFTaEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA235 |language=en |chapter=Lorraine Daston's Historical Epistemology: Style, Program, and School |date=2023 |access-date=30 July 2024 |archive-date=22 August 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240822122210/https://books.google.com/books?id=sFTaEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA235#v=onepage&q&f=false |url-status=live }} * {{cite book |last1=Ayers |first1=Michael |title=Knowing and Seeing: Groundwork for a New Empiricism |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-257012-3 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Qt-RDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA4 |language=en |date=2019 |access-date=19 August 2024 |archive-date=18 August 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240818181733/https://books.google.com/books?id=Qt-RDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA4 |url-status=live }} * {{cite web |last1=Baehr |first1=Jason S. |title=Virtue Epistemology |url=https://iep.utm.edu/virtue-epistemology/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=2 August 2024 |ref=Baehr, "''Virtue Epistemology''" |archive-date=1 April 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230401155028/https://iep.utm.edu/virtue-epistemology/ |url-status=live }} * {{cite web |last1=Baehr |first1=Jason S. |title=A Priori and A Posteriori |url=https://iep.utm.edu/apriori/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=17 September 2022 |archive-date=7 August 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210807213522/https://iep.utm.edu/apriori/ |url-status=live |ref=Baehr, "''A Priori and A Posteriori''" }} * {{cite web |last1=Baldwin |first1=Tom |title=George Edward Moore |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moore/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=17 July 2024 |date=2010 |archive-date=15 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230315182300/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moore/ |url-status=live }} * {{cite book |last1=Barber |first1=Alex |editor1-last=Barber |editor1-first=Alex |title=Epistemology of Language |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-925057-8 |language=en |chapter=Introduction |date=2003 }} * {{cite book |last1=Barnett |first1=Ronald |title=The Idea Of Higher Education |date=1990 |publisher=Open University Press |isbn=978-0-335-09420-2 |page=40 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=eTjlAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA40 |language=en |access-date=5 March 2023 |archive-date=5 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230305174659/https://books.google.com/books?id=eTjlAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA40 |url-status=live }} * {{cite journal |last1=Barth |first1=Fredrik |title=An Anthropology of Knowledge |journal=Current Anthropology |date=2002 |volume=43 |issue=1 |pages=1–18 |doi=10.1086/324131 |hdl=1956/4191 |language=en |issn=0011-3204 |hdl-access=free}} * {{cite journal |last1=Baumann |first1=Peter |title=Epistemic Contrastivism, Knowledge and Practical Reasoning |journal=Erkenntnis |volume=81 |issue=1 |doi=10.1007/s10670-015-9728-z |date=2016 |pages=59–68 }} * {{cite book |last1=Beebe |first1=James |title=Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy |chapter=Experimental Epistemology |chapter-url=https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/experimental-epistemology/v-1 |publisher=Routledge |access-date=30 July 2024 |doi=10.4324/9780415249126-P067-1 |date=2017 |isbn=978-0-415-25069-6 |archive-date=30 July 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240730082844/https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/experimental-epistemology/v-1 |url-status=live }} * {{cite book |last1=Beilby |first1=James |title=Epistemology as Theology: An Evaluation of Alvin Plantinga's Religious Epistemology |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-351-93932-4 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=omdQDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA74 |language=en |date=2017 |access-date=19 July 2024 |archive-date=17 July 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240717170159/https://books.google.com/books?id=omdQDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA74 |url-status=live }} * {{cite journal |last1=Benton |first1=Matthew |title=The Epistemology of Interpersonal Relations |journal=Noûs |volume=early view |issue=|doi=10.1111/nous.12499 |date=2024 |pages=1–20 |url=https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12499 |access-date=29 April 2024 |archive-date=22 August 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240822122339/https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/nous.12499 |url-status=live }} * {{cite book |last1=Bergmann |first1=Michael |title=Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-265357-4 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=T7EzEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA57 |language=en |date=2021 |access-date=3 August 2024 |archive-date=31 July 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240731114921/https://books.google.com/books?id=T7EzEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA57 |url-status=live }} * {{Cite book |last=Bernecker |first=Sven |chapter=Triangular Externalism |date=2013-09-03 |url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781118328408.ch25 |title=A Companion to Donald Davidson |pages=443–455 |editor-last=Lepore |editor-first=Ernie |access-date=2023-10-03 |edition=1 |publisher=Wiley |language=en |doi=10.1002/9781118328408.ch25 |isbn=978-0-470-67370-6 |editor2-last=Ludwig |editor2-first=Kirk |archive-date=9 May 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240509104056/https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781118328408.ch25 |url-status=live }} * {{cite book |last1=Best |first1=Steven |last2=Kellner |first2=Douglas |title=Postmodern Theory: Critical Interrogations |publisher=Bloomsbury Publishing |isbn=978-1-349-21718-2 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=vZBKEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA165 |language=en 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|editor-last1=Jared |editor-first1=Keengwe |title=Handbook of Research on Pedagogical Models for Next-Generation Teaching and Learning |date=2017 |publisher=IGI Global |isbn=978-1-5225-3874-5 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=5JE3DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA365 |language=en |access-date=22 August 2022 |archive-date=25 January 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240125193646/https://books.google.com/books?id=5JE3DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA365#v=onepage&q&f=false |url-status=live }} * {{cite book |last1=Vagelli |first1=Matteo |editor1-last=Herring |editor1-first=Emily |editor2-last=Jones |editor2-first=Kevin |editor3-last=Kiprijanov |editor3-first=Konstantin |editor4-last=Sellers |editor4-first=Laura |title=The Past, Present, and Future of Integrated History and Philosophy of Science |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-351-21481-0 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=hT33DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA96 |language=en |chapter=Historical Epistemology and the 'Marriage' Between History and Philosophy of Science |date=2019 |access-date=19 July 2024 |archive-date=22 August 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240822130426/https://books.google.com/books?id=hT33DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA96#v=onepage&q&f=false |url-status=live }} * {{cite web |last1=Vahid |first1=Hamid |title=Doxastic Conservatism |url=https://iep.utm.edu/doxastic-conservatism/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=2 August 2024 |archive-date=2 August 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240802164156/https://iep.utm.edu/doxastic-conservatism/ |url-status=live }} * {{cite journal |last1=Vaidya |first1=Anand Jayprakash |last2=Wallner |first2=Michael |title=The Epistemology of Modality and the Problem of Modal Epistemic Friction |journal=Synthese |volume=198 |issue=S8 |doi=10.1007/s11229-018-1860-2 |date=2021 |pages=1909–1935 |pmid=34720230 |pmc=8549955 }} * {{cite web |last1=Van Inwagen |first1=Peter |last2=Sullivan |first2=Meghan |last3=Bernstein |first3=Sara |title=Metaphysics |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/metaphysics/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=17 March 2024 |date=2023 |archive-date=16 September 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180916103726/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/metaphysics/ |url-status=live }} * {{cite book |last1=Vassilopoulou |first1=P. |last2=Clark |first2=S. |title=Late Antique Epistemology: Other Ways to Truth |publisher=Springer |isbn=978-0-230-24077-3 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=bI59DAAAQBAJ&pg=PA303 |language=en |date=2009 |access-date=19 July 2024 |archive-date=18 July 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240718085830/https://books.google.com/books?id=bI59DAAAQBAJ&pg=PA303 |url-status=live }} * {{cite book |last1=Vermeir |first1=Koen |editor1-last=Laerke |editor1-first=Mogens |editor2-last=Smith |editor2-first=Justin E. H. |editor3-last=Schliesser |editor3-first=Eric |title=Philosophy and Its History: Aims and Methods in the Study of Early Modern Philosophy |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-985714-2 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=hKqCD5U_ba8C&pg=PA65 |language=en |chapter=Philosophy and Genealogy: Ways of Writing History of Philosophy |date=2013 |access-date=30 July 2024 |archive-date=29 July 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240729162032/https://books.google.com/books?id=hKqCD5U_ba8C&pg=PA65 |url-status=live }} * {{cite book|title=La philosophie allemande de Kant à Heidegger|trans-title=La filosofia deutx de Kant asta Heidegger|chapter=Fichte| first1=Miklós |last1= Vető|editor=Dominique Folscheid|language=fr|year=1993|publisher=Presses universitaires de France|isbn=2 13 045256 6}} * {{cite book |last1=Vogt |first1=Katja Maria |editor1-last=Machuca |editor1-first=Diego E. |title=Pyrrhonism in Ancient, Modern, and Contemporary Philosophy |publisher=Springer Science & Business Media |isbn=978-94-007-1991-0 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=4s-X8wfhemsC&pg=PA44 |language=en |chapter=The Aims of Skeptical Investigation |date=2011 |access-date=19 July 2024 |archive-date=18 July 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240718160025/https://books.google.com/books?id=4s-X8wfhemsC&pg=PA44 |url-status=live }} * {{cite journal |last=Walton |first=Douglas N. |author-link=Douglas N. Walton |date=2005 |title=Pragmatic and Idealized Models of Knowledge and Ignorance |journal=[[American Philosophical Quarterly]] |volume=42 |issue=1 |pages=59–69 [59, 64] |jstor=20010182 }} * {{cite book |last1=Warder |first1=Anthony Kennedy |title=A Course in Indian Philosophy |publisher=Motilal Banarsidass Publ |isbn=978-81-208-1482-0 |edition=2 |date=1998 }} * {{cite book |last1=Warren |first1=Jared |title=Shadows of Syntax: Revitalizing Logical and Mathematical Conventionalism |date=2020 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-008615-2 |url=https://global.oup.com/academic/product/shadows-of-syntax-9780190086152 |access-date=30 July 2024 |archive-date=28 May 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240528232725/https://global.oup.com/academic/product/shadows-of-syntax-9780190086152 |url-status=live }} * {{cite book |last1=Watkins |first1=Chris |last2=Mortimore |first2=Peter |title=Understanding Pedagogy and Its Impact on Learning |date=1999 |publisher=Sage |doi=10.4135/9781446219454 |isbn=978-1-85396-453-4 |url=https://sk.sagepub.com/books/understanding-pedagogy-and-its-impact-on-learning/n1.xml |chapter=Pedagogy: What Do We Know? |access-date=24 July 2024 |archive-date=12 July 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220712120304/https://sk.sagepub.com/books/understanding-pedagogy-and-its-impact-on-learning/n1.xml |url-status=live }} * {{cite web |last1=Webb |first1=Mark Owen |title=Jain Philosophy |url=https://iep.utm.edu/jain/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=2 August 2024 |archive-date=28 May 2010 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100528030933/https://iep.utm.edu/jain/ |url-status=live }} * {{cite journal |last1=Wheeler |first1=Gregory R. |last2=Pereira |first2=Luís Moniz |title=Epistemology and Artificial Intelligence |journal=Journal of Applied Logic |volume=2 |issue=4 |doi=10.1016/j.jal.2004.07.007 |date=2004 |pages=469–493 }} * {{Cite book |last=Whitcomb |first=Dennis |chapter=Wisdom |url=https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9781136882012 |title=The Routledge Companion to Epistemology |date=2011 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-136-88201-2 |editor-last=Bernecker |editor-first=Sven |edition=0 |language=en |doi=10.4324/9780203839065 |editor-last2=Pritchard |editor-first2=Duncan }} * {{cite book |last1=Wilson |first1=Fred |title=The External World and Our Knowledge of It: Hume's Critical Realism, an Exposition and a Defence |publisher=University of Toronto Press |isbn=978-0-8020-9764-4 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=b8n609PDSrsC&pg=PA314 |language=en |date=2008 |access-date=19 August 2024 |archive-date=18 August 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240818112748/https://books.google.com/books?id=b8n609PDSrsC&pg=PA314 |url-status=live }} * {{cite web |last1=Wilson |first1=Robert A. |title=Externalism and Internalism in the Philosophy of Mind |url=https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/display/document/obo-9780195396577/obo-9780195396577-0352.xml |website=Oxford Bibliographies |access-date=11 August 2024 |language=en |date=2023 |archive-date=10 April 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230410004809/https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/display/document/obo-9780195396577/obo-9780195396577-0352.xml |url-status=live }} * {{cite web |last1=Windt |first1=Jennifer M. |title=Dreams and Dreaming |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dreams-dreaming/#CartDreaSkep |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=12 December 2023 |date=2021 |archive-date=1 February 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240201125124/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dreams-dreaming/#CartDreaSkep |url-status=live }} * {{cite book |last1=Wolenski |first1=Jan |editor1-last=Niiniluoto |editor1-first=I. |editor2-last=Sintonen |editor2-first=Matti |editor3-last=Wolenski |editor3-first=Jan |title=Handbook of Epistemology |publisher=Springer Science & Business Media |isbn=978-1-4020-1986-9 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=6gvlBwAAQBAJ |language=en |chapter=History of Epistemology |date=2004 |access-date=13 July 2024 |archive-date=12 July 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240712163703/https://books.google.com/books?id=6gvlBwAAQBAJ |url-status=live }} * {{cite web |last1=Wrenn |first1=Chase B. |title=Naturalistic Epistemology |url=https://iep.utm.edu/nat-epis/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=2 August 2024 |archive-date=16 July 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240716142002/https://iep.utm.edu/nat-epis/ |url-status=live }} * {{cite book |last1=Zagzebski |first1=Linda |author1-link=Linda Zagzebski |date=1999 |chapter=What Is Knowledge? |editor1-last=Greco |editor1-first=John |editor2-last=Sosa |editor2-first=Ernest |title=The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology |publisher=Blackwell |pages=92–116 |chapter-url=https://philpapers.org/rec/ZAGWIK |isbn=978-0-631-20290-5 |oclc=39269507 |doi=10.1002/9781405164863.ch3 |s2cid=158886670 |access-date=12 June 2022 |archive-date=2 June 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220602215147/https://philpapers.org/rec/ZAGWIK |url-status=live }} {{Refend}} </small> </div> [[Categoria:Filosofia]] l6vv5qjfhbe942fqk1hd8lnzp94467o 0 4662 42602 23391 2026-04-07T16:25:58Z Penarc 4148 42602 wikitext text/x-wiki [[Fix:Flag of WHO.svg|197px|right]] La '''Organiza Mundal de Sania''' es un ajenteria spesialida de la [[Nasiones Unida]] cual es consernada con la sania publica internasional. Lo ia es instituida en [[7 de april]] e sua xeferia es locada en Geneve, [[Suiz]]. Lo es membro de la Grupo de Developa de la Nasiones Unida. Sua presedor, la [[Organiza de Sania]], ia es un ajenteria de la Alia de Nasiones. [[Categoria:Nasiones Unida]] 6ped646ipwo3q3e22ak5zvkyr81j08z 0 5729 42622 29699 2026-04-08T05:39:13Z Psubhashish 16833 Video + 42622 wikitext text/x-wiki [[File:Munda-Sprachen.png|thumb|La distribui de la linguas munda]] [[File:OpenSpeaks-juy-Juray-Dinabandhu Gamango-OG-Social Impact of Aadhaar.webm|thumb|Un parlor de jurai, un lingua munda, es parlante sur la ID biometric de India]] La '''linguas munda''' es un familia parlada par sirca nove milion persones en India sentral e este e en Bangladex. Los composa un ramo de la linguas austroasiatica, con linguas como cmer e viet. Munda pare ia es en India este plu temprana ca otra linguas de la rejion. La cualias de la linguas munda inclui tre cuantias (singular, dual, e plural), du jeneros (animada e nonanimada), un distingui entre la incluinte e escluinte en la pronomes plural de la person un, e la usa de sufisas o parolas aidante per indica tempo. La linguas munda es polisintese e aglutinante. [[Categoria:Lingua]] 2go2c0scse9iy90znhca0k5u8hdo0m2 0 7692 42618 42579 2026-04-07T16:46:39Z Penarc 4148 42618 wikitext text/x-wiki [[File:MosMetro KomsomolskayaKL img2 asv2018-01.jpg|thumb|Comsomolscaia]] '''[[Комсомольская|Comsomolscaia]]''' es un stasion de la metro de [[Moscva]]. Lo es situada a la linia Sirculo. Lo ia es abrida 30 janero 1952. La arcitetor de la stasion es Alecsei Xusev. Lo es un de la stasiones la plu grandiosa de la Metro de Moscva. Lo es famosa per sua stilo baroca. La teto es jala e ornada con oto mosaicas grande de jemma e mineral. Esta mosaicas mostra la vitoria de la popla rusce. La stasion ave un teto multe alta con candelas briliante. Lo ave liantes a du otra linias e lo es locada prosima a tre terminales de ferovia: Leningradsci, Iaroslavsci e Casansci. == Lias esterna == * [https://mosmetro.ru/ La sito ofisial] [[Category:Moscva]] [[Category:Metro de Moscva]] s3ttib04rih4itb2igfzq072oydatss 42623 42618 2026-04-08T09:11:50Z Danvintius Bookix 2866 Desfa revisa [[Special:Diff/42618|42618]] par [[Special:Contributions/Penarc|Penarc]] ([[User talk:Penarc|discute]]) 42623 wikitext text/x-wiki [[File:MosMetro KomsomolskayaKL img2 asv2018-01.jpg|thumb|Comsomolscaia]] '''Comsomolscaia''' es un stasion de la metro de [[Moscva]]. Lo es situada a la linia Sirculo. Lo ia es abrida 30 janero 1952. La arcitetor de la stasion es Alecsei Xusev. Lo es un de la stasiones la plu grandiosa de la Metro de Moscva. Lo es famosa per sua stilo baroca. La teto es jala e ornada con oto mosaicas grande de jemma e mineral. Esta mosaicas mostra la vitoria de la popla rusce. La stasion ave un teto multe alta con candelas briliante. Lo ave liantes a du otra linias e lo es locada prosima a tre terminales de ferovia: Leningradsci, Iaroslavsci e Casansci. == Lias esterna == * [https://mosmetro.ru/ La sito ofisial] [[Category:Moscva]] [[Category:Metro de Moscva]] 4416u0oal2oknckow6iezh9xnxvf6st 0 7708 42610 42585 2026-04-07T16:38:48Z Penarc 4148 42610 wikitext text/x-wiki [[File:Курская-радиальная-05.jpg|thumb|Curscaia]] '''[[Курская|Curscaia]]''' es un stasion de la metro de [[Moscva]]. Es locada a la linia Arbatsco-Pocrovscaia. Lo ia abrida 13 marte 1938. La arcitetor de la stasion es Leonid Poliacov. Es situada entre la staciones Plocxad Revolutsii e [[Baumanscaia]]. La stasion ave liantes a la [[Curscaia|stasion Curscaia]] de la linia Circulo e a la stasion Txcalovscaia. == Lias esterna == * [https://mosmetro.ru/ La sito ofisial] [[Category:Metro de Moscva]] 3v6qvhskha48wqxizvztumzxtyfcht4 42633 42610 2026-04-08T09:16:41Z Danvintius Bookix 2866 Desfa revisa [[Special:Diff/42610|42610]] par [[Special:Contributions/Penarc|Penarc]] ([[User talk:Penarc|discute]]) 42633 wikitext text/x-wiki [[File:Курская-радиальная-05.jpg|thumb|Curscaia]] '''Curscaia''' es un stasion de la metro de [[Moscva]]. Es locada a la linia Arbatsco-Pocrovscaia. Lo ia abrida 13 marte 1938. La arcitetor de la stasion es Leonid Poliacov. Es situada entre la staciones Plocxad Revolutsii e [[Baumanscaia]]. La stasion ave liantes a la [[Curscaia|stasion Curscaia]] de la linia Circulo e a la stasion Txcalovscaia. == Lias esterna == * [https://mosmetro.ru/ La sito ofisial] [[Category:Metro de Moscva]] ti8w0lh1zf7jpk9zb35ju0wdzxjdmvy 0 7710 42616 42575 2026-04-07T16:44:54Z Penarc 4148 42616 wikitext text/x-wiki [[File:Metro MSK Line3 Baumanskaya.jpg|thumb|Baumanscaia]] '''[[Бауманская|Baumanscaia]]''' es un stasion de la metro de [[Moscva]]. Es locada a la linia Arbatsco-Pocrovscaia. Lo ia abrida 18 janero 1944. La arcitetor de la stasion es Boris Iofan. Es situada entre la stasiones [[Curscaia (Arbatsco-Pocrovscaia linia)|Curscaia]] e [[Electrozavodscaia]]. == Lias esterna == * [https://mosmetro.ru/ La sito ofisial] [[Category:Metro de Moscva]] aqv7ovpqz62spxh92010y4t2sp1q9xf 42625 42616 2026-04-08T09:12:31Z Danvintius Bookix 2866 Desfa revisa [[Special:Diff/42616|42616]] par [[Special:Contributions/Penarc|Penarc]] ([[User talk:Penarc|discute]]) 42625 wikitext text/x-wiki [[File:Metro MSK Line3 Baumanskaya.jpg|thumb|Baumanscaia]] '''Baumanscaia''' es un stasion de la metro de [[Moscva]]. Es locada a la linia Arbatsco-Pocrovscaia. Lo ia abrida 18 janero 1944. La arcitetor de la stasion es Boris Iofan. Es situada entre la stasiones [[Curscaia (Arbatsco-Pocrovscaia linia)|Curscaia]] e [[Electrozavodscaia]]. == Lias esterna == * [https://mosmetro.ru/ La sito ofisial] [[Category:Metro de Moscva]] 7uqtfcpfqrtldlhsi56gyo7phm64b96 0 7719 42611 42581 2026-04-07T16:39:45Z Penarc 4148 42611 wikitext text/x-wiki [[File:Kievskaya APL.jpg|thumb|Cievscaia]] '''[[Киевская|Cievscaia]]''' es un stasion de la metro de [[Moscva]]. Es locada a la [[linia Arbatsco-Pocrovscaia]]. Lo ia es abrida 5 avrilo 1953. Lo es situada entre la stasiones [[Parc Pobedi]] e [[Smolenscaia (Arbatsco-Pocrovscaia linia)|Smolenscaia]]. Prosima de la stasion es locada stasion de ferovia Terminal Cievsci. == Lias esterna == * [https://mosmetro.ru/ La sito ofisial] [[Category:Metro de Moscva]] 27ui1lew8mq4a0s8chvbanbf12aydkl 42632 42611 2026-04-08T09:16:23Z Danvintius Bookix 2866 Desfa revisa [[Special:Diff/42611|42611]] par [[Special:Contributions/Penarc|Penarc]] ([[User talk:Penarc|discute]]) 42632 wikitext text/x-wiki [[File:Kievskaya APL.jpg|thumb|Cievscaia]] '''Cievscaia''' es un stasion de la metro de [[Moscva]]. Es locada a la [[linia Arbatsco-Pocrovscaia]]. Lo ia es abrida 5 avrilo 1953. Lo es situada entre la stasiones [[Parc Pobedi]] e [[Smolenscaia (Arbatsco-Pocrovscaia linia)|Smolenscaia]]. Prosima de la stasion es locada stasion de ferovia Terminal Cievsci. == Lias esterna == * [https://mosmetro.ru/ La sito ofisial] [[Category:Metro de Moscva]] lc3gsgdyrzl08clzdcce73kfb7yxnyx 0 7721 42615 42576 2026-04-07T16:44:10Z Penarc 4148 42615 wikitext text/x-wiki [[File:Alsad-mm.jpg|thumb|Alecsandrobsci sad]] '''[[Александровский сад |Alecsandrovsci sad]]''' es un stasion de la metro de [[Moscva]]. Es locada a la linia Filiovscaia. Lo ia abrida 15 maio 1935. La arcitetor de la stasion es Alecsandr Gontscevitx. == Cambias == * A la Biblioteca imeni Lenina stasion * A la [[Arbatscaia (Arbatsco-Pocrovscaia linia)|Arbatscaia]] stasion * A la Borovitscaia stasion == Lias esterna == * [https://mosmetro.ru/ La sito ofisial] [[Category:Metro de Moscva]] 4720cogpazngl038wcd1lhrmk09lnba 42629 42615 2026-04-08T09:14:39Z Danvintius Bookix 2866 Desfa revisa [[Special:Diff/42615|42615]] par [[Special:Contributions/Penarc|Penarc]] ([[User talk:Penarc|discute]]) 42629 wikitext text/x-wiki [[File:Alsad-mm.jpg|thumb|Alecsandrobsci sad]] '''Alecsandrovsci sad''' es un stasion de la metro de [[Moscva]]. Es locada a la linia Filiovscaia. Lo ia abrida 15 maio 1935. La arcitetor de la stasion es Alecsandr Gontscevitx. == Cambias == * A la Biblioteca imeni Lenina stasion * A la [[Arbatscaia (Arbatsco-Pocrovscaia linia)|Arbatscaia]] stasion * A la Borovitscaia stasion == Lias esterna == * [https://mosmetro.ru/ La sito ofisial] [[Category:Metro de Moscva]] s4bd6h561bra6z3lvuj29psoro375tf 0 7733 42614 42577 2026-04-07T16:43:17Z Penarc 4148 42614 wikitext text/x-wiki [[File:Moscow Metro SmolenskayaFL asv2018-09.jpg|thumb|Smolenscaia]] [[File:House on SmolSquare Moscow asv2018-01.jpg|thumb|La casa con la tore]] '''[[Смоленская| Smolenscaia]]''' es un stasion de la metro de [[Moscva]]. Es locada a la linia Filiovscaia. Lo ia abrida 15 majo 1935. La arcitetores de la stasion es Sergei Andrievsci e Nicolai Colli. Es situada entre la stasiones [[Cievscaia (Filiovscaia linia)|Cievscaia]] e [[Arbatscaia (Filiovscaia linia)|Arbatscaia]]. La stasion no ave cambia a la [[Smolenscaia (Arbatsco-Pocrovscaia linia)|stasion Smolenscaia]] de la linia Arbatsco-Pocrovscaia. La vestibulo de la stasion es situada en [[Casa con la tore (Moscva)|la casa con la tore]] cual ia construida a 1956. == Lias esterna == * [https://mosmetro.ru/ La sito ofisial] [[Category:Metro de Moscva]] bssx408kopqql9ppt7gj90bvnuvscrk 42630 42614 2026-04-08T09:14:56Z Danvintius Bookix 2866 Desfa revisa [[Special:Diff/42614|42614]] par [[Special:Contributions/Penarc|Penarc]] ([[User talk:Penarc|discute]]) 42630 wikitext text/x-wiki [[File:Moscow Metro SmolenskayaFL asv2018-09.jpg|thumb|Smolenscaia]] [[File:House on SmolSquare Moscow asv2018-01.jpg|thumb|La casa con la tore]] '''Smolenscaia''' es un stasion de la metro de [[Moscva]]. Es locada a la linia Filiovscaia. Lo ia abrida 15 majo 1935. La arcitetores de la stasion es Sergei Andrievsci e Nicolai Colli. Es situada entre la stasiones [[Cievscaia (Filiovscaia linia)|Cievscaia]] e [[Arbatscaia (Filiovscaia linia)|Arbatscaia]]. La stasion no ave cambia a la [[Smolenscaia (Arbatsco-Pocrovscaia linia)|stasion Smolenscaia]] de la linia Arbatsco-Pocrovscaia. La vestibulo de la stasion es situada en [[Casa con la tore (Moscva)|la casa con la tore]] cual ia construida a 1956. == Lias esterna == * [https://mosmetro.ru/ La sito ofisial] [[Category:Metro de Moscva]] m9o0f0lneebgpi60ldenxq7yqz69v2r 0 7750 42613 42578 2026-04-07T16:42:22Z Penarc 4148 42613 wikitext text/x-wiki [[File:Metro MSK Line4 Arbatskaya (img1).jpg|thumb|Arbatscaia]] '''[[Арбатская|Arbatscaia]]''' es un stasion de la metro de [[Moscva]]. Es locada a la linia Filiovscaia. Lo ia abrida 15 majo 1935. La arcitetor de la stasion es Leonid Teplitsci. Es situada entre la stasiones [[Alecsandrovsci sad]] e [[Smolenscaia (Filiovscaia linia)|Smolenscaia]]. La stasion no ave cambia a la [[Arbatscaia (Arbatsco-Pocrovscaia linia)|stasion Arbatscaia]] de la linia Arbatsco-Pocrovscaia. == Lias esterna == * [https://mosmetro.ru/ La sito ofisial] [[Category:Metro de Moscva]] sy9h1gmfcaitl3r6upf331xvpz6mio6 42631 42613 2026-04-08T09:15:31Z Danvintius Bookix 2866 Desfa revisa [[Special:Diff/42613|42613]] par [[Special:Contributions/Penarc|Penarc]] ([[User talk:Penarc|discute]]) 42631 wikitext text/x-wiki [[File:Metro MSK Line4 Arbatskaya (img1).jpg|thumb|Arbatscaia]] '''Arbatscaia''' es un stasion de la metro de [[Moscva]]. Es locada a la linia Filiovscaia. Lo ia abrida 15 majo 1935. La arcitetor de la stasion es Leonid Teplitsci. Es situada entre la stasiones [[Alecsandrovsci sad]] e [[Smolenscaia (Filiovscaia linia)|Smolenscaia]]. La stasion no ave cambia a la [[Arbatscaia (Arbatsco-Pocrovscaia linia)|stasion Arbatscaia]] de la linia Arbatsco-Pocrovscaia. == Lias esterna == * [https://mosmetro.ru/ La sito ofisial] [[Category:Metro de Moscva]] 7upyq2t5hytoscdwmknqhadbaia4nvq 0 7828 42617 42574 2026-04-07T16:45:48Z Penarc 4148 42617 wikitext text/x-wiki [[File:Mosmetro Pyatnitskoe Chaussee 121229.jpg|thumb|Stasion Piatnitscoie xosse]] '''[[Пятницкое шоссе|Piatnitscoie xosse]]''' es un stasion de la [[Metro de Moscva|metro]] de [[Moscva]]. Es locada a la [[linia Arbatsco-Pocrovscaia]]. Lo ia abrida 28 desembre 2012. La arcitetores de la stasion es Alecsansdr Necrasov e otras. La stasion es la fini de la linia. == Lias esterna == * [https://mosmetro.ru/ La sito ofisial] [[Category:Metro de Moscva]] lru37xxc5r5fytp76184y2azfsoyvr3 42624 42617 2026-04-08T09:12:14Z Danvintius Bookix 2866 Desfa revisa [[Special:Diff/42617|42617]] par [[Special:Contributions/Penarc|Penarc]] ([[User talk:Penarc|discute]]) 42624 wikitext text/x-wiki [[File:Mosmetro Pyatnitskoe Chaussee 121229.jpg|thumb|Stasion Piatnitscoie xosse]] '''Piatnitscoie xosse''' es un stasion de la [[Metro de Moscva|metro]] de [[Moscva]]. Es locada a la [[linia Arbatsco-Pocrovscaia]]. Lo ia abrida 28 desembre 2012. La arcitetores de la stasion es Alecsansdr Necrasov e otras. La stasion es la fini de la linia. == Lias esterna == * [https://mosmetro.ru/ La sito ofisial] [[Category:Metro de Moscva]] 077zqx73kd87vpkhqokjzm41v03r4w1 0 7834 42609 42593 2026-04-07T16:37:53Z Penarc 4148 42609 wikitext text/x-wiki [[File:RZD Kuskovo station 2018 (42366389232).jpg|250px|right|thumb|Stasion Cuscovo]] '''[[Кусково|Cuscovo]]''' es un stasion de ferovia en [[Moscva]]. Esta es un de la stasiones de ferovia la plu vea en Moscva, cual parteni a la dirije de Gorci. Lo ia es construida en 1861 e oji lo es un de la locas la plu importante sur la diametre cuatro de Moscva (MTsD-4). Prosima a la stasion es un parca bela e la palasio antica Cuscovo. Ala es multe trenos cual vade a la site e a la sites visina, como Jeleznodorojni e [[Balaxiha]]. La stasion ave du platformas per pasajores e un ponte de pase supratera. == Lias esterna == * [https://mcd.mosmetro.ru/mcd-4/ La sito ofisial] [[Categoria:Transporta de Moscva]] scapqulqkucr5rfpqefeaxesq3dhj8m 42634 42609 2026-04-08T09:16:57Z Danvintius Bookix 2866 Desfa revisa [[Special:Diff/42609|42609]] par [[Special:Contributions/Penarc|Penarc]] ([[User talk:Penarc|discute]]) 42634 wikitext text/x-wiki [[File:RZD Kuskovo station 2018 (42366389232).jpg|250px|right|thumb|Stasion Cuscovo]] '''Cuscovo''' es un stasion de ferovia en [[Moscva]]. Esta es un de la stasiones de ferovia la plu vea en Moscva, cual parteni a la dirije de Gorci. Lo ia es construida en 1861 e oji lo es un de la locas la plu importante sur la diametre cuatro de Moscva (MTsD-4). Prosima a la stasion es un parca bela e la palasio antica Cuscovo. Ala es multe trenos cual vade a la site e a la sites visina, como Jeleznodorojni e [[Balaxiha]]. La stasion ave du platformas per pasajores e un ponte de pase supratera. == Lias esterna == * [https://mcd.mosmetro.ru/mcd-4/ La sito ofisial] [[Categoria:Transporta de Moscva]] 4y0xam7oidx60w69gzbrhoknr5er0pf 0 7835 42608 42595 2026-04-07T16:36:52Z Penarc 4148 42608 wikitext text/x-wiki '''[[Новогиреево|Novogireevo]]''' es un de la stasiones de ferovia importante en la este de [[Moscva]], cual parteni a la dirije de Gorci. Lo ia es construida en 1908 e oji lo es un parte de la diametre cuatro de Moscva (MTsD-4). Prosima a la stasion es un parca de bosce Terletsky e multe vias de tram. Ala es multe trenos cual vade a la sentro de la site e a la sites visina, como [[Reutov]] e [[Jeleznodorojni]]. Multe persones usa esta stasion per transfere a [[Novogireevo (stasion de metro)|la stasion de metro con la mesma nom]]. == Lias esterna == * [https://mcd.mosmetro.ru/mcd-4/ La sito ofisial] [[Categoria:Transporta de Moscva]] fivong2g0f8icltdf4hu6kezycajr38 42635 42608 2026-04-08T09:17:20Z Danvintius Bookix 2866 Desfa revisa [[Special:Diff/42608|42608]] par [[Special:Contributions/Penarc|Penarc]] ([[User talk:Penarc|discute]]) 42635 wikitext text/x-wiki '''Novogireevo''' es un de la stasiones de ferovia importante en la este de [[Moscva]], cual parteni a la dirije de Gorci. Lo ia es construida en 1908 e oji lo es un parte de la diametre cuatro de Moscva (MTsD-4). Prosima a la stasion es un parca de bosce Terletsky e multe vias de tram. Ala es multe trenos cual vade a la sentro de la site e a la sites visina, como [[Reutov]] e [[Jeleznodorojni]]. Multe persones usa esta stasion per transfere a [[Novogireevo (stasion de metro)|la stasion de metro con la mesma nom]]. == Lias esterna == * [https://mcd.mosmetro.ru/mcd-4/ La sito ofisial] [[Categoria:Transporta de Moscva]] ije7ka3vcs8bktg77hdz37bvuc88405 0 7836 42605 42598 2026-04-07T16:31:47Z Penarc 4148 42605 wikitext text/x-wiki [[File:Moscow VoykovskayaMetroStation 1152.jpg|thumb|Stasion Voicovscaia]] '''[[Войковская|Voicovscaia]]''' es un stasion de la [[Metro de Moscva|metro]] de [[Moscva]]. Lo es locada a la [[linia Zamoscvoretscaia]]. Lo ia es abrida 31 desembre 1964. La arcitetores de la stasion es Iraida Petuhova e Anna Focina. Es situada entre la stasiones [[Socol (stasion de metro)|Socol]] e [[Vodni stadion]]. == Lias esterna == * [https://mosmetro.ru/ La sito ofisial] [[Category:Metro de Moscva]] oc709sn3vhmpmeidt4xc7sw03cmuhm6 42637 42605 2026-04-08T09:17:51Z Danvintius Bookix 2866 Desfa revisa [[Special:Diff/42605|42605]] par [[Special:Contributions/Penarc|Penarc]] ([[User talk:Penarc|discute]]) 42637 wikitext text/x-wiki [[File:Moscow VoykovskayaMetroStation 1152.jpg|thumb|Stasion Voicovscaia]] '''Voicovscaia''' es un stasion de la [[Metro de Moscva|metro]] de [[Moscva]]. Lo es locada a la [[linia Zamoscvoretscaia]]. Lo ia es abrida 31 desembre 1964. La arcitetores de la stasion es Iraida Petuhova e Anna Focina. Es situada entre la stasiones [[Socol (stasion de metro)|Socol]] e [[Vodni stadion]]. == Lias esterna == * [https://mosmetro.ru/ La sito ofisial] [[Category:Metro de Moscva]] 9ojtb7wmprgfahp30qsb2dnvsdbef37 0 7837 42604 42599 2026-04-07T16:30:12Z Penarc 4148 42604 wikitext text/x-wiki [[File:Moscow VodnyStadiontMetroStation 1123.jpg|thumb|Stasion Vodni stadion]] '''[[Водный стадион|Voicovscaia]]''' es un stasion de la [[Metro de Moscva|metro]] de [[Moscva]]. Lo es locada a la [[linia Zamoscvoretscaia]]. Lo ia es abrida 31 desembre 1964. La arcitetores de la stasion es Mihail Marcovsci e Iulia Colesnicova. Es situada entre la stasiones [[Voicovscaia]] e [[Retxnoi voczal]]. == Lias esterna == * [https://mosmetro.ru/ La sito ofisial] [[Category:Metro de Moscva]] iv89haiwi3yaro624qcuiwtz5t7kh3v 42606 42604 2026-04-07T16:33:44Z Penarc 4148 42606 wikitext text/x-wiki [[File:Moscow VodnyStadiontMetroStation 1123.jpg|thumb|Stasion Vodni stadion]] '''[[Водный стадион|Vodni]]''' es un stasion de la [[Metro de Moscva|metro]] de [[Moscva]]. Lo es locada a la [[linia Zamoscvoretscaia]]. Lo ia es abrida 31 desembre 1964. La arcitetores de la stasion es Mihail Marcovsci e Iulia Colesnicova. Es situada entre la stasiones [[Voicovscaia]] e [[Retxnoi voczal]]. == Lias esterna == * [https://mosmetro.ru/ La sito ofisial] [[Category:Metro de Moscva]] 97zybpgsvi90mx56y5d1w5bspes2jfv 42619 42606 2026-04-07T17:18:55Z Penarc 4148 Penarc move paje [[Vodni stadion]] a [[Vodni stasion de metro]]: Misspelled title 42606 wikitext text/x-wiki [[File:Moscow VodnyStadiontMetroStation 1123.jpg|thumb|Stasion Vodni stadion]] '''[[Водный стадион|Vodni]]''' es un stasion de la [[Metro de Moscva|metro]] de [[Moscva]]. Lo es locada a la [[linia Zamoscvoretscaia]]. Lo ia es abrida 31 desembre 1964. La arcitetores de la stasion es Mihail Marcovsci e Iulia Colesnicova. Es situada entre la stasiones [[Voicovscaia]] e [[Retxnoi voczal]]. == Lias esterna == * [https://mosmetro.ru/ La sito ofisial] [[Category:Metro de Moscva]] 97zybpgsvi90mx56y5d1w5bspes2jfv 42626 42619 2026-04-08T09:13:43Z Danvintius Bookix 2866 Danvintius Bookix move la paje [[Vodni stasion de metro]] a [[Vodni stadion]] con redirije 42606 wikitext text/x-wiki [[File:Moscow VodnyStadiontMetroStation 1123.jpg|thumb|Stasion Vodni stadion]] '''[[Водный стадион|Vodni]]''' es un stasion de la [[Metro de Moscva|metro]] de [[Moscva]]. Lo es locada a la [[linia Zamoscvoretscaia]]. Lo ia es abrida 31 desembre 1964. La arcitetores de la stasion es Mihail Marcovsci e Iulia Colesnicova. Es situada entre la stasiones [[Voicovscaia]] e [[Retxnoi voczal]]. == Lias esterna == * [https://mosmetro.ru/ La sito ofisial] [[Category:Metro de Moscva]] 97zybpgsvi90mx56y5d1w5bspes2jfv 42628 42626 2026-04-08T09:14:02Z Danvintius Bookix 2866 42628 wikitext text/x-wiki [[File:Moscow VodnyStadiontMetroStation 1123.jpg|thumb|Stasion Vodni stadion]] '''Vodni stadion''' es un stasion de la [[Metro de Moscva|metro]] de [[Moscva]]. Lo es locada a la [[linia Zamoscvoretscaia]]. Lo ia es abrida 31 desembre 1964. La arcitetores de la stasion es Mihail Marcovsci e Iulia Colesnicova. Es situada entre la stasiones [[Voicovscaia]] e [[Retxnoi voczal]]. == Lias esterna == * [https://mosmetro.ru/ La sito ofisial] [[Category:Metro de Moscva]] rnyboluna7zrx5hkipv0s6s8e3bid7e 0 7838 42603 42600 2026-04-07T16:28:19Z Penarc 4148 42603 wikitext text/x-wiki [[File:Moscow RechnoyVokzaltMetroStation 1091.jpg|thumb|Stasion Retxnoi voczal]] '''[[Речной вокзал|Retxnoi voczal]]''' es un stasion de la [[Metro de Moscva|metro]] de [[Moscva]]. Lo es locada a la [[linia Zamoscvoretscaia]]. Lo ia es abrida 31 desembre 1964. La arcitetores de la stasion es Nicolai Demtxinsci e Iulia Colesnicova. Es situada entre la stasiones [[Vodni stadion]] e [[Belomorscaia]]. La stasion es nomida per la Porton de Rio Norda, cual es situada prosima. == Lias esterna == * [https://mosmetro.ru/ La sito ofisial] [[Category:Metro de Moscva]] 9jeyr7bx46t3jube0djydl145uyq5jp 42638 42603 2026-04-08T09:18:05Z Danvintius Bookix 2866 Desfa revisa [[Special:Diff/42603|42603]] par [[Special:Contributions/Penarc|Penarc]] ([[User talk:Penarc|discute]]) 42638 wikitext text/x-wiki [[File:Moscow RechnoyVokzaltMetroStation 1091.jpg|thumb|Stasion Retxnoi voczal]] '''Retxnoi voczal''' es un stasion de la [[Metro de Moscva|metro]] de [[Moscva]]. Lo es locada a la [[linia Zamoscvoretscaia]]. Lo ia es abrida 31 desembre 1964. La arcitetores de la stasion es Nicolai Demtxinsci e Iulia Colesnicova. Es situada entre la stasiones [[Vodni stadion]] e [[Belomorscaia]]. La stasion es nomida per la Porton de Rio Norda, cual es situada prosima. == Lias esterna == * [https://mosmetro.ru/ La sito ofisial] [[Category:Metro de Moscva]] ihhrf4v4lkd5swm9zhghbx9j222hq8e 42639 42638 2026-04-08T09:36:42Z Danvintius Bookix 2866 42639 wikitext text/x-wiki [[File:Moscow RechnoyVokzaltMetroStation 1091.jpg|thumb|Stasion Retxnoi voczal]] '''Retxnoi voczal''' ({{lang|ru|Речной вокзал}}) es un stasion de la [[Metro de Moscva|metro]] de [[Moscva]]. Lo es locada a la [[linia Zamoscvoretscaia]]. Lo ia es abrida 31 desembre 1964. La arcitetores de la stasion es Nicolai Demtxinsci e Iulia Colesnicova. Es situada entre la stasiones [[Vodni stadion]] e [[Belomorscaia]]. La stasion es nomida per la Porton de Rio Norda, cual es situada prosima. == Lias esterna == * [https://mosmetro.ru/ La sito ofisial] [[Category:Metro de Moscva]] t5n8b4v7xpkirscr98fppnwh01wyh7f 0 7839 42607 42601 2026-04-07T16:35:05Z Penarc 4148 42607 wikitext text/x-wiki [[File:Moscow Belomorskaya metro station asv2019-06.jpg|thumb|Stasion Belomorscaia]] '''[[Беломорская|Belomorscaia]]''' es un stasion de la [[Metro de Moscva|metro]] de [[Moscva]]. Lo es locada a la [[linia Zamoscvoretscaia]]. Lo ia es abrida 20 desembre 2018. La arcitetores de la stasion es Nicolai Demtxinsci e Iulia Colesnicova. Es situada entre la stasiones [[Retxnoi voczal]] e [[Hovrino (stasion de metro)|Hovrino]]. La stasion es nomida per la strada Belomorscaia, cual es situada prosima. == Lias esterna == * [https://mosmetro.ru/ La sito ofisial] [[Category:Metro de Moscva]] m5wbn3b7loh75qbj75bl539pbix0wzq 42636 42607 2026-04-08T09:17:36Z Danvintius Bookix 2866 Desfa revisa [[Special:Diff/42607|42607]] par [[Special:Contributions/Penarc|Penarc]] ([[User talk:Penarc|discute]]) 42636 wikitext text/x-wiki [[File:Moscow Belomorskaya metro station asv2019-06.jpg|thumb|Stasion Belomorscaia]] '''Belomorscaia''' es un stasion de la [[Metro de Moscva|metro]] de [[Moscva]]. Lo es locada a la [[linia Zamoscvoretscaia]]. Lo ia es abrida 20 desembre 2018. La arcitetores de la stasion es Nicolai Demtxinsci e Iulia Colesnicova. Es situada entre la stasiones [[Retxnoi voczal]] e [[Hovrino (stasion de metro)|Hovrino]]. La stasion es nomida per la strada Belomorscaia, cual es situada prosima. == Lias esterna == * [https://mosmetro.ru/ La sito ofisial] [[Category:Metro de Moscva]] gsa7sn1tpvyh9doled49gwbzjd8uqkd 0 7841 42627 2026-04-08T09:13:43Z Danvintius Bookix 2866 Danvintius Bookix move la paje [[Vodni stasion de metro]] a [[Vodni stadion]] con redirije 42627 wikitext text/x-wiki #REDIRECT [[Vodni stadion]] 418metqwohydn083uu0cp9ddohtjl89