Chiến tranh Trung-Nhật – Wikipedia tiếng Việt

# Chiến tranh Trung-Nhật

### Bách khoa toàn thư mở Wikipedia

Chiến tranh Trung-Nhật (thừ Nhì)
Bản đồ vùng Nhật Bản chiếm đóng vào năm 1940

Ngày: | 7 tháng 7 1937 - 9 tháng 9 1945
Địa điểm: | Trung Quốc
Kết quả: | Trung Hoa chiến thắng
Biến cố khơi mào: | Sự kiện Lư Câu Kiều
Thay đổi lãnh thổ: | Trung Hoa chiếm lại Mãn Châu, Đài Loan và Pescadores. Mất Mông Cổ

Tham chiến
Trung Hoa Dân Quốc | Đế Quốc Nhật Bản
Chỉ huy

Tưởng Giới Thạch,
Mao Trạch Đông,
Yan Xishan,
Feng Yuxiang,
Zhu De,
He Yingqin

Hideki Tojo,
Matsui Iwane,
Jiro Minami,
Kesago Nakajima,
Toshizo Nishio,
Yasuji Okamura.

Sức mạnh
5,600,000 | 4,100,000 (kể luôn người Hoa theo Nhật)
Thương vong
3,200,000 binh lính, 17,530,000 thường dân | 1,100,000 binh lính

Chiến tranh Trung-Nhật là chiến tranh giữa Trung Quốc và Nhật Bản.

- Lần thứ Nhất (1894 - 1895) xảy ra vì tranh chấp vùng bán đảo Đại Hàn.

- Lần thứ Nhì bắt đầu từ 7 tháng 7 1937 khi quân Nhật Hoàng tiến chiếm bắc Trung Hoa và kết thúc khi Nhật đầu hàng quân đồng minh ngày 9 tháng 9 1945 vào cuối Đệ Nhị Thế Chiến.

## [sửa] Chiến tranh Trung-Nhật lần thứ Nhất

### [sửa] Bối cảnh lịch sử và nguyên nhân

#### [sửa] Trung Hoa

#### [sửa] Nhật Bản

### [sửa] Diễn tiến

### [sửa] Kết thúc

### [sửa] Hậu quả

## [sửa] Chiến tranh Trung-Nhật lần thứ Nhì

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## [sửa] Bối cảnh lịch sử

The origin of the Second Sino-Japanese War can be traced to the First Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, in which China, then under the Qing Dynasty, was defeated by Japan and was forced to cede Taiwan and recognize the independence of Korea in the Treaty of Shimonoseki. The Qing Dynasty was on the eve of collapse from internal revolts and foreign imperialism, while Japan had already emerged as a great power through its effective measures at modernization. The Republic of China was founded in 1912, following the Xinhai Revolution which overthrew the Qing Dynasty. However, the nascent Republic was even weaker than before due to the dominance of warlords. The prospect of unifying the nation and repelling imperialism seemed a remote possibility. Some warlords even aligned themselves with various foreign powers in an effort to wipe each other out. For example, warlord Zhang Zuolin of Manchuria openly cooperated with the Japanese for military and economic assistance. It was during the early period of the Republic that Japan became the greatest foreign threat to China. In 1915 Japan issued the Twenty-One Demands to further its political and commercial interests in China. Following World War I, Japan acquired German sphere of influence in Shandong. China under the Beiyang government remained fragmented and unable to resist foreign incursions until the Northern Expedition of 1926-28, launched by the Kuomintang (KMT, or Chinese Nationalist Party) rival government based in Guangzhou. The Northern Expedition swept through China until it was checked in Shandong, where Beiyang warlord Zhang Zongchang, backed by the Japanese, attempted to stop the Kuomintang Army from unifying China. This situation culminated in the Jinan Incident of 1928 in which the Kuomintang army and the Japanese were engaged in a short conflict. In the same year, Manchurian warlord Zhang Zuolin was also assassinated when he became less willing to cooperate with Japan. Following these incidents, the Kuomintang government under Chiang Kai-shek finally succeeded in unifying China in 1928.

Japanese troops entering Shenyang during Mukden Incident.

Still, numerous conflicts between China and Japan persisted as Chinese nationalism had been on the rise and one of the ultimate goals of the Three People's Principles was to rid China of foreign imperialism. However, the Northern Expedition had only nominally unified China, and civil wars broke out between former warlords and rivalling Kuomintang factions. In addition, the Chinese Communists revolted against the central government. Because of these situations, the Chinese central government diverted much attention into fighting these civil wars and followed a policy of first internal pacification before external resistance. This situation provided an easy opportunity for Japan to further its aggression. In 1931, the Japanese invaded Manchuria right after the Mukden Incident. After five months of fighting, in 1932, the puppet state Manchukuo was established with the last emperor of China, Puyi, installed as its head of state. Unable to challenge Japan directly, China appealed to the League of Nations for help. The League's investigation was published as the Lytton Report, which condemned Japan for its incursion of Manchuria, and led Japan to withdraw from the League of Nations. From the late 1920s and throughout the 1930s, appeasement was the policy of the international community and no country was willing to take an active stance other than a weak censure. Japan saw Manchuria as a limitless supply of raw materials and also as a buffer state against the Soviet Union.

Incessant conflicts followed the Mukden Incident. In 1932, Chinese and Japanese soldiers fought a short war in the January 28 Incident. The war resulted in the demilitarization of Shanghai, which forbade the Chinese from deploying troops in their own city. In Manchukuo there was an ongoing campaign to defeat the volunteer armies that arose from the popular frustration at the policy of nonresistance to the Japanese. In 1933, the Japanese attacked the Great Wall region, and in its wake the Tanggu Truce was signed, which gave Japan the control of Rehe province and a demilitarized zone between the Great Wall and Beiping-Tianjin region. The Japanese aim was to create another buffer region, this time between Manchukuo and the Chinese Nationalist government whose capital was Nanjing.

In addition, Japan increasingly utilized the internal conflicts among the Chinese factions to reduce their strength one by one. This was precipitated by the fact that even some years after the Northern Expedition, the political power of the Nationalist government only extended around the Yangtze River Delta region, and other regions of China were essentially held in the hands of regional powers. Thus, Japan often bought off or created special links with these regional powers to undermine the efforts of the central Nationalist government in bringing greater unity to China. To do this, Japan sought various Chinese traitors for cooperation and helped these men lead some "autonomous" governments that were friendly to Japan. This policy was called the Specialization of North China (chữ Hán: 華北特殊化; bính âm: húaběitèshūhùa), or more commonly known as the North China Autonomous Movement. The northern provinces affected by this policy were Chahar, Suiyuan, Hebei, Shanxi, and Shandong.

In 1935, under Japanese pressure, China signed the He-Umezu Agreement, which forbade the KMT from conducting party operation in Hebei and effectively ended Chinese control of North China. In the same year, the Chin-Doihara Agreement was signed and vacated the KMT from Chahar. Thus, by the end of 1935, the Chinese central government had virtually vacated from North China. In its place, the Japanese-backed East Hebei Autonomous Council and the Hebei-Chahar Political Council were established.

## [sửa] Xâm chiếm Trung Hoa

Chiang Kai-shek announced the KMT's policy of resistance against Japan at Lushan on July 10 1937, three days after the Battle of Lugou Bridge.

Most historians place the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War at the Battle of Lugou Bridge (Marco Polo Bridge Incident) on July 7, 1937. Some Chinese historians, however place the starting point at the Mukden Incident of September 18, 1931. Following the Mukden Incident, the Japanese Kwantung Army occupied Manchuria and established the puppet state of Manchukuo in February 1932. Japan pressured China into recognising the independence of Manchukuo.

Chinese Nationalist defenders during the Battle of Shanghai

Following the Battle of Lugou Bridge in 1937, the Japanese occupied Shanghai, Nanjing and Southern Shanxi in campaigns involving approximately 350,000 Japanese soldiers, and considerably more Chinese soldiers. Historians estimate up to 300,000 people perished in the Nanjing Massacre, after the fall of Nanjing, while some Japanese historians denied the existence of a massacre at all.

The Marco Polo Bridge Incident not only marked the beginning of an open, undeclared, war between China and Japan, but also hastened the formation of the second Kuomintang-Communist Party of China (CCP) Second United Front. The cooperation took place with salutary effects for the beleaguered CCP. The distrust between the two antagonists was scarcely veiled. Their alliance was forged literally at gun point when Chiang Kai-shek was kidnapped in the Xi'an incident and forced to ally with the CCP. The uneasy alliance began breaking down by late 1938, despite Japan's steady territorial gains in northern China, the coastal regions, and the rich Yangtze River Valley in central China. After 1940, conflict between the Nationalists and Communists became more frequent in the areas outside Japanese control, culminating in the New Fourth Army Incident. The Communists expanded their influence wherever opportunities were presented, through mass organizations, administrative reforms, land and tax reform measures favoring peasants, while the Nationalists attempted to neutralize the spread of Communist influence and fight the Japanese at the same time.

The Japanese had neither the intention nor the capability of directly administering China. Their goal was to set up friendly puppet governments favorable to Japanese interests. However, the atrocities of the Japanese army made the governments that were set up very unpopular. In addition, the Japanese refused to negotiate with the Kuomintang or the Communist Party of China, which fuelled anti-Japanese sentiments at Japan's brutality against the Chinese. The Japanese then forced the Chinese people to change their money into military banknotes, which the current Japanese government still refuses to exchange even today.[cần chú thích]

## [sửa] Chiến lược của Trung Hoa

Hình:Chinese soldiers 1939.jpg
Chinese soldiers march to the front in 1939

Unlike Japan, China was unprepared for total war and had little military-industrial strength, no mechanized divisions, and few armored forces. Up until the mid-1930s China had hoped that the League of Nations would provide countermeasures to Japan's aggression. In addition, the Kuomintang government was mired in a civil war against the Communists. Chiang famously was quoted: "the Japanese are a disease of skin, the Communists are a disease of the heart". Though the communists formed the New Fourth Army and the 8th Route Army which were nominally under the command of the National Revolutionary Army, the United Front was never truly unified, as each side was preparing for a showdown with the other once the Japanese were driven out. All these disadvantages forced China to adopt a strategy whose first goal was to preserve its military strength, whereas a full frontal assault on the enemy would often prove to be suicidal. Also, pockets of resistance were to be continued in occupied areas to pester the enemy and make their administration over the vast lands of China difficult. As a result the Japanese really only controlled the cities and railroads, while the countrysides were almost always hotbeds of partisan activity.

However, Chiang realized that in order to win the support from the United States or other foreign nations, China must prove that it was indeed capable of fighting. A fast retreat would discourage foreign aid so Chiang decided to make a stand in the Battle of Shanghai. Chiang sent his German-trained divisions, the best of his troops, to defend China's largest and most industrialized city from the Japanese. The battle saw heavy casualties on both sides and ended with a Chinese retreat towards Nanjing. While the battle was a military defeat for the Chinese, it proved that China would not be defeated easily and showed China's determination to the world. The battle lasted over three months and proved to be an enormous morale booster for the Chinese people as it ended the Japanese taunt of conquering Shanghai in three days and China in three months.

Chinese soldiers in house-to-house fighting in Battle of Tai'erzhuang

While this direct army to army fighting lasted during the early phases of the war, large numbers of Chinese defeats compared to few victories eventually led to the strategy of stalling the war. Large areas of China were conquered during the early stages of the war but the Japanese advancements began to stall in mid-1938. The Chinese strategy at this point was to prolong the war until it had sufficient strength to defeat the Japanese. Chinese troops sometimes engaged in a practice of scorched earth in an attempt to slow down the Japanese. Dams and levees were sabotaged which led to the 1938 Huang He flood. In addition, industry was transported from coastal industrialized areas to inland cities such as Chongqing. By 1940, the war had reached a stalemate with both sides making minimal gains. The Chinese had successfully defended their land from oncoming Japanese on several occasions while strong resistance in areas occupied by the Japanese made a victory seem impossible to the Japanese. This frustrated the Japanese and led them to employ the "Three Alls Policy" (kill all, loot all, burn all) (三光政策, Hanyu Pinyin: Sānguāng Zhèngcè, Japanese On: Sankō Seisaku). It was during this time period that a bulk of Japanese atrocities were committed.

On December 7, 1941, the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, which brought the United States into the war. China officially declared war on Japan on 8 December. It refused to declare war earlier because receiving military aid while officially at war would break the neutrality of the donor nation. At this point, the priority changed from survival to victory. Enriched with foreign aid, China's army, now better trained and equipped, began taking the fight to the enemy. Chinese forces took part in the Burma Campaign to liberate Burma from the Japanese. By 1945 China was making significant progress, liberating large areas conquered by Japan during Operation Ichigo. Operations BETA and CARBONADO, were joint Chinese-American plans to liberate the entire Chinese mainland, starting with a push into Guandong and then north to Shanghai. But the dropping of the atomic bombs and the Soviet entry into the war, Operation August Storm, ended the war faster than anyone had expected.

The basis of Chinese strategy during the war, which can be divided into three periods:

1. First Period: 7 July 1937 (Battle of Lugou Bridge) - 25 October 1938 (Fall of Hankou). In this period, one key concept is the trading of "space for time" (Chinese: 以空間換取時間). The Chinese army would put up fights to delay Japanese advance to northeastern cities, to allow the home front, along with its professionals and key industries, to retreat west into Chongqing to build up military strength.
2. Second Period: 25 October 1938 (Fall of Hankou) - July, 1944. During the second period, the Chinese army adopted the concept of "magnetic warfare" to attract advancing Japanese troops to definite points where they were subjected to ambush, flanking attacks, and encirclements in major engagements. The most prominent example of this tactic is the successful defense of Changsha numerous times.
3. Third Period: July 1944 - 15 August 1945. This period employs general full frontal counter-offensives.

## [sửa] Các lực lượng quân sự

### [sửa] Quân đội Cách Mạng Quốc Gia

  Main article: National Revolutionary Army

Flag of the National Revolutionary Army

The National Revolutionary Army (NRA) throughout its lifespan employed approximately 4,300,000 regulars, in 370 Standard Divisions (正式師), 46 New Divisions (新編師), 12 Cavalry Divisions (騎兵師), 8 New Cavalry Divisions (新編騎兵師), 66 Temporary Divisions (暫編師), and 13 Reserve Divisions (預備師), for a grand total of 515 divisions. However, many divisions were formed from 2 or more other divisions, and many were not active at the same time. Therefore the number of divisions in active service at any given time is much smaller than this. At the start of the war in 1937, there were about 170 NRA divisions. The average NRA division had 4,000-5,000 troops. A Chinese army is roughly the equivalent to a Japanese division in terms of manpower. In addition, the Chinese army was severely understrength due to a general lack of artillery, heavy weapons, and motorized transport. The shortage of military hardware meant that three to four Chinese divisions had the firepower of only one Japanese division. Because of these material constraints, available artillery and heavy weapons were usually assigned to specialist brigades rather than to the general division, which caused more problems as the Chinese command structure lacked precise coordination. The fighting strength of a Chinese division was further reduced with other aspects of warfare, such as intelligence, logistics, communications, and medical services, taken into account.

The National Revolutionary Army can be divided roughly into two groups. The first one is the so-called dixi (嫡系, "direct descent") group, which was comprised of divisions trained by the Whampoa military academy and loyal to Chiang Kai-shek, and can be considered the Central Army (中央軍) of the NRA. The second group is known as the zapai (雜牌, "miscellaneous units"), and was comprised of all divisions led by non-Whampoa commanders, and is more often known as the Regional Army or the Provincial Army (省軍). Even though both military groups were part of the National Revolutionary Army, their distinction lies much in their allegiance to the central government of Chiang Kai-shek. Many former warlords and regional militarists were incorporated into the NRA under the flag of the Kuomintang, but in reality they retained much independence from the central government. They also controlled much of the military strength of China, the most notable of them being the Guangxi, Shanxi, Yunnan and Ma Cliques.

  Main article: Chinese Red Army

Although during the war the Chinese Communist forces fought as a nominal part of the NRA, the number of those on the CCP side, due to their guerrilla status, is difficult to determine, though estimates place the total number of the Eighth Route Army, New Fourth Army, and irregulars in the Communist armies at 1,300,000.

For more information of combat effectiveness of communist armies and other units of Chinese forces see Chinese armies in the Second Sino-Japanese War.

### [sửa] Lục Quân Đế Quốc Nhật Bản

  Main article: Imperial Japanese Army

Flag of the Imperial Japanese Army

- The IJA had approximately 2,000,000 regulars. More Japanese troops were quartered in China than deployed elsewhere in the Pacific Theater during the war. Japanese divisions ranged from 20,000 men in its divisions numbered less than 100, to 10,000 men in divisions numbered greater than 100. At the time of the Pearl Harbor attack, the IJA had 51 divisions of which 35 were in China, and 39 independent brigades of which all but one were in China. This represented roughly 80% of the IJA's manpower.
- The Collaborationist Chinese Army in 1938 had 78,000 people, and grew to 145,000 in 1940. Their growth was explosive around 1942-43, and according to KMT estimates 1,186,000 people were involved in the collaborationist army by the war's end. However, 2 million is also a figure often-quoted, which would make China the only country in World War II with a collaborationist army which outnumbered the invading army. At their height they fielded a maximum of 900,000 troops. Almost all of them belonged to the regional puppet governments such as Manchukuo, Provisional Government of the Republic of China (Beijing), Reformed Government of the Republic of China (Nanjing) and the later collaborationist Nanjing Nationalist Government or Wang Jingwei regime. The puppet and collaborationist troops were mainly assigned to garrison and logistics duties in areas held by the puppet governments and in occupied territories. They were rarely fielded in combat because of low morale and distrust by the Japanese, and fared poorly in skirmishes against real Chinese forces, whether the KMT or the CCP.

## [sửa] Vũ khí

### [sửa] Trung Quốc

The National Revolutionary Army standing at attention during an inspection by German officers during Second Sino-Japanese War.

The Central Army possessed 80 Army infantry divisions with approximately 8,000 men each, nine independent brigades, nine cavalry divisions, two artillery brigades, 16 artillery regiments and three armored battalions. The Chinese Navy displaced only 59,000 tonnes and the Chinese Air Force comprised only 600 aircraft.

Chinese weapons were mainly produced in the Hanyang and Guangdong arsenals. However, for most of the German-trained divisions, the standard firearms were German-made 7.92 mm Gewehr 98 and Karabiner 98k. The 98 style rifles were often called the "Chiang Kai-shek" rifles. The standard light machine gun was a local copy of the Czech 7.92 mm Brno ZB26. There were also Belgian and French LMGs. Surprisingly, the NRA did not purchase any of the infamous Maschinengewehr 34s from Germany, but did produce their own copies of them. On average in these divisions, there was 1 machine gun set for each platoon. Heavy machine guns were mainly locally-made 1924 water-cooled Maxim guns, from German blueprints. On average every battalion would get one heavy machine gun (about half of what actual German divisions got during the war). The standard sidearm was the 7.63 mm Mauser M1932 semi-automatic pistol, also known as C96.

Some divisions were equipped with 37mm PaK 35/36 anti-tank guns, and/or mortars from Oerlikon, Madsen, and Solothurn. Each infantry division had 6 French Brandt 81 mm mortars and 6 Solothurn 20mm autocannons. Some independent brigades and artillery regiments were equipped with Bofors 72mm L/14, or Krupp 72mm L/29 mountain guns. They were 24 Rheinmetall 150mm L/32 sFH 18 howitzers (bought in 1934) and 24 Rheinmetall 150mm L/30 sFH 18 howitzers (bought in 1936).

Infantry uniforms were basically redesigned Zhongshan suits. Leg wrappings are standard for soldiers and officers alike since the primary mode of movement for NRA troops was by foot. The helmets were the most distinguishing characteristic of these divisions. From the moment German M35 helmets (standard issue for the Wehrmacht until late in the European theatre) rolled off the production lines in 1935, and until 1936, the NRA imported 315,000 of these helmets, each with the 12-ray sun emblem of the ROC on the sides. Other equipment included cloth shoes for soldiers, leather shoes for officers and leather boots for high-ranking officers. Every soldier was issued ammunition, ammunition pouch/harness, a water flask, combat knives, food bag, and a gas mask.

On the other hand, warlord forces varied greatly in terms of equipment and training. Some warlord troops were notoriously under-equipped, such as Shanxi's Dadao Teams and the Yunnanese army. Some however were highly professional forces with their own air force and navies. The quality of Guangxi's army was almost on par with the Central Army's, as the Guangzhou region was wealthy and the local army could afford foreign instructors and arms. The Muslim Ma Clique to the Northwest was famed for its well-trained cavalry divisions.

### [sửa] Nhật Bản

Although Imperial Japan possessed significant mobile operational capacity, it did not possess capability for maintaining a long sustained war. At the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War the Japanese Army comprised 17 divisions, each composed of approximately 22,000 men, 5,800 horses, 9,500 rifles and submachine guns, 600 heavy machine guns of assorted types, 108 artillery pieces, and 24 tanks. Special forces were also available. The Japanese Navy displaced a total of 1,900,000 tonnes, ranking third in the world, and possessed 2,700 aircraft at the time. Each Japanese division was the equivalent in fighting strength of four Chinese regular divisions (at the beginning of Battle of Shanghai (1937)).

Xem thêm:

- List of Japanese infantry weapons used in the Second-Sino Japanese War
- List of armour used by the Imperial Japanese Army in the Second Sino-Japanese War
- List of Japanese aircraft in use during the Second Sino-Japanese War

## [sửa] Bất phân thắng bại và Ngọai viện

By 1940, the fighting had reached a stalemate. While Japan held most of the eastern coastal areas of China, guerrilla fighting continued in the conquered areas. The Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek struggled on from a provisional capital at the city of Chongqing; however, realizing that he also faced a threat from communist forces of Mao Zedong, he mostly tried to preserve the remaining strength of his army and avoid heavy battle with the Japanese in the hopes of defeating the Communists once the Japanese left. China, with its low industrial capacities and limited experience in modern warfare, could not launch any decisive counter-offensive against Japan. Chiang could not risk an all-out campaign given the poorly-trained, under-equipped, and disorganized state of his armies and opposition to his leadership both within Kuomintang and in China at large. He had lost a substantial portion of his best trained and equipped army defending Shanghai and the remaining troops were used to preserve his army. On the other hand, Japan had suffered tremendous casualties from unexpectedly stubborn resistance from China and already developed problems in administering and garrisoning fallen territories. Neither side could make any swift progress in a manner resembling the fall of France and Western Europe to Nazi Germany.

Most military analysts predicted that the Kuomintang could not continue fighting with most of the war factories located in the prosperous areas under or near Japanese control. Other global powers were reluctant to provide any support — unless supporting an ulterior motive — because in their opinion the Chinese would eventually lose the war, and did not wish to antagonize the Japanese who might, in turn, eye their colonial possessions in the region. They expected any support given to Kuomintang might worsen their own relationship with the Japanese, who taunted the Kuomintang with the prospect of conquest within 3 months.

Germany and the Soviet Union did provide support to the Chinese before the war escalated to the Asian theatre of World War II. The Soviet Union was helping the Kuomintang government to hinder the Japanese from invading Siberia, thus saving itself from a two front war. In September 1937 the Soviet leadership signed Sino-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact and approved Operation Zet. As part of the secret operation Soviet technicians upgraded and handled some of the Chinese war-supply transport. Bombers, fighters, military supplies and advisors arrived, including future Soviet war hero Georgy Zhukov, who won the Battle of Halhin Gol. It also supported the Communists, at least until war with Germany forced her into conserving everything for her own forces.

Because of Chiang Kai-shek's anti-communist nationalist policies and hopes of defeating the CCP, Germany provided the largest proportion of Kuomintang arms imports. German military advisors modernized and trained the Kuomintang armies; Kuomintang officers (including Chiang's second son, Chiang Wei-kuo) were educated in and served in the German army prior to World War II. More than half of the German arms exports during its rearmament period were to China. Nevertheless the proposed 30 new divisions equipped with all German arms did not materialize as the Germans sided with the Japanese later in World War II.

Other prominent powers, including the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and France, only officially assisted in war supply contracts up to the attack on Pearl Harbor in late 1941, when a significant influx of trained military personnel and supplies boosted the Kuomintang chance of maintaining the fight.

Unofficially, public opinion in the United States was becoming favorable to the Kuomintang. At the start of the 1930s, public opinion in the United States had tended to support the Japanese. However, reports of Japanese brutality added to Japanese actions such as the attack on the U.S.S. Panay (the Panay incident) swung public opinion sharply against Japan. By the summer of 1941, the United States had begun to sponsor the American Volunteer Group (later known as the Flying Tigers) to boost Chinese air defenses, though the AVG did not in fact go into combat until after the U.S. and Japan were at war. In addition, the United States began an oil and steel embargo which made it impossible for Japan to continue operations in China without another source of oil from Southeast Asia. This set the stage for the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 (8 December west of the 180th meridian).

## [sửa] Chiến tranh Thái Bình Dương

Within a few days of the attack on Pearl Harbor, both the United States and China officially declared war against Japan. Chiang Kai-shek continued to receive supplies from the United States, as the Chinese conflict was merged into the Asian theatre of World War II. However, in contrast to the arctic supply route to the Soviet Union that stayed open most of the war, sea routes to China had long been closed, so between the closing of the Burma Road in 1942 and its re-opening as the Ledo Road in 1945, foreign aid was largely limited to what could be flown in over The Hump. Most of China's own industry had already been captured or destroyed by Japan, and the Soviet Union could spare little from the Eastern Front. So neither Chinese government ever had the supplies and equipment needed to mount a major offensive.

Chiang was appointed Allied Commander-in-Chief in the China theater in 1942. General Joseph Stilwell served for a time as Chiang's Chief of Staff, while commanding US forces in the China Burma India Theater. However, relations between Stilwell and Chiang soon broke down, due largely to the corruption and inefficiency of the Chinese government. Stilwell criticised the Chinese government's conduct of the war in the American media, and to President Franklin Roosevelt. Stilwell also wished to assume the supreme command of all Chinese troops, which Chiang vehemently opposed. Chiang was hesitant to deploy more Chinese troops because China already suffered tens of millions of war casualties, and believed that Japan would eventually capitulate to America's overwhelming industrial output and manpower. The Allies thus lost confidence in the Chinese ability to conduct offensive operations from the Asian mainland, and instead concentrated their efforts against the Japanese in the Pacific Ocean Areas and South West Pacific Area, employing an island hopping strategy. Conflicts among China, the United States, and the United Kingdom also emerged in the Pacific war. Winston Churchill was reluctant to devote British troops, the majority of whom were defeated by the Japanese in earlier campaigns, to reopen the Burma Road. On the other hand, Stilwell believed that the reopening of the Burma Road was vital to China as all the ports on mainland China were under Japanese control. Chiang and his associates also distrusted the intentions of the United Kingdom. Churchill's "Europe First" policy obviously did not sit well with Chiang. Furthermore, the later British insistence that China send in more and more troops into Indochina in the Burma Campaign, was regarded as an attempt by Great Britain to use Chinese manpower to secure Britain's colonial holdings in Southeast Asia and the gate to India from falling to Japan. Chiang also believed that China should divert its troops to eastern China to defend the airbases of the American bombers, a strategy that Claire Chennault supported. In addition, Chiang voiced his support of Indian Independence in a meeting with Mahatma Gandhi in 1942, which further soured the relationship between China and the United Kingdom.

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Winston Churchill met at the Cairo Conference in 1943 during World War II.

The United States saw the Chinese theater as a means to tie up a large number of Japanese troops, as well as being a possible location for American airbases. In 1944, as the Japanese position in the Pacific was deteriorating fast, they launched Operation Ichigo to attack the airbases which had begun to operate. This brought the Hunan, Henan, and Guangxi provinces under Japanese administration.

Nevertheless the Japanese prospect of transferring their troops to fight the Americans was in vain and they only committed the Guandong Army from Manchuria in their "Sho plan", which later facilitated the Soviet advancement after the Soviet war declaration on August 8 1945.

## [sửa] Tổn thất

Shanghai 1937: One of the earlier images of the war to come out from China, this iconic photo appeared in LIFE magazine

The conflict lasted for 97 months and 3 days (measured from 1937 to 1945).

### [sửa] Trung Quốc

- The Kuomintang fought in 22 major engagements, most of which involved more than 100,000 troops on both sides, 1,171 minor engagements most of which involved more than 50,000 troops on both sides, and 38,931 skirmishes.
- The Chinese lost approximately 3.22 million soldiers. 9.13 million civilians died in the crossfire, and another 8.4 million as non-military casualties. Some Chinese historians claimed the total military and non-military deaths of the Chinese were at most 35 million. Most Western historians believed that the casualties were at least 20 million.
- Property loss of the Chinese valued up to 383,301.3 million US dollars according to the currency exchange rate in July 1937, roughly 50 times of the GDP of Japan at that time (7,700 million US dollars). [cần chú thích]
- In addition, the war created 95 million refugees.

### [sửa] Nhật Bản

The Japanese recorded around 1.1 million military casualties, killed, wounded and missing. There were a lot of various claims about the Japanese casualties. The official death-toll according to the Japan defense ministry was only about 200 thousand. But this is believed to be highly unlikely-- the number is far too small. The Chinese (both the communists and nationalists) claimed to have at most killed 1.77 million of Japanese soldiers during the 8-year-war but it would be an exaggeration.

## [sửa] Hậu quả

Hình:Japanesesurrenderoilpainting.jpg
The Empire of Japan surrenders to China on 9 September 1945.
Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong met in the wartime capital of Chongqing, to toast to the Chinese victory over Empire of Japan.

As of mid 1945, all sides expected the war to continue for at least another year. On 8 August the Soviets launched Operation August Storm. The Soviet Union, having renounced its nonaggression pact with Japan, attacked the Japanese in Manchuria, fulfilling its Yalta pledge to attack the Japanese within three months after the end of the war in Europe. The attack was made by three Soviet army groups. In less than two weeks the Japanese army in Manchuria consisting of over a million men had been destroyed by the Soviets. And after the dropping of the two atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Japan capitulated to the allies on August 15, 1945. The Japanese troops in China formally surrendered on September 9, 1945 and by the provisions of the Cairo Conference of 1943 the lands of Manchuria, Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands reverted to China. However, the Ryukyu islands were maintained as Japanese territory.

The Chinese return to Liuchow in July 1945

In 1945 China emerged from the war nominally a great military power but actually a nation economically prostrate and on the verge of all-out civil war. The economy deteriorated, sapped by the military demands of foreign war and internal strife, by spiraling inflation, and by Nationalist profiteering, speculation, and hoarding. Starvation came in the wake of the war, and millions were rendered homeless by floods and the unsettled conditions in many parts of the country. The situation was further complicated by an Allied agreement at the Yalta Conference in February 1945 that brought Soviet troops into Manchuria to hasten the termination of war against Japan (Operation August Storm). Although the Chinese had not been present at Yalta, they had been consulted; they had agreed to have the Soviets enter the war in the belief that the Soviet Union would deal only with the Nationalist government. After the war, the Soviet Union, as part of the Yalta agreement's allowing a Soviet sphere of influence in Manchuria, dismantled and removed more than half the industrial equipment left there by the Japanese. The Soviet presence in northeast China enabled the Communists to move in long enough to arm themselves with the equipment surrendered by the withdrawing Japanese army. The problems of rehabilitating the formerly Japanese-occupied areas and of reconstructing the nation from the ravages of a protracted war were staggering, to say the least.

Japanese Instrument of Surrender

The war left the Nationalists severely weakened and their policies left them unpopular. Meanwhile the war strengthened the Communists, both in popularity and as a viable fighting force. At Yan'an and elsewhere in the "liberated areas," Mao was able to adapt Marxism-Leninism to Chinese conditions. He taught party cadres to lead the masses by living and working with them, eating their food, and thinking their thoughts. When this failed, however, more repressive forms of coercion, indoctrination and ostracization were also employed. The Red Army fostered an image of conducting guerrilla warfare in defense of the people. In addition, the CCP was effectively split into "Red" (cadres working in the "liberated" areas) and "White" (cadres working underground in enemy-occupied territory) spheres, a split that would later sow future factionalism within the CCP. Communist troops adapted to changing wartime conditions and became a seasoned fighting force. Mao also began preparing for the establishment of a new China, well away from the front at his base in Yan'an. In 1940 he outlined the program of the Chinese Communists for an eventual seizure of power and began his final push for consolidation of CCP power under his authority. His teachings became the central tenets of the CCP doctrine that came to be formalized as "Mao Zedong Thought". With skillful organizational and propaganda work, the Communists increased party membership from 100,000 in 1937 to 1.2 million by 1945. Soon, all out war broke out between the KMT and CCP, a war that would leave the Nationalists banished to Taiwan and the Communists victorious on the mainland.

## [sửa] Ảnh hưởng về sau

China War of Resistance Against Japan Memorial Museum on the site where Marco Polo Bridge Incident took place.

To this day the war is a major point of contention between China and Japan. The war remains a major roadblock for Sino-Japanese relations today, and many people, particularly in China, harbour grudges over the war and related issues. A small but vocal group of Japanese nationalists and/or right-wingers deny a variety of crimes attributed to Japan. The Japanese invasion of its neighbours is often glorified or whitewashed, and wartime atrocities, most notably the Nanjing Massacre, comfort women, and Unit 731, are frequently denied by such individuals. The Japanese government has also been accused of historical revisionism by allowing the approval of school textbooks omitting or glossing over Japan's militant past. In response to criticism of Japanese textbook revisionism, the PRC government has been accused of using the war to stir up already growing anti-Japanese feelings in order to whip up nationalistic sentiments and divert its citizens' minds from internal matters.

The PRC government has also been accused of greatly exaggerating the CCP's role in fighting the Japanese. The PRC has traditionally emphasized the role of communist guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines and claimed that the KMT refused to fight the Japanese. Such viewpoint is often challenged by contemporary generals and historians. One such notable critic is General Hau Pei-tsun, who refused to attend a joint celebration in China marking the sixtieth anniversary of the end of war in 2005, claiming that the PRC continues to distort history. In reality, the KMT army, including Chiang Kai-shek's central army and other non-Whampoa provincial armies, carried the brunt of combat during the war. The KMT army suffered some 3.2 million casualties while the CCP increased its military strength from practically nothing to 1.7 million men. In addition, many surviving KMT officers and soldiers, who were not able to evacuate to Taiwan following the Chinese Civil War, were also persecuted by the communist government and sent to labor camps for having served under Chiang Kai-shek's command. Their descendants and relatives also faced hardships as they were categorized as "counter-revolutionaries" during the Cultural Revolution.

The legacy of the war is more complicated in the Republic of China on Taiwan. Traditionally, the government has held celebrations marking the Victory Day on September 9 (now known as Armed Forces Day), and Taiwan's Retrocession Day on October 25. However, with the power transfer from KMT to the more pro-Taiwanese independence pan-green coalition and the rise of desinicization, events commemorating the war have become less commonplace. Many supporters of Taiwanese independence see no relevance in preserving the memory of the war of resistance that happened primarily on mainland China. Still, commemorations are held in regions where politics is dominated by the pan-blue coalition. Many pan-blue supporters, particularly veterans who retreated with the government in 1949, still have an emotional interest in the war. For example, in celebrating the sixtieth anniversary of the end of war in 2005, the cultural bureau of pan-blue stronghold Taipei held a series of talks in the Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall regarding the war and post-war developments, while the KMT held its own exhibit in the KMT headquarters.

## [sửa] Lực lượng Trung Hoa nào thực sự đánh Nhật?

The question as to which political group directed the Chinese war effort and exerted most of the effort to resist the Japanese still remains a controversial issue.

In the Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japan Memorial near the Marco Polo Bridge and in mainland Chinese textbooks, the People's Republic of China claims that it was the Communist Party that directed Chinese efforts in the war and did everything to resist the Japanese invasion. Recently, however, with a change in the political climate, the CCP has admitted that certain Nationalist generals made important contributions in resisting the Japanese. The official history in mainland China is that the KMT fought a bloody, yet indecisive, frontal war against Japan, while it was the CCP that engaged the Japanese forces in far greater numbers behind enemy lines. This emphasis on the CCP's central role is partially reflected by the PRC's labeling of the war as the Chinese People's Anti-Japanese War of Resistance rather than merely the War of Resistance. According to the PRC official point of view, the Nationalists mostly avoided fighting the Japanese in order to preserve its strength for a final showdown with the Communists. However, for the sake of Chinese reunification and appeasing the ROC on Taiwan, the PRC has now "acknowledged" that the Nationalists and the Communists were "equal" contributors because the victory over Japan belonged to the Chinese people, rather than to any political party.

Leaving aside Nationalists sources, scholars researching third party Japanese and Soviet sources have documented quite a different view. Such studies claim that the Communists actually played a miniscule involvement in the war against the Japanese compared to the Nationalists and used guerilla warfare as well as opium sales to preserve its strength for a final showdown with the Kuomintang.[1] This is congruent with the Nationalist viewpoint, as demonstrated by history textbooks published in Taiwan, which gives the KMT credit for the brunt of the fighting. According to these third-party scholars, the Communists were not the main participants in any of the 22 major battles, most involving more than 100,000 troops on both sides, between China and Japan. Soviet liaison to the Chinese Communists Peter Vladimirov documented that he never once found the Chinese Communists and Japanese engaged in battle during the period from 1942 to 1945. He also expressed frustration at not being allowed by the Chinese Communists to visit the frontline,[2] although as a foreign diplomat Vladimirov may have been overly optimistic to expect to be allowed to join Chinese guerrilla sorties. The Communists usually avoided open warfare (the Hundred Regiments Campaign and the Battle of Pingxingguan are notable exceptions), preferring to fight in small squads to harass the Japanese supply lines. In comparison, right from the beginning of the war the Nationalists committed their best troops (including the 36th, 83rd, 88th divisions, the crack divisions of Chiang's Central Army) to defend Shanghai from the Japanese, a third of whom were killed or wounded. The Japanese considered the Kuomintang rather than the Communists as their main enemy[3] and bombed the Nationalist wartime capital of Chongqing to the point that it was the most heavily bombed city in the world to date.[4] Also, the main bulk of Japanese forces were fighting mainly in Central and Southern China, away from major Communist strongholds such as those in Shaanxi.

A third perspective advocated by some historians is that the former warlords actually did most of the fighting with the Japanese, considering that a large part the National Revolutionary Army was actually composed of troops from different factions. Chiang Kai-shek's Central Army sustained heavy casualties in the beginning of the war in Shanghai-Nanjing campaigns and his military strength was never to recover to pre-war levels. This situation forced Chiang to rely on other divisions of the National Revolutionary Army. These non-Whampoa divisions, also known as the "provincial army," were nominally part of the National Revolutionary Army but in reality had their own command structures. Some major engagements after the initial 1937 campaigns, such as Battle of Xuzhou and the Battle of Changsha were fought by former warlords under the banner of the Kuomintang.

## [sửa] Tham khảo

- Chang, Flora and Ming, Chu-cheng. (July 12 2005). Rewriters of history ignore truth. Taipei Times, pg. 8.
- Gordon, David M. "The China-Japan War, 1931-1945" Journal of Military History (Jan 2006) v 70#1, pp 137-82. Historiographical overview of major books
- Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, Mao: The Unknown Story (London, 2005); Jonathan Cape, ISBN 0-679-42271-4
- Annalee Jacoby and Theodore H. White, Thunder out of China, New York: William Sloane Associates, 1946

## [sửa] Nhân vật nổi bật

Trung Hoa Dân Quốc

- Bai Chongxi (白崇禧)
- Chen Cheng (陳誠,陈诚)
- Chiang Kai-Shek (蔣介石,蒋介石)
- Du Yuming (杜聿明)
- Fang Xianjue (方先覺,方先觉)
- Feng Yuxiang (馮玉祥,冯玉祥)
- Gu Zhutong (顧祝同,顾祝同)
- He Yingqin (何應欽,何应钦)
- H. H. Kung (孔祥熙)
- Hu Zongnan (胡宗南)
- Li Zongren (李宗仁)
- Long Yun (龍雲,龙云)
- Song Zheyuan (宋哲元)
- Soong May-ling (宋美齡,宋美龄)
- T. V. Soong (宋子文)
- Sun Lianzhong (孫連仲,孙连仲)
- Sun Liren (孫立人,孙立人)
- Tang Enbai (湯恩伯,汤恩伯)
- Tang Shengzhi (唐生智)
- Wang Jingwei (汪精衛,汪精卫)
- Wei Lihuang (衛立煌,卫立煌)
- Xue Yue (薛岳)
- Yan Xishan (閻錫山,阎锡山)
- Xie Jinyuan (謝晉元,谢晋元)
- Ye Ting (叶挺)
- Zhang Zhizhong (張治中,张治中)
- Zhang Zizhong (張自忠,张自忠)

Trung Hoa Cộng Sản

- Chen Yi (陳毅,陈毅)
- Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平,邓小平)
- He Long (賀龍,贺龙)
- Lin Biao (林彪)
- Liu Bocheng (劉伯承,刘伯承)
- Liu Shaoqi (劉少奇,刘少奇)
- Luo Ronghuan (羅榮桓,罗荣桓)
- Mao Zedong (毛澤東,毛泽东)
- Nie Rongzhen (聶榮臻,聂荣臻)
- Peng Dehuai (彭德懷,彭德怀)
- Su Yu (粟裕)
- Xu Xiangqian (徐向前)
- Ye Jianying (葉劍英,叶剑英)
- Zhang Aiping (张爱萍)
- Zhou Enlai (周恩來,周恩来)
- Zhu De (朱德)

Đế Quốc Nhật Bản

- Emperor Shôwa Hirohito
- Anami Korechika (阿南 惟幾)
- Abe Nobuyuki (阿部 信行)
- Prince Asaka Yasuhiko
- Prince Chichibu Yasuhito
- Doihara Kenji (土肥原 賢二)
- Prince Fushimi Hiroyasu
- Hashimoto Kingoro (橋本 欣五郎)
- Hata Shunroku (畑 俊六)
- Prince Higashikuni Naruhiko
- Honma Masaharu (本間 雅晴)
- Isogai Rensuke (磯谷 廉介)
- Ishii Shiro
- Itagaki Seishiro (板垣 征四郎)
- Prince Kan'in Kotohito
- Konoe Fumimaro (Kyūjitai:近衞 文麿,Shinjitai:近衛 文麿)
- Kanji Ishiwara (石原 莞爾)
- Koiso Kuniaki (小磯 國昭,小磯 国昭)
- Matsui Iwane (松井 石根)
- Nakajima Kesago (中島 今朝吾)
- Nagumo Chuichi (南雲 忠一)
- Nagano Osami
- Nishio Toshizo (西尾 壽造,西尾 寿造)
- Nomura Kichisaburo (野村 吉三郎)
- Mutaguchi Renya (牟田口 廉也）
- Sakai Takashi (酒井 隆)
- Sugiyama Hajime (杉山 元)
- Shimada Shigetaro
- Suzuki Kantaro (鈴木 貫太郎)
- Prince Takeda Tsuneyochi
- Terauchi Hisaichi (寺内 壽一,寺内 寿一)
- Tojo Hideki (東條 英機,東条 英機)
- Umezu Yoshijiro (梅津 美治郎)
- Yamaguchi Tamon (山口 多聞)
- Yamamoto Isoroku (山本 五十六)
- Yamashita Tomoyuki (山下 奉文)
- Okamura Yasuji (岡村 寧次)

Những nơi khác

- Agnes Smedley
- Norman Bethune
- Claire Chennault
- Alexander von Falkenhausen
- John Rabe
- Joseph Stilwell
- Albert Coady Wedemeyer

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